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Abstract 
 
Many of the existing commentaries on enormous, interconnected, 
dynamic datasets, or Big Data, as they have become commonly known, 
have highlighted their technical qualities. It has for example been argued 
that what separates Big Data from previous forms of data are the so 
called 3Vs; Volume, Variety and Velocity. In contrast, based on a 
historical, conceptual and empirical analysis, I suggest that what is novel 
about Big Data is not just its technical composition, but more importantly 
the changing jurisdictions between the producers of data that its 
emergence entails. Its technical composition, I argue, is predicated upon 
how its production is organised. 
 
I suggest that historically, statistics have emerged out of a co-constitutive 
interaction between methodological and technological developments 
and changes in the political and administrative world (Desrosières 1998). 
Further to this, I suggest that the production of data on which statistics 
have relied has often been monopolised by dominant institutions. By 
situating Big Data in the context of political economy, I argue that its 
emergence reflects broader processes of neoliberalisation that have 
swept over western polities in the past few decades, notably in the sense 
that it primarily accumulates in the private, rather than the public sector.  
 
By exploring responses to Big Data within National Statistical Institutes, 
I suggest that it signals not just an increasing privatisation of data 
production and related infrastructures, but also an increasing pressure 
to adopt neoliberal rationalities and values in the public sector. I suggest 
that at Statistics Finland, where my fieldwork was based, these 
processes are potentially undermining the social welfarist principles 
upon which the production of official statistics has for long been based. 
I argue that the social organisation of Big Data must be rethought based 
on Social Democratic principles and political imaginations and that the 
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question about the future role of the NSI must form a central component 
of such considerations. 
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“Knowledge is power; statistics is democracy” - Olavi Niitamo, former 
Director General of Statistics Finland 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Empirical sociology has often been placed somewhere between science 
and literature (Lepenies, 1988) and sociologists have throughout the 
history of their discipline had to ask themselves whether their accounts 
of social change have been able to compete with those given usually in 
a more timely manner by fiction writers (Halsey, 2004). I therefore begin 
with an anecdote from a recent science fiction novel. When one of the 
main protagonists in Dave Eggar’s novel The Circle (2014) suggests that 
the government might build an online voting system by itself, the other 
employees at a fictional internet conglomerate, whose social media 
platform is by this point used by 83 % of the American electorate, burst 
out in laughter. In the dystopian near future depicted in the novel, 
therefore, processes of privatisation and neoliberalisation (an ideology 
that posits that all aspects of society should be organised according to 
market principles) have gone so far that people simply cannot any longer 
imagine a role for the state in constructing and maintaining the 
infrastructure upon which a highly technical society functions. 
 
In this thesis, I explore how the emergence of enormous, interconnected, 
dynamic datasets – or Big Data, as they have become commonly known, 
is being interpreted by governments, or more specifically, their statistical 
agencies. In Official Statistics, Big Data1 is typically defined by referring 
                                            
1 Rather than settling on a technical definition, I understand Big Data as an emerging 
field of practices “that is not defined by but generative of (sometimes) novel data 
qualities such as high volume and granularity and complex analytics such as data 
linking and mining” (Big Data & Society, 2018). I use capitalisation throughout to denote 
that rather than simply a descriptor of types of data, Big Data is as a concept whose 
meaning is unsettled and a matter of debate and struggle across numerous fields and 
settings, of which official statistics is one. I will expand on this theme in chapter four. 
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to the 3Vs of Volume, Variety and Velocity, which are seen to 
characterise new data sources such as mobile positioning data, 
customer club card data, traffic sensor data, electricity meter data and 
social media data (See for example, UNECE, 2013, 2014b, 2016a). For 
almost four centuries, states maintained an effective monopoly on data 
concerning their whole populations, economies and territories. While 
private corporations also generated data about individuals especially 
over the last century or so through opinion polling and marketing 
research and the production of vast archives of customer data, this was 
limited to more narrow concerns and specific population groups. 
However, National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) are now rethinking how 
they produce data and statistics as a result of the production and 
accumulation of Big Data by private corporations, especially major 
technology providers that potentially have command over more granular, 
immediate, varied and detailed data about populations beyond that of 
any state. What this means for how NSIs conceive of their future role 
and the very conditions of the production of knowledge of societies is a 
key question I explore. 
 
In this study, I move beyond proclamations about the revolutionary 
potentials of Big Data (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013) to first 
undertake a historical review and then empirical exploration of how Big 
Data is changing and challenging conceptions of data production within  
a specific domain, that of official statistics. My empirical work focuses on 
the National Statistical Institute of Finland, a country long considered a 
stronghold of the Nordic Welfare State model. Furthermore, I situate 
developments at the Finnish statistical institute in relation to conceptions 
of Big Data and its implications for the future of official statistics within a 
transnational field of statistics of which it is a part. 
 
From a rapidly growing corpus of social scientific reflections on Big Data, 
I highlight two key sources of inspiration. Back in 2007, Savage and 
Burrows (2007) argued polemically that because sociologists had not 
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kept up to date with methodological advances in the analysis of Big Data 
(at this point referred to as “digital transactional data”), they had begun 
to lose their jurisdiction over social questions. What the authors of the 
polemic furthermore noted was that increasingly, it was the private sector 
that produced and had access to Big Data and the skills and expertise 
required for its analysis. This point is for me an important insight, one 
that I see as being part of a larger story. Reflecting on developments that 
were taking place in the US, Starr and Corson (1987) identified already 
in the 1980s the increasing role of the private sector in selling 
repackaged public data, privately collected data, and statistical models 
and analyses of different types. Their analysis of the rise of a “statistical 
service industry” came with a warning: an increasing production of data 
in the private sector might in the future jeopardise its free flow, the 
building block of democratic politics and scientific life. 
 
Although data has undoubtedly been an important resource for capitalist 
enterprises for centuries (Porter 1995), many have recently argued that 
as a result of digitisation it has come to occupy a far more critical role 
than before. Fundamentally, digitisation has opened up massive new 
expanses of potential data, and new industries and business models 
have emerged to extract profits from them, most notably in the form of 
dominant digital platforms (Srnicek, 2017). Whereas the private 
statistical service industry that Starr and Corson were writing about still 
relied, for the most part, on the government for the data which it then 
repackaged into commercial products of various sorts, what has taken 
place in the years since is that the production, harvesting and analysis 
of data by private corporations has increased to a point where it has 
potentially come to outstrip that of states. In this study, I forge an 
understanding of the circumstances underlying this development and 
consider its broader social and political implications. Following from this, 
I argue that what is novel about Big Data is not only its technical 
composition (Kitchin, 2014a; Kitchin and McArdle, 2016) but perhaps 
even more importantly the changing jurisdictions between the producers 
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of data that its emergence entails. 
 
A second key source of inspiration that underpins my work is Rob 
Kitchin’s book The Data Revolution (2014b) which, although not an 
empirical study, is nevertheless tremendously helpful in that it outlines a 
proposal for how to study Big Data sociologically. Kitchin (2014b: 192) 
ends his book with the following call: 
For too long data and the constitution and operation of the 
assemblages surrounding them have been taken-for-granted, with 
attention focused on information and knowledge distilled from them. It 
is time to rectify this neglect. 
Kitchin (2014b: 184) proposes that the way to do this is “First, through 
philosophical reflection and synoptic, conceptual and critical analysis” 
and second “through detailed empirical research concerning the 
genesis, constitution, functioning and evolution of data assemblages.” 
Kitchin (2014b: 188) furthermore explains that “at present, we have little 
understanding of both the overall construction of data assemblages and 
their apparatus and individual elements”, and that consequently, what 
we need are case studies that “trace out the sociotechnical 
arrangements of whole assemblages or document in detail specific 
aspects of an assemblage such as the sociology and political economy 
of a community of practice within a sector of big data”. For Kitchin 
(2014b: 17), the production of data is a contested and negotiated 
process in which vested interests compete over what should be counted 
and how. 
 
It is this research agenda that I take up in this thesis. Instead of 
conducting a taxonomy of an entire assemblage, a task that would be 
cumbersome even for a team of researchers, I explore both conceptually 
and empirically how the assemblage producing official statistics is 
currently being reconceived by national statisticians in response to the 
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increasing production of data by private corporations. By paying 
attention to specific practices through which Big Data is conceived and 
experimented with by NSIs, I move beyond statements of data 
revolutions to exploring how Big Data are or are not influencing the 
everyday work of statisticians and the reconfiguration of assemblages 
through which data and official statistics are produced. In the remainder 
of this introductory chapter, I outline the structure of the thesis and note 
the occasions where it further addresses some of the research themes 
and questions prompted by Kitchin. 
 
A good starting point for a study on the pressing issues around data and 
methods that are emerging in our own time is to look at what others have 
written about the subject previously. Long before the debate on Big Data, 
social scientists have not only used statistics in their research, but have 
also studied them as a topic in their own right. In chapter two, “Early 
statistics in a transnational context”, I therefore begin the analysis by 
exploring the literature around the history of statistics and its sociological 
interpretations. What emerges from this literature review is the 
conceptual starting point of the thesis. An author that I draw heavily on 
is Desrosières (1998), who argues that historically, statistics have 
emerged out of a co-constitutive interaction between, on the one hand, 
methodological and technological developments, and changes in the 
political and administrative world, on the other. Law et al. (2011) provide 
an apt description of this process when they argue that methods have a 
“double social life” as they are both constituted by the social world of 
which they are part and active in shaping that same world. Building from 
the concept of co-constitution, in this introductory chapter I explore four 
important configurations of the co-constitution of statistics and society in 
the history of statistics. By demonstrating how advances in statistics 
have been connected to political contingencies, particularly changing 
governmental rationalities, historically, I set the analytical framework for 
the rest of the thesis. 
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The first configuration I examine concerns how already in early societies 
rulers maintained some form of statistics on their populations, usually for 
purposes of taxation and social control. Next, I trace the roots of statistics 
in their modern form to seventeenth century Germany and England, 
where university professors and laymen began applying various 
techniques for the comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of states. Thereafter I explore in detail the early parts of the nineteenth 
century, a period of statistical enthusiasm that resulted in the 
establishment of statistical societies and institutes across Europe. 
Finally, I turn my attention to the mathematisation of statistics in the early 
parts of the twentieth century, before concluding with an analysis of the 
politics of statistics in the period of welfare states that followed the 
Second World War. By analysing the interaction between statistics and 
society in previous time periods, I set the stage for a later analysis of the 
ways in which Big Data reflects recent trends of advanced liberalism in 
Western polities. 
 
As Kitchin (2014b: 17) points out, data has both a temporality and a 
spatiality. What data gets produced and how varies across time and 
space, depending on, amongst other things, organisational jurisdictions, 
laws, technologies, statistical methods and techniques. Kitchin (2014b: 
17) notes that despite this, to date there have not been many histories 
and geographies of data assemblages. Kitchin (2014b: 189) therefore 
suggests that one way to study Big Data is to employ a genealogical 
method “to trace out the formation and evolution of big data, open data, 
and data infrastructures more generally, and specific instantiations of 
them.” Kitchin (2014b: 189) points out that “rather than producing a 
sanitized, teleological historiography”, such an approach “illustrates how 
the future is built upon the past, but is not necessarily determined by it 
in simple cause-effect ways” and that it furthermore “identifies points of 
confluence when people or ideas come together and give rise to new 
assemblages and the complex and messy ways in which these then 
develop”. 
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Inspired by this research agenda, in chapter three “A brief history of 
social statistics in Finland”, I consider the historical development of 
statistics in relation to Finland. My main motivation for this is to situate 
contemporary changes in the production of official statistics in Finland, 
which I discuss later on in the thesis, within longer historical 
reconfigurations. Again, instead of trying to account for the entire 
assemblage, with all the actors, technologies, legislations and methods 
etc. involved, I narrow my focus to the main reconfigurations in data 
production that have occurred in the history of official statistics in 
Finland. First, I explore statistics in the Kingdom of Sweden, a country 
that Finland was part of for over half a millennium. Next, I examine 
statistics in the period beginning at the start of the nineteenth century in 
which Finland formed an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian 
empire. After that, I explore statistics in the period shortly after Finland 
gained its independence in 1917 before moving on to a detailed analysis 
of developments after the Second World War, in particular the period 
from the 1960s onwards in which a register-based statistical system was 
put in place as part of the technologies of an emerging welfare state. I 
then define register-based statistics as a form of welfare state 
governmentality (Alastalo, 2009b) and explore some of their uses in 
social scientific research, along with a more general reflection on 
methodological developments in Finland. 
 
I conclude the chapter by drawing three major analytical conclusions 
from the review conducted. First, I suggest that historically, statistics 
have in Finland been produced from data produced by the dominant 
institution of its time. Whereas the earliest forms of statistics were 
produced from data compiled by the ruler and the church, their modern 
form is tied to the centralised authority of the nation state. In light of this, 
we should perhaps not be surprised by the increasing centrality of private 
corporations in generating, harvesting and analysing Big Data. Rather, 
this development reflects broader shifts in political economy, which is a 
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theme that I address in more detail in chapter four. Second, the 
increasing centrality of private actors in the production of data suggests 
a historical break in that the production of data has started to potentially 
move away from its historical basis in states. Finally, the extensive 
governmental data collection system in Finland has been made possible 
by a high level of trust towards the state, and it is not inconceivable that 
this trust could be lost in the future. These are all fundamentally 
important points to reflect upon in relation to my empirical material. 
Without an appreciation of the longer historical trajectory, my ability to 
interpret current developments would be limited indeed. 
  
Whereas data production in the public sector in Finland particularly in 
the period of the welfare state has been underpinned by social welfarist 
aims and objectives, what type of a rationality is driving the increasing 
production of data in the private sector? Continuing with the 
understanding that statistics evolve in interaction with political 
contingencies, in chapter four, “Big Data: A harbinger of utopia, but a 
utopia for who?”, I take up the challenging task of situating Big Data in 
the context of contemporary political economy. I suggest that in midst of 
the recent hype around the socially transformative powers of Big Data it 
is worth reminding that sociologists have been debating the societal 
impact of information technologies at least since the 1970s. By situating 
Big Data in this debate, I argue that instead of a radical rupture from the 
past, Big Data should in fact be seen as a recent chapter in a much 
longer development. 
 
This problematisation then points me towards an investigation into the 
political and economic circumstances in which the computerisation of 
society kicked into motion in the 1970s. Drawing on a number of 
scholars, I first argue that information technology should be seen as a 
key site of ideological battles in our contemporary world, and second, 
that the digitisation of society has in the past few decades gone hand in 
hand with a larger ideological shift towards more market oriented 
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Western societies. Building on from this idea, I then read critically both 
popular and academic responses to Big Data and suggest that in 
celebrating the opportunities afforded by it, computational social 
scientists in particular have tended to fail to account for the fact that 
much of the data that is opening up exciting new possibilities for social 
research is simultaneously now also absolutely central to the functioning 
of modern capitalism. 
 
I therefore suggest that the practical, methodological and ethical issues 
related to Big Data are tightly connected to the increasingly 
commercialised context in which much of it is being generated. I end the 
chapter by taking a critical look at the Big Data industry in its current 
form. This investigation reveals that behind the many myths surrounding 
Big Data still exists the hard material reality of a capitalist mode of 
production ultimately not that different from its industrial predecessor. 
Far from alleviating the many injustices and inequalities that have come 
to define the modern world, I suggest that Big Data should in fact be 
seen as an increasingly important driving factor behind them. 
 
In sum, by building the analysis around the conceptual starting point of 
the thesis, that data and society are co-constituted, I argue that Big Data 
reflects a shift in political rationalities towards neoliberalism in Western 
polities. Although certainly not all Big Data is produced in the private 
sphere, a significant part is and is therefore underpinned by a market 
and profit rationality. This central argument is reflected also in the title of 
the thesis. I have included the question mark to signify that Big Data can 
be appropriated for other purposes as well, and that in the broader 
sense, therefore, different Big Data futures are possible (See for 
example, Ruppert, 2018). 
 
But what does the increasing production of Big Data by private 
corporations mean for official statistics? Like many existing 
commentaries on Big Data, the first three chapters are of a conceptual 
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rather than empirical nature. However, as Kitchin (2014b: 118) points 
out, what we urgently need at the moment are analyses that move 
beyond the conceptual to empirical explorations of the workings of Big 
Data within specific contexts and domains. In chapter five, “Big Data at 
Statistics Finland: A neoliberalisation of statistical practices?” I situate 
the concern with the emergence of Big Data to the empirical context of 
the National Statistical Institute of Finland, Statistics Finland. Drawing on 
expert interviews with statisticians, I focus my attention on the everyday 
practices where social transformations and revolutions get enacted. 
Furthermore, by attending to how Statistics Finland are potentially 
changing their data infrastructures in response to how they conceive of 
the “threats” or “opportunities” of Big Data, I provide early empirical 
evidence of what this means for relations between the public and the 
private sector in the production of data for official statistics. Although 
numerous challenges and risks of using Big Data for official statistics 
remain unsolved, and so far no pre-existing statistics have been 
replaced by it, NSIs are currently not only changing their ways of thinking 
but are also taking up entirely new practises in response to the perceived 
challenge represented it.  For the time being, therefore, in official 
statistics the so called data revolution manifests itself most clearly in 
changing mentalities and mindsets. 
 
My analysis of my interview material consists of four main parts. First, 
instead of assuming a predefined definition of Big Data, I start by 
describing how statisticians understood it and the questions they saw it 
raising for their professional practice. In contrast to popular debates that 
locate the newness of Big Data in its technical qualities, for my 
respondents the biggest change brought about by it was that more and 
more institutions now have the capacity to produce and analyse data, 
potentially undermining the role of NSIs as the central producers of data 
and in turn official statistics. Furthermore, rather than a complete break 
of past ways of producing and analysing  data, my respondents identified 
many similarities between old and new forms of data, more precisely 
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between administrative registers and Big Data. Some drew a parallel 
between the establishment of the register-based statistical system in the 
post war years, and the period of Big Data statistics emerging at the 
moment, with the difference between the two being that today, data 
increasingly accumulates in the private-, rather than the public sector. 
 
Then, by analysing in detail Big Data projects that were ongoing at 
Statistics Finland at the time of research, I suggest that they are 
indicative of a neoliberalisation of data infrastructures in at least two 
ways. First, not only does data increasingly accumulate in the private 
sector, but amidst public sector cuts Statistics Finland was hard pressed 
to find resources to tackle Big Data in terms of its processing, analysis, 
and storage, potentially leading to a more central role for private actors 
also at the operations at Statistics Finland. Second, success in one Big 
Data project had been made possible by outsourcing the majority of data 
handling to the company providing the data. Based on these findings I 
suggest that in an age of Big Data the production of official statistics is 
likely to be increasingly influenced, not by the rationalities of government 
departments, as has been the case in the period of register-based 
statistics (Alastalo, 2009b), but by those of private corporations. 
 
By interrogating further a set of responses to Big Data at Statistics 
Finland, I suggest that neoliberalisation can also be identified in the ways 
that Statistics Finland imagines its future role and relevancy. Younger 
interviewees in particular felt that in order to remain relevant in the future, 
Statistics Finland needed to adopt the mentality of an agile and fast 
paced organisation, often resembling that of a company or a start-up. 
Drawing on findings such as this I suggest that in a paradigm of Big Data 
statistics, not only data, but also valuations of professional skills and 
expertise in its analysis increasingly originate in the private sector. By 
analysing in detail one effort to build partnerships with companies, I 
suggest that they too are reflective of growing demands to adopt private 
sector ways of thinking and acting also in the public sector. 
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I conclude the analysis in the chapter by exploring companies’ attitudes 
towards data sharing, as perceived by my interviewees. In contrast to 
the markedly positive picture painted by my respondents, I suggest that 
there are ways in which the demands of markets are likely to come into 
conflict with a desire to share data for the advancement of collective 
goods. I identify here, in its increasingly proprietary nature, a potential 
contradiction in how the assemblage producing official statistics is 
currently being reconfigured. In sum, following the central conceptual 
point of this thesis, that statistics and society are co-constituted, I 
demonstrate empirically how the production of statistics is in Finland 
potentially becoming increasingly underpinned by market-, rather than 
social welfarist-, rationalities. 
 
In laying out his research agenda for Big Data, Kitchin (2014b: 188) 
notes that ideally, “such studies would also be comparative in nature, 
contrasting iterations of an assemblage, such as across locales or 
contexts, or across various types of assemblage” as “comparative 
research enables generalities and specificities to be identified, and to 
chart the various contingent and relational ways in which assemblages 
unfold”. This thesis is in a unique position in that it forms part of the 
European Research Council funded project, ARITHMUS, which, by 
following the working practices of statisticians at seven different sites, 
including five European NSIs (Office for National Statistics for England 
and Wales, Statistics Netherlands, Statistics Estonia, Turkish Statistical 
Institute, and Statistics Finland), and two international statistical 
organisations (Eurostat and United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe), has sought to examine how digital technologies and Big Data 
are leading to methodological diversification and innovations in how 
official statistics are being conceived and produced. By starting from the 
idea of a transnational field of statistical practices in which the local, the 
national and the transnational overlap and intersect, one of the project’s 
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major aims has been to move beyond nationally bounded case studies, 
or what is often termed methodological nationalism (Scheel et al., 2016).  
 
The project’s central premise is that the ways in which national 
statisticians position themselves in relation to phenomenon such as Big 
Data are “not delineated by national interests and practices” but are 
instead “part of transnational negotiations, contestations and tensions 
that cut across numerous NSIs and international statistical 
organisations” (Grommé et al., Forthcoming: 2). Unsurprisingly, given its 
sometimes utopian but often practical promises, Big Data has in recent 
years captured the interest of not just NSIs but also supra-national 
statistical organisations such as the statistical office of the European 
Union, Eurostat, the European Statistical System (ESS), the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the United 
Nations Statistical Division (UNSD). In 2013, the Heads of the National 
Statistical Institutes of the EU signed the Scheveningen Memorandum 
(2013) to examine the use of Big Data in official statistics. Efforts to 
engage with Big Data have thereafter often ben led by the supra-national 
organisations who have provided funding and other forms of support to 
the NSIs. For example, most of the Big Data experiments that were 
taking place at Statistics Finland were funded by Eurostat and similar 
experiments were taking place at other NSIs across Europe. 
Statisticians from different countries regularly convened to share 
experiences and to work collaboratively in projects funded by Eurostat. 
Illustrating the transnational character of Big Data and official statistics, 
the threats and opportunities of Big Data that my interviewees at 
Statistics Finland identified closely mirrored international debates on the 
topic (For a comprehensive overview of the debates around Big Data 
and Official Statistics, see Kitchin, 2015). 
 
Therefore, in order to avoid the analytical pitfall of treating Statistics 
Finland as an isolated container of the debates around Big Data and 
official statistics, in the final chapter before the conclusion I situate the 
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developments at Statistics Finland within the transnational relations 
through which much of the practices of modern NSIs are debated and 
formed. In order to do so, I devise an analytic that draws on a large 
corpus of data (a collection of over three thousand documents, including 
fieldwork notes and various policy documents etc.) collected as part of 
the ARITHMUS project. My approach involves using a number of 
keywords from my previous chapter on Statistics Finland to conduct 
keyword searches in the ARITHMUS database. Rather than a 
comparison, I outline some of the ways in which the major themes of my 
previous chapter are being discussed at other NSIs and at international 
forums. Furthermore, although my aim is not to conduct a detailed 
mapping of the relative positions of authority of the different stakeholders 
in the field, I highlight some of the tensions and disagreements that are 
necessarily part of the interactions within a field. 
 
The analysis consists of three parts. First, I explore how the words hype, 
threat, opportunity and paradigm come up in the ARITHMUS database. 
In addition to reiterating numerous points that were made also by my 
interviewees at Statistics Finland, the analysis helps to shed more light 
on how the increasing involvement of the private sector in the production 
and management of data is being problematised by official statisticians. 
The analysis furthermore points to a divergence in how administrative 
data and Big Data are distinguished from each other at Statistics Finland 
and at international forums. The analysis also highlights some of the 
discontents and disagreements that exist between NSIs and the supra-
national organisations that increasingly come to influence their work. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, I explore how the words skills, 
mentality and mindset come up in the broader corpus of data collected 
as part of the ARITHMUS project. This part of the analysis provides 
further support to the finding that increasingly, what “modernisation” 
comes to mean is the adoption of market rationalities also within public 
sector institutions such as NSIs. The analysis suggests also that cultural 
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differences towards issues such as data sharing within governments do 
exist between countries, raising the question whether some 
governments might currently be better placed than others to take 
advantage of the affordances of Big Data. 
 
In the final part of the analysis, I explore the ways in which data access 
and partnerships are debated in the ARITHMUS data. As was the case 
at Statistics Finland, also at the transnational level the importance of 
obtaining access to more data sources, especially those produced by 
the private sector, is identified as a key concern. This includes how 
actors who might have previously been considered competitors, are 
seen as possible partners to secure access to new data sources. In 
marked contrast to the positive outlook of my interviewees at Statistics 
Finland, however, numerous issues with the increasing need to form 
partnerships with private actors are identified. Business interests are for 
example identified as being “transient”, and it is conceded that although 
modern companies recognise the importance of corporate social 
responsibility, it is usually not part of their core business models. Some 
of the material in the ARITHMUS database suggests also that official 
statisticians are in fact far from comfortable with the increasing 
involvement of private actors in the production and management of data. 
 
Therefore, in addition to yielding many similar findings to my interviews 
at Statistics Finland, thus conforming the transnational rather than 
national character of Big Data, official statistics, and processes of 
neoliberalisation, the analysis highlights numerous issues in relation to 
the increasing in involvement of private actors in the production of data 
for official statistics. In connection to this, the analysis raises questions 
about the appropriateness of NSIs current responses to Big Data. I 
conclude by suggesting that due to their role as impartial providers of 
factual knowledge on societies, NSIs strategic responses to Big Data 
must in the long run go beyond appropriating the rationalities and 
practices of actors in the private sector. 
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I conclude this thesis by reprising its main findings, by suggesting a 
number of broader analytical themes and problematics that follow from 
it, and by pointing out directions for future research. I argue that in order 
to avoid the dystopian future depicted in The Circle, the social 
organisation of Big Data must be rethought based on Social Democratic 
political imaginations. I suggest that forming such imaginations must 
begin by establishing a more precise picture of the challenges that Big 
Data presents for different stakeholders, in addition to the NSIs. I argue 
that such an understanding is needed for devising an implementing a set 
of principles and organisational frameworks through which the power of 
Big Data can be unleashed for the advancement of common, rather than 
private, goods. I suggest that the question about the future role of the 
NSI must form an absolutely central component of such considerations. 
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2 Early statistics in a transnational context 
 
2.1 Introduction. The co-constitution of statistics 
and society? 
 
A good starting point for a study on the pressing issues around data and 
methods that are emerging in our own time, is to look at what others 
have written about the subject previously. I therefore begin the analysis 
in this thesis by exploring the literature around the history of statistics 
and its sociological interpretations. What this investigation reveals first 
and foremost is that long before the debate on Big Data, social scientists 
have not only used statistics in their research but have also studied them 
as a topic in their own right. 
 
An idea that comes up repeatedly in this history is that statistics and 
society are co-constituted. One author that I draw heavily on is 
Desrosières (1998), who argues that historically, statistics have 
emerged out of a co-constitutive interaction between, methodological 
and technological developments, on the one hand, and changes in the 
political and administrative world, on the other. Resembling Desrosières, 
Law et al. (2011) suggest that social research methods are part of the 
“social” in two ways. First, they are social because they are constituted 
by the social world of which they are part, and second, they are social 
because they help to constitute that very same world. In other words, in 
their view methods exist only as long as they have advocates who 
promote and use them, and by describing social realities, methods help 
these realities to come into being. 
 
The etymological roots of statistics, the Latin words statisticum 
collegium, which in the late nineteenth century came to designate “the 
science of the state”, implies that the co-constitutive relationship 
between statistics and society (as state building) is self-evident. 
29 
 
However, as Kullenberg (2011: 64) notes, etymological statements do 
not describe the processes through which co-constitution happens. 
Another useful conceptual starting point for this chapter is therefore the 
work done around Michel Foucault’s concept of “governmental 
rationality” or “governmentality”. Foucault, for whom government meant 
“’the conduct of conduct’: that is to say, a form of activity aiming to shape, 
guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991: 
2) traced the emergence of the notion of “the population” to the end of 
the eighteenth century. According to Foucault (2007) statistics began in 
this period to indicate phenomena, movements and regularities that 
could not be understood as simply the result of the decisions of the 
sovereign. Thereafter, the population became seen simultaneously as 
an object in the hands of the governor and as a subject with its own 
needs, ambitions and possibilities. Like the physical body, it was seen 
as an entity that could be disciplined through statistical measurements 
and assessments of things such as birth and mortality rates and life-
expectancy tables. In the Foucaultian view, therefore, statistics form part 
of the processes that “open up society for government” (Hammer, 2011: 
82) of which different variations make “some ways of thinking and acting 
more relevant than their alternatives” (Kullenberg, 2011: 10). By 
“counting its citizens, territories, resources, problems, and so on […] the 
State participates in creating both itself, its citizens, and the policies, 
rights, expectations, services, and so on, that bind them together.” 
(Saetnan et al., 2011: 2). As a result, by critically interrogating the 
statistics that the government uses and produces it is possible to gauge 
at how it “thinks” in terms of its priorities, agendas and concerns. 
Governmental rationalities, in other words, form an integral component 
of what I mean by the co-constitution of statistics and society. 
 
Drawing on the literature around the history of statistics, in what follows 
I explore the interaction between statistics and society in four important 
historical configurations of the co-constitution of statistics and society. In 
particular, I demonstrate how statistical methods and infrastructures 
30 
 
have often emerged alongside and as part of governmental rationalities 
concerned with the question of how to best address social issues. Since 
this question is closely tied to a history of systems of expertise (Barry et 
al., 1996), in my review I pay specific attention to the changing forms of 
professional expertise that have accompanied the different historical 
configurations. The analysis in this chapter is crucial in order to set up 
the analytical framework for a later analysis of the ways in which Big 
Data reflects recent developments in “advanced liberalism” in western 
polities. 
 
I begin the chapter by demonstrating how already in early societies rulers 
have practiced some form of bookkeeping on the population, usually for 
purposes of taxation and social control. I suggest that whereas the 
modern census can be understood as a tool for generating quantitative 
information on society, its pre-modern form was more clearly an 
instrument of state power and social control. I suggest furthermore that 
at the heart of the transformation from pre-modern to modern censuses 
was a change in the conception of the relation between the state and its 
subjects. 
 
Next, I trace the roots of statistics in their modern form to seventeenth 
century Germany and England, where university professors and laymen 
began applying various techniques for the comparison of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of states. Whereas the early German 
statisticians were connected to the state to an extent where they could 
not conceive of a civil society distinct from it, the early English 
statisticians operated largely outside of it, which allowed them to 
conceive of social phenomenon as existing irrespective of the state. 
Furthermore, because in England the liberal conception of the state 
limited its prerogatives, including the organising of large scale surveys, 
the early English statisticians did not have access to comprehensive 
data and had to therefore instead use roundabout calculations and 
31 
 
indirect methods. From this context emerged the predecessor of the 
sample survey, the population multiplier. 
 
Thereafter I explore in detail the early parts of the nineteenth century, a 
period of statistical enthusiasm that resulted in the establishment of 
statistical societies and institutes across Europe. In England, where the 
industrial revolution began, parts of the middle-classes feared a violent 
revolution from below, and decided to begin systematically collecting 
data on the living conditions of the working classes in order to alleviate 
the difficult conditions through policy reform. The twin revolutions in 
England and France gave rise also to new theorising about society, 
specifically to the idea that society was governed by social laws and that 
these laws could be studied. In contrast to common belief, experiments 
with statistical methods had an important role in the formation of a 
“sociological imagination”. 
 
Finally, I turn my attention to the mathematisation of statistics in the early 
parts of the twentieth century, before concluding with an analysis of the 
politics of statistics in the period of welfare states that followed the 
Second World War. In modern versions of the debate around nature 
versus nurture it is largely forgotten that sociology emerged out of an 
institutional battle between the proponents of biological explanations, on 
the one side, and those who thought that biology and society were best 
kept separate, on the other. Whereas the latter camp won the 
institutional battle, the former invented the statistical tools of correlation 
and regression that are widely used today also outside of the social 
sciences. I conclude the analysis in the chapter by arguing that in the 
period of welfare states after the Second World War, the sample survey 
method became an important tool in assessing Social Democratic 
concerns with poverty and inequality. 
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The two histories of statistical infrastructures, on the one hand, and 
statistical methods, on the other, are necessarily connected to each 
other in important ways. In what follows, I seek to account for both. 
 
2.2 An instrument of state power and social 
control: Early examples of official statistics 
 
The first known censuses of agriculture were undertaken already in 
Babylonian times 3000 years B.C, meaning that the first statistics were 
compiled relatively soon after the art of writing was invented. In India, a 
treatise called Arthasastra, probably written between 321–296 B.C., 
contained a detailed description of the system of data collection relating 
to agricultural, population, and economic censuses in villages and 
towns. Also in ancient China the administration counted its subjects in 
order to determine the income revenues and military strength of different 
provinces. In Egypt, rulers were compiling statistical overviews long 
before the birth of Christ and also the Romans took regular censuses of 
people and property (Eves, 2002; Kuusela, 2011b: 31). 
 
In the middle ages, attempts at conducting censuses were rare. 
European examples of official statistics from the middle ages include 
Charlemagne’s Survey of the Holy Land and William the Conqueror’s 
Domesday Book, a survey listing all the landholders along with their 
holdings in England in 1086. Both of these surveys were conducted for 
purposes of taxation and army recruiting (Higgs, 2004). 
 
An interesting example of the early history of official statistics can be 
found in the Inca Empire that existed between 1000 A.D and 1500 in 
South America. There, each Inca tribe had its own statistician, called 
Quipucamayoc, who kept records of the people, houses, marriages, 
llamas, and the number of men who could be recruited for the army. At 
regular intervals, these early statisticians were brought in to the capital 
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of the kingdom, Cusco, where regional statistics were compiled into a 
national overview. This system vanished with the fall of the Inca Empire 
(Kuusela, 2011b: 32). 
 
Claims of the first modern census have been made for Canada, which 
as a French colony had an enumeration in 1665. The name, sex, marital 
status and occupation was recorded for the total of 3215 persons. In 
Europe, the first modern censuses were undertaken in the Nordic 
countries: Iceland carried one out in 1703, Sweden in 1746 and Denmark 
in 1769. In 1790, the United States became the first nation to inaugurate 
a periodic census, publish the results, and to organize its government 
according to them (Starr, 1987: 12–13). France and Great Britain, where 
population censuses were for long met with opposition from both citizens 
and local authorities, conducted their first censuses in 1801 (Diamond, 
1999: 9; Hakim, 1985: 39). 
 
John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland, published in twenty-one 
volumes between 1791 and 1799 was the first book written in English to 
use the term “statistics” in its title. The book, often considered a 
cornerstone of modern statistics, was based on a comprehensive social 
and geographical survey that was sent to local clergy. A pre-planned set 
of 160 questions was sent to all parishes in Scotland, 40 questions of 
which covered the geography and topography of the parish, 60 
population and related matters, and the rest matters related to 
agricultural and industrial production. In 1799, Sinclair presented to the 
General Assembly “a unique survey of the state of the country, locality 
by locality” (Westergaard, 1932). 
 
Starr (1987: 11) argues that whereas the modern census is a tool for 
generating quantitative information on society, its pre-modern version 
was unambiguously an instrument of state power and social control. He 
suggests that it differed from its modern form in numerous important 
ways. First, whereas the modern census is an enumeration of an entire 
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population, the pre-modern censuses were typically limited to males of 
particular age groups and classes. Second, whereas the modern census 
provides information at the individual level, its pre-modern version was 
usually a continuous register. Fourth, in contrast to the modern census 
whose results are usually made available publically, pre-modern 
censuses were typically treated as state secrets. Finally, in pre-modern 
societies statistical agencies were not necessarily distinguished from 
agencies charged with tax assessments and law enforcement, as is 
generally the case today. Starr (1987: 12) contends that at the heart of 
the transformation from pre-modern censuses to the modern census 
was a change in the conception of the relation between the state and its 
subjects. Whereas the pre-modern censuses assumed a coercive 
relationship between the two, the modern census presumes one based 
on cooperation. 
 
To conclude this section, the early examples of statistics that I have 
introduced so far can be thought of more as bookkeeping about the 
population for purposes of surveillance and control, rather than as 
attempts at statistical reasoning in the more modern sense. When 
looking for the ancestors of statistics as we understand them today, two 
strands of development stand out. The first is the tradition of German 
“Statistik” that developed in German speaking cultural areas in the 
seventeenth century and the second the tradition of English Political 
Arithmetic that developed in England at roughly the same time. 
 
2.3 A tool for the comparison of states: 
Predecessors of modern statistics 
 
2.3.1 German “Statistik” 
 
The etymological roots of the word statistics are in the Latin expression 
“statisticum collegium”, meaning council of state and in the Italian word 
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“statista”, meaning statesman or politician. In the 18th century the word 
“staatenkunde” was used in German speaking cultural areas to describe 
the comparative description of states (Westergaard, 1932: 2). By the end 
of the century the term statistics had entered the English language, and 
the Finnish equivalent, “tilasto”, was introduced in the 1840s (Luther, 
1993; Westergaard, 1932: 13). 
 
Westergaard (1932: 4) traces the practice of giving comparative 
descriptions of states to Aristotle, who in Politeiai described the history, 
present character, public administration, justice system, science and 
arts, religious life, manners and customs of 158 different states. The 
parts of Aristotle’s work that survived through the middle-ages provided 
the model for statistics compiled in 16th century Italy, where, Francesco 
Sansovino, amongst others, published descriptions of 22 states, 
including ancient Sparta, Athens and Rome. Interestingly, one of 
Sansovino’s chapters was devoted to the ideal state, “Utopia”. 
 
During the seventeenth century, similar descriptions started being 
published in Germany, especially by university professor Hermann 
Conring (1606-1681), who started the long tradition of German Statistik. 
Conring described the territory, population, administration, aims and 
armies of Spain, Portugal, France, Japan, Morocco and Abyssinia. 
Conring did not have any manuscripts for his lectures, but his students 
published summaries of them after his death (Westergaard, 1932: 7). 
 
A number of German professors continued Conring’s work, including 
Gottfried Achenwall (1719-1772), who defined statistics as the 
description of the constitution. According to him, statistics should confine 
itself to the strictly necessary facts, choosing only those that can throw 
light on the whole organisation of the state, its powers and weaknesses. 
Furthermore, statistics should deal with the present time, not the past, 
and historical descriptions should only be included as introductions. 
Consequently, Achwell displayed very little interest towards numerical 
36 
 
observations, despite the fact that during his time the first census had 
already been conducted in countries such as Sweden (Westergaard, 
1932: 8–9). 
 
Statistics, as they developed in German universities were literal, rather 
than numerical descriptions of countries. Drawing on Lazarsfeld (1970), 
Desrosières (1998: 20), relates this tendency towards literary description 
to the political situation in Germany during the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Germany was at that time divided up in to nearly 
three hundred poor and hostile small cities. Legal disputes over 
problems of territory, marriage, and succession had to be made by 
referring to case laws and by examining the archives, giving authority to 
people who were more inclined toward systematic cataloguing rather 
than inventing new things. 
 
The comparisons between states were sometimes done by cross-
tabulating states in rows and their descriptions in columns. Eventually 
this required the construction of common referents and criteria, leading 
to a familiar sounding dispute over whether it was okay to allow objects 
to lose their singularity by reducing them to numbers. The tabular form 
invited the comparison of numbers and was therefore an important 
innovation in the development of quantitative statistics (Desrosières, 
1998: 21). 
  
Gradually along the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, numerical data 
became more and more important also in the German states. During the 
eighteenth century statistical activity increased in German-speaking 
countries probably as a result of courses being offered at many 
universities. At this point however, the objective of statistics became the 
establishment of universal social laws and the interest of early 
statisticians shifted towards the problems created by industrial 
capitalism (Kuusela, 2011a). 
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Desrosières (1998: 22–23) argues that by identifying with the viewpoint 
of the state, the early German statisticians could not conceive of a civil 
society distinct from it. In England, in contrast, where people were 
allowed to go about their business in a relatively autonomous way, a 
different relationship between the state and its subjects was emerging. 
There, the state was part of society, rather than its totality. From this 
context emerged another important predecessor of modern statistics, 
the tradition of English Political Arithmetic. 
 
2.3.2 English Political Arithmetic 
 
Since early on in Europe, population statistics had been gathered by 
both the government and by the church. By the Late Middle Ages, many 
churches in Europe had started to keep records of christenings and 
burials, and in 1538 churches in England were obligated by law to 
maintain a record of births and deaths. Church rolls were in those days 
used to monitor the spread of epidemics such as the plague (Luther, 
1993). 
 
The seventeenth century was in general a period of rising interest in the 
possibilities that statistics offered for describing and understanding 
social phenomenon. In London, the public availability of church rolls 
made it possible to report births and deaths even on a weekly basis, 
which provided the material for the early demographic study The Natural 
and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills of Mortality, published in 
1662 by merchant John Graunt (1623-1687). The study included an 
estimation of London’s population size and one of the first life 
expectancy tables (Westergaard, 1932: 16–24). 
 
William Petty (1623-1687), who coined the term “Political arithmetic”, 
systemised and theorised the methods used by Graunt and himself. 
Petty used ratios, weighted means, and other techniques to estimate 
population size, agricultural production, trade, and other variables. Being 
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a follower of Bacon, Political Arithmetic meant for Petty the application 
of Baconian principles to the art of government. Bacon had drawn a 
parallel between the natural and the political body and argued that in 
order to act upon the political body, one had to know it first (Porter, 1986: 
19). 
 
Similarly to the early German statistics, Political Arithmetic was 
concerned with the comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different countries. Where it differed from the former, however, was in its 
emphasis of numerical, rather than literal descriptions. The wealth and 
strength of a country was seen as being strongly connected to the size 
and character of its population, which prompted an interest in things such 
as mortality rates. Until the late eighteenth century, the data for these 
studies were derived solely from the highly unreliable church rolls 
(Porter, 1986: 19–23). 
 
Desrosières (1998: 24) highlights another important way in which 
Political Arithmetic differed from the early German statistics. Whereas 
the German statisticians were academics who wanted to construct an 
overall logical description of the state in general, the political 
arithmeticians were practical men that had forged their knowledge in 
work-related activities.  Graunt was for example a merchant and Petty a 
medical doctor. According to Desrosières (1998: 24) this paved the way 
for a new social role:“…[that of] the expert with precise field of 
competence who suggests techniques to those in power while trying to 
convince them that, in order to realize their intentions, they must first go 
through him”. Whereas the German statisticians had offered a general 
all-encompassing language, the political arithmeticians offered one that 
could be precisely articulated through numbers. 
 
In line with the idea that statistics evolve in interaction with political 
contingencies, Desrosières (1998: 24) identifies a connection between 
the methods developed by the political arithmeticians and the political 
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circumstances in which they operated. In England, the liberal concept of 
the state limited its prerogatives, including the organising of large scale 
surveys. In 1752 for example, a plan to conduct a population census was 
opposed by the Whig Party as “utterly ruining the last freedoms of the 
English people” (Desrosières, 1998: 24). Due to not having access to 
comprehensive data, the political arithmeticians had to resort to indirect 
methods and roundabout calculations. 
 
The most famous technique developed by the political arithmeticians 
was the population multiplier. Since a full census was not possible, the 
political arithmeticians needed to find a way of inferring the total 
population of the country from the number of annual births provided by 
the parish catalogues. Their solution consisted of first taking a census in 
a few places, then calculating the relationship between the population 
and the number of births in those places, and finally estimating the total 
population of the country by multiplying the general sum of births with 
this number (Desrosières, 1998: 25). This technique can be regarded as 
an ancestor to the sample survey, which has been the method of choice 
for data collection for both governments and academics up until very 
recently (See for example Savage and Burrows, 2007). I will cover 
sampling in more detail later. 
 
Again tied to changing political circumstances, in the eighteenth century 
Political Arithmetic went in to decline. Political economists, such as 
Adam Smith, had doubts not only about the reliability of the available 
data, but also about the underlying assumptions about state guidance of 
economic life (Starr, 1987: 14–15). Buck (1982: 28) argues that at this 
point Political Arithmetic was transformed from “a scientific prospectus 
for the exercise of state power” into “a program for reversing the growth 
of government and reducing its influence on English social and economic 
life.” The decoupling of statistics from state ideology allowed it to re-enter 
public debate on new terms, which helped to stimulate the development 
of science. 
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With innovations such as the population multiplier, Political Arithmetic 
paved the way for a new social science of statistics that began to emerge 
from the early nineteenth century onwards. At this point, statistics 
became connected to the profound social changes set in motion by 
capitalist industrialisation and urbanisation. 
 
2.4 Accounting for the revolutionary threat: The 
rise of statistical thinking in the nineteenth 
century 
 
Due to the diverse set of principles according to which they had been 
compiled, up until the nineteenth century statistics were usually 
incoherent, irregularly collected, and difficult to get access to. Another 
obstacle in the study of human population had for long been the belief 
that it was too heterogeneous, irregular and unstable to be researched. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, this belief started to 
weaken, and research on human populations started to grow rapidly 
(Kuusela, 2011a). 
 
Porter (1986: 17) argues that in this period statistical writers became 
increasingly convinced that society was not just a passive recipient of 
legislative initiatives, but instead, a dynamic and autonomous entity that 
had to be known before it could be acted upon. For Hacking (1982), on 
the other hand, the improvements in official statistics in combination with 
the founding of statistical societies in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century resulted in an “avalanche of printed numbers”. In an earlier 
account of the history of statistics, Westergaard (1932: 136) describes 
the period from 1830 to 1850 as “the Era of Enthusiasm”, in which 
“statistics attracted public interest to an unusual degree”. 
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Drawing on Foucault, Barry et al. (1996: 8–9) suggest that “society” 
emerged in this period as a result of a mutation in the demands of 
governmental rationalities. Whereas preceding political rationalities had 
sought to govern “to the minutiae of existence”, a newly forming “liberal” 
governmental rationality acknowledged that government needed to deal 
not only with territories and subjects, but also with a complex reality that 
had its own laws and mechanisms that needed to be known in order to 
be acted upon. Thereafter government became as much about the 
technical as the political or the ideological, and the social sciences 
developed “as a way of representing the autonomous dynamics of 
society and assessing whether they should or should not be an object of 
regulation”. 
 
This “liberal” governmental rationality manifested itself as statistical 
developments on two separate but related fronts. First, in the 
development of statistical institutions and infrastructures and second, in 
new theorising about the nature of social phenomenon and their stability. 
The material conditions underlying both were the tensions brought about 
by capitalist industrialisation and urbanisation. Due to its position as the 
first industrialised nation in the world, Britain assumes a central stage 
also in this period in the history of statistics. 
 
2.4.1 Statistical societies, institutes and congresses 
 
2.4.1.1 Statistical societies 
 
Kent (1981: 5) points out that even though the classical authors of 
Sociology were born elsewhere, Britain is nevertheless the place where 
empirical social science first developed. As the first industrialised nation 
in the world, Britain was also the first to encounter its side effects. In this 
period, the prospect of violence arising from industrial unrest raised fears 
in the middle classes, and largely as a result of this, the earliest studies 
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in to the living conditions of the working classes in Britain trace back to 
the early parts of the nineteenth century (Kent, 1981: 18). 
 
The interest towards the living conditions of the working classes led to 
the formation of various statistical societies. The first statistical society 
was founded in 1833 in Manchester, where rapid urbanisation had 
brought along fast population growth, acute housing problems, and 
diseases. The society’s objective was to collect social facts that were 
meant to speak for themselves. By doing so, the society wanted to 
demonstrate the condition of society without committing itself to party 
politics. In 1834, the statistical society in Manchester carried out the first 
house to house social survey in England and perhaps in the world (Kent, 
1981: 18–19). 
 
The statistical society that attracted the most public attention, however, 
was The London Statistical Society, founded in 1834. This society 
differed from the one in Manchester in that it regarded itself almost as a 
branch of government. It successfully brought together government 
officials, party politicians and other distinguished individuals. One of its 
primary tasks was to provide the parliament with data that it considered 
necessary for social reform. In 1838, the society started to publish the 
journal today known as the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society and 
in 1887, the society was granted royal charter. Soon after the society in 
London was established, similar societies were founded in other parts of 
the country too (Kent, 1981: 20–22). 
 
Britain was however not the only place where statistical societies were 
being founded. One famous one was for example founded in the 
Kingdom of Saxony in 1831, where the society got its mandate directly 
from the king. The American Statistical Association was founded in 
Boston in 1839 and in 1888, it started publishing the journal that is today 
known as the Journal of the American Statistical Association. The 
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statistical societies were generally formed by citizens with very little or 
no statistical training whatsoever (Kuusela, 2011b: 76–77). 
 
In England, the members of the various statistical societies were mostly 
middle class men, often professionals, industrialists or members of the 
establishment. As supporters of free trade policies and economic 
laissez-faire, they preferred to see the towns and cities, rather than the 
factories as the cause behind the increasing social problems. The root 
of statistical activity in the early parts of the nineteenth century was 
therefore more often that of middle class fear, rather than sympathy 
towards the working classes. Because the statistical societies focused 
their attention on the built environment, it is questionable how much, and 
whether they at all contributed to promoting social legislation in factories 
(Kent, 1981: 31–33). 
 
The members of the statistical societies believed that large amounts of 
facts were necessary in order for social reform to be possible, even if 
they themselves could not necessarily tell what reforms followed from 
their data. Their goal was not to establish a welfare state, but to create 
an environment that would foster a healthy and hardworking working 
class. Improvements in public health and education were seen as key 
for this goal to be possible. Many believed that if the appropriate policies 
did not emerge from the data, what was needed was simply more data 
(Kent, 1981: 31–33). 
 
Kent (1981: 29–30) identifies the near total lack of theoretical tools to 
interpret data as one of the reasons why activity in the statistical 
societies soon began to decline. Statistical facts could in the end not 
speak for themselves, nor could they be separated from opinion. The 
membership in the statistical societies began to decline already in the 
late 1840s, at which point statistical activity was already increasingly 
connected to the government. Albeit short-lived, the statistical societies 
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laid the foundations for the professional character of statistical work that 
exists today (Kuusela, 2011a). 
 
By the late nineteenth century, house-to-house surveys, first hand 
observations, and government statistics were all techniques that had 
been used by social researchers to gather information about people and 
their living conditions. Charles Booth, a wealthy businessman from 
Liverpool, who devoted his life and fortune to surveying poverty in 
London, combined all these techniques in to one study. In Life and 
Labour of the People in London, published between 1889 and 1903, 
Booth and his team of researchers mapped out poverty in London by 
allocating each street in to one of eight categories, from the semi-
criminal to the upper middle classes (Kent, 1981: 52–54). Booth’s 
methods were later adopted by Seebohm Rowntree, who along with his 
team of researchers used them to study the working classes in York by 
visiting every single working class home in the city (Kent, 1981: 25). 
 
Arthur Bowley (1869 – 1957), an economist and statistician with a 
background in mathematics, codified and standardised the techniques 
used by Booth and Rowntree. Desrosières (1998: 166–167) argues that 
by doing this, Bowley created the scientific and professional norms for 
the “administrative statistician relying on the knowledge acquired in 
mathematical statistics”. This figure, who became common in official 
statistics after the 1940s, could not have developed in France or 
Germany, where academic research was more theoretical and rarely 
had such strong connections to the administrative world (Desrosières, 
1998: 177). 
 
2.4.1.2 Statistical institutes and congresses 
 
In addition to the emergence of statistical societies, the early nineteenth 
century was also a period when many statistical institutes were being 
founded. Perhaps the first forerunner of a modern national statistical 
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institute, Tabellverket, was established in Sweden in 1748, followed by 
Denmark in 1797 (Luther, 1993: 17–18). The Napoleonic Wars put the 
development of official statistics to a halt, but the interest quickly 
reappeared from 1830s onwards with the formation of statistical offices 
in France, England, Germany, Belgium, Norway, Netherlands and 
Russia (Luther, 1993: 50). 
 
Following the idea that statistics are the outcome of a co-constitutive 
interaction between methodological and technological developments, on 
the one hand, and changes in the political and administrative world, on 
the other, Desrosières (1998) illuminates ways in which the histories of 
statistical agencies reflect different roles and rationalities of states in 
different countries. For example, although both France and England 
have a long history as unified states, the organisation of the state has 
assumed very different forms in the two countries, and as a result, so too 
have their statistical agencies. 
 
In France the state and its statistical apparatus were always more 
centralised than in England. A general statistical bureau that had been 
supressed in 1812 was re-established in 1833, at which point it became 
part of the Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore, in France expert 
competency was usually internal to the administration, meaning that 
external experts, such as university people had a smaller influence on 
statistics than in some other countries. Due to the authority of the 
administration, statistics also aroused less public scrutiny (Desrosières, 
1998: 149). 
 
In England, in contrast, different administrations were more autonomous 
in relation to each other, and the county and village authorities had more 
power than in France. Statistics were never centralised into one sole 
institution, and the national bureaus had to work in collaboration with the 
local ones. From the outset, therefore, in England official statistics were 
divided between two branches: the Board of Trade established in 1832 
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that dealt with economic statistics, and the General Register Office 
established in 1837 that dealt with social statistics. Furthermore, and as 
mentioned previously, perhaps due to the general scepticism towards 
the state, in England attempts at collecting data on the national scale 
were for long met with opposition (Desrosières, 1998: 149). 
 
In Germany, the early nineteenth century was a period of gradual 
development towards a unified empire. There, the first statistical bureau 
was established in Prussia in 1805. The other states, Saxony, 
Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, also had their own statistical bureaus which 
remained autonomous until the Nazis gained control in the 1930s. In 
Germany, the bureaus inherited the three traditions of the eighteenth 
century: the political, historical, and geographical descriptions developed 
by university professors, the administrative records kept by officials, and 
the numerical tables developed by scholarly amateurs. The bureaus 
were often led by university professors who taught “sciences of the 
state”, although by now in a more numerical fashion than their 
seventeenth century predecessors (Desrosières, 1998: 179–180). 
 
Despite the fact that a decennial census provided the basis for political 
representation in the congress, the US did not establish a permanent 
bureau of statistics during the nineteenth century. Twenty-one censuses 
were conducted there between 1790 and 1990. For each one, a 
superintendent and provisional staff were recruited, only for the group to 
be disbanded once the work was completed (Desrosières, 1998: 188–
189). Desrosières (1998: 196) argues that by recruiting temporary 
personnel for the census, the American establishment was able to hire 
experts whose opinions they discreetly wished to influence. This, in 
combination with a long-standing reluctance to increase the number of 
federal agencies helps to explain why a permanent Census Bureau was 
there not created until 1902. 
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Soon after the statistical institutes were established, international 
collaboration began to increase. Westergaard (1932) describes the 
years from 1853 to 1888 as the period of statistical congresses. In these 
years, the civil servants working in the newly founded statistical institutes 
began to share experiences with colleagues from abroad. According to 
Westergaard, the initiative leading to the establishment of the first 
international statistical congress came from the famous Belgian 
statistician, Adolphe Quetelet. 
 
The first international statistical congress was held in Brussels in 1853, 
with about 150 civil servants and scientists attending from all over 
Europe. The chief objective of the congress was to promote the 
organisation of statistics and to unify reports from different countries. The 
congress ended in a declaration that a unified statistical system was 
necessary. In addition, it recommended that each country should strive 
towards centralising its statistical activities. After the first congress in 
Brussels, congresses were held in Paris in 1855, in London in 1860, in 
Berlin in 1863, in Firenze in 1869, in Hague in 1869, in St Petersburg in 
1872, and in Budapest in 1876 (Westergaard, 1932: 175–181). 
 
The aims of the first meetings were more practical and less focused on 
scientific questions. However, in Firenze in 1867, at the initiative of 
Quetelet, a resolution was passed that in future congresses there was 
to be a special section to deal with statistical questions in connection 
with the theory of probabilities. At the following congress a 
recommendation was entered that statistical investigations should deal 
not only with averages, but also with deviations from the mean 
(Westergaard, 1932: 176–180). 
 
The International Statistical Congresses gradually faded away only to 
reappear with the formation of the International Statistical Institute (ISI) 
in 1887 (Westergaard, 1932: 183). The first ISI Session (today called 
World Statistics Congress) was held in Rome in 1887, and it was 
48 
 
attended by many of the leading statisticians of the time (Westergaard, 
1932: 246). 
 
2.4.2 Excursion: statistics, state building and democracy 
 
In line with the Foucaultian view, which I introduced earlier, many have 
identified a close relationship between state sponsored economic and 
social development and increases in efforts to collect statistics. Starr 
(1987: 16–17) proposes as a general hypothesis that the more extensive 
the scope of state authority over economic and social life, the greater the 
scope, detail, and volume of statistical inquiry – but notes also a number 
of objections to such generalisations. First, the interests of the state do 
not automatically call up systems of thought. Therefore, although the 
Spanish empire kept more comprehensive accounts of its colonies than 
did the English, it was the English who came up with the majority of 
theoretical tools needed to interpret statistical data. Second, although 
more interventionist states may have a broader interest in statistical 
enquiry, they may also arouse more public resistance towards data 
collection. Numerous scholars have related the question of the extent to 
which people have been willing to tolerate their governments collecting 
data on them to the question of whether people have trusted their 
governments, and have therefore proposed that a relationship exists 
between statistics and democratic political rationality. 
 
Starr (1987: 18–19) highlights a number of hypotheses concerning the 
historical link between statistics and democracy. First, one of the 
reasons why democracies have been interested in statistics are their use 
in distributing representation. In the US, the annual census was originally 
mandated as a means of allocating seats in the House of 
Representatives, and the decision to do so helped to change the relation 
between census takers and respondents. Whereas previously, 
respondents had often tried to avoid the census due to its association 
with tax assessment, the decision to make political representation 
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dependent on it created a strong incentive for participation. Secondly, 
Starr hypothesises that in democratic states the public might be more 
willing to give up data also because the aggregate results are usually 
made available publically. Third, in democracies statistics often function 
as a means of presenting and evaluating competing claims for 
legislation, and historical examples suggest that support for public 
provision of statistics has often been based on political purposes, such 
as the needs of legislators for information. Finally, democracy might be 
a particularly hospitable environment for statistics due to their usefulness 
in representing different interest groups, including minorities. 
 
Analysing the more contemporary couplings between statistics and 
democracy, Prewitt (1987) identifies two ways in which official statistics, 
despite their limitations, contribute in his opinion to the functioning of 
democracy. First, by offering the public information on social conditions 
for which the government is responsible, statistics enhance democratic 
accountability. Secondly, by offering especially resource poor social 
groups a means of drawing recognition, statistics help to ensure that 
diverse interests are represented in politics. Prewitt sees pros and cons 
in both uses of statistics but is more optimistic that in the former the 
benefits clearly outweigh the potential negative effects. 
 
Building from perspectives such as these, Rose (1991) argues that 
democratic power is calculated power in that “numbers are intrinsic to 
the forms of justification that give legitimacy to political power”, 
calculating power in that “numbers are integral to the technologies that 
seek to give effect to democracy as a particular set of mechanisms of 
rule” and finally, democratic power requires citizens who calculate about 
power, making numeracy and numericised spaces of public discourse 
essential for making up self-controlling democratic citizens. Modern 
democracy relies, in other words, in numerous ways on the existence of 
a statistical system and a numerically literate population able to interpret 
its outputs. 
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However, the use of statistics is certainly not limited to democratic states 
only, as non-democratic states also make use of them, albeit potentially 
in different ways. In general, the interconnections between statistics, 
state formation and democracy are complex, and no fixed relationship 
can be assumed. The examples of the co-constitution of statistics and 
society that I have covered so far in this chapter demonstrate that 
statistical apparatuses have emerged out of very different social and 
political contexts, and that all states, democratic or not, rely on statistical 
systems to know and govern their populations and economies. What is 
clear however is that official statistics could not have developed far 
without the theoretical innovations that took place in the nineteenth 
century, and it is to this history that I turn my attention next. 
 
2.4.3 The discovery of social phenomena and their stability 
 
As I already mentioned previously, the people working in the newly 
founded statistical societies and institutes were for the most part ordinary 
citizens with very little or no statistical training at all. The statistical 
societies in particular were committed to collecting facts that they argued 
would speak for themselves. However, already at this point many had 
doubts whether the practice made much sense and suggested instead 
that data could be interpreted through the use of theory. As argued by 
both Foucault (2007) and Porter (1986: 40–41) many had at this point 
come to believe that society, like nature, was governed by laws, and that 
these laws could be uncovered by the methods of modern social 
science. 
 
The mathematical foundations of statistics drew heavily on probability 
theory pioneered in the seventeenth century by the mathematician 
Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662). Prompted by a friend interested in 
gambling problems, Pascal introduced the notion of expected value 
thereby laying the foundations for probability theory. In the early 
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nineteenth century, Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749 – 1827), Adrien-Marie 
Legendre (1752 – 1833) and Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777 – 1855) used 
the method of least squares to minimize errors in data measurement in 
the field of astronomy. In 1802, Laplace produced an estimate for the 
entire population of France based on samples from only three 
communities. Despite this achievement, it took long before the majority 
of statistical writers began using probability theory in their work (Hacking, 
1990). 
 
According to Desrosières (1998: 67) the key concern for statistical 
thinkers in the early parts of the nineteenth century was the question of 
how to make single units out of multiple ones. Soon, the notion of the 
average value became a key tool in objectifying the social world, and 
once it became possible to objectify the social world in this way, a debate 
followed on the nature of the object. What was at stake was the question 
of whether society could have an autonomous existence in relation to its 
individual members. 
 
Next, I review a number of answers given to this question. First, I review 
the answer given by the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-
1874), and second, ones given by some of the classical authors of 
Sociology. Even though Quetelet is usually not included in the official 
canon of sociology, his work was similarly to the classics prompted by 
the two revolutions, the political one in France and the economic one in 
England. In their work, both Quetelet and the classics tried to come to 
terms with the rapid breakdown of old social forms and values. 
 
2.4.3.1 Adolphe Quetelet 
 
The Belgian astronomer Quetelet was perhaps the most famous 
nineteenth-century scientist to believe that a numerical social science 
could uncover the laws of society. Quetelet contributed to the emergence 
of modern statistics both as a statistician and as an organiser of 
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statistical activity in nineteenth century Europe. His interest towards 
statistics came initially from his work in astronomy, and he was set apart 
from most of his statistical contemporaries by his commitment to 
mathematics. On the other hand, not many mathematicians or 
astronomers were interested in social questions (Stigler, 1986: 161–
169). 
 
Quetelet’s interest in social phenomena grew especially after a visit to 
Paris in 1824, where he had familiarised himself with the tradition of 
Laplacian probability theory. Around the time, the French government 
had started to publish statistics that indicated that crime remained fairly 
constant from year to year. From this Quetelet concluded that not only 
nature but also society was governed by laws. Furthermore, for Quetelet, 
society should be considered an entity of its own, independent of the 
actions of its individual members. Poisson’s Law of Large Numbers, the 
theorem that general effects in society are always caused by general 
causes, became a fundamental principle of Quetelet’s “social physics” 
(Porter, 1986: 43–52). 
 
The relative regularity of births, marriages and deaths from year to year 
had been discovered already in the eighteenth century, but at that time 
it had been interpreted as further proof that a divine creature was 
directing society from above. According to Desrosières (1998: 74–75) 
Quetelet was able to provide a new answer to the question why there 
nevertheless was such a remarkable diversity of physical and mental 
traits between individuals. Quetelet maintained that the law of error (later 
called the Normal Distribution) was true also for human beings, and that 
this made it possible to determine the average physical and intellectual 
features of a population. This divine creation, the average man, had both 
moral and physical attributes, and his development could be studied over 
time. Quetelet interpreted the normal distribution as evidence that 
departures from the mean were like errors in measurement, so that the 
mean value was the “true value” representing an underlying value or type 
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(Desrosières, 1998: 52–54). Statistical regularities were for Quetelet an 
evidence of determinism: an individual might think that marriage was his 
own choice, but it was in fact pre-determined (Kuusela, 2011b: 83). 
 
Quetelet’s major goal was to measure the changes experienced by the 
average man over time. By doing this, Quetelet hoped to discover the 
forces that acted on the “social body”, and after that predict its future. In 
practice though, no calculations were included in Quetelet’s written work. 
Porter (1986: 54–55) suggests therefore that Quetelet’s lasting 
contribution to statistics came not from his methodological innovations, 
which remained modest, but from the fact that he was able to connect 
French probability theory with the work of the newly founded statistical 
services. 
 
During his lifetime, Quetelet enjoyed a celebrity status as an organiser 
of censuses, statistical services and international statistical congresses. 
He was also important in that he was able to convince his successors 
that instead of looking for concrete causes of individual phenomena, they 
should concentrate on the statistical information presented by the larger 
whole. Quetelet’s hypotheses inspired work that later led to the 
development of many of the statistical principle still in use today 
(Kuusela, 2011b: 84–87). 
 
Based on Quetelet’s idea of the average man, a new type of survey 
research method, the monograph survey, was for example introduced at 
the end of the nineteenth century by Frederic LePlay (1806 – 1882). The 
method was widely used during the nineteenth century especially to 
explore family budgets and even at the start of the twentieth century the 
method was officially still accepted by the International Statistical 
Institute (Kuusela, 2011b: 84). 
 
Probably the most famous of Quetelet’s apprentices was Wilhelm Lexis, 
who is best known for his work on dispersion. Lexis worked mainly on 
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developing mathematical methods for research on the stability of 
statistical series, such as the ratio of sexes at birth. According to Porter 
(1986) Lexis’ emphasis on the measurement of dispersion of statistical 
series was intended as a critique of statistical determinism as advocated 
by Quetelet. Whereas Quetelet aimed to set every series within a unique 
“normal” model by assuming their homogeneity and stability, Lexis 
stressed its fluctuations. It has been suggested that Lexis’ analysis of 
dispersion foreshadowed more modern analysis of variance (Kuusela, 
2011b: 86). 
 
2.4.3.2 The birth of modern sociology 
 
The nineteenth century was also the period in which modern Sociology 
was born. The early classics of the discipline, such as August Comte 
(1798-1857), Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864 – 1920), Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917) were all concerned with objectifying and 
understanding forces that existed outside of the will of the individual. It 
is interesting to note that although the story of the birth of sociology is 
usually presented as a tale of a handful of geniuses inventing theoretical 
frameworks for interpreting social problems, most of the classics were 
early on in their careers engaged in empirical research. Perhaps this 
should not come as such as surprise, especially in light of more recent 
research that has highlighted the role of the early experiments in 
statistics in the emergence of the “sociological imagination” (Bayatrizi, 
2009). Osborne et al. (2008) go as far as to argue that it is largely thanks 
to retrospective commentary that the classics are considered theoretical 
thinkers at all. 
 
August Comte, for example, who coined the term “Sociology”, believed 
that society was governed by social laws but objected strongly to any 
attempts at quantifying them. Comte’s “positive” method was based on 
observation, experiment and comparison. Although he deemed 
observation to be key, he never explained how they should be made or 
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analysed in practice. Comte never engaged in any form of empirical 
inquiry himself, asserting simply that facts were plentiful (Thompson, 
1976). 
 
Max Weber, known usually only as a social theorist, was in fact on 
numerous occasions engaged in empirical work. Weber’s career in 
empirical research included investigations into agricultural and industrial 
labour conditions and investigations into workers' attitudes and work 
histories, utilising both questionnaires and direct observation. In 
addition, Weber used a statistical approach in a study on the 
psychological aspects of factory work and in a critique of another study 
concerning workers' attitudes. In the end, Weber’s attitude towards 
quantitative methods remained ambivalent, and he wondered whether 
empirical work was best left to psychologists. Like many others, Weber 
was in the end unable to integrate his empirical studies with his efforts 
to construct a general sociological theory (Lazarsfeld and Oberschall, 
1965). 
 
Also Karl Marx once tested his skills as a quantitative social researcher. 
In his period of exile in London, Marx used secondary sources, 
government records in particular, to document the extent to which 
workers were being exploited by the capitalist system. In 1880, Marx 
drew up a questionnaire including over one hundred items, and 
distributed it in France to workers societies, to socialist and social 
democratic groups, and to newspapers. The survey covered occupation 
and conditions of work, working hours and leisure activities, terms of 
employment, wages and the cost of living. In the end, Marx received very 
few replies and none of the results were ever published (Kent, 1981: 2–
3). Important to note also is that that many of the ideas that formed the 
basis of Marx’s theories were already apparent in the empirical enquiries 
in to life in Manchester’s slum districts conducted by Frederick Engels in 
the 1840s. Marx, who formed a lifelong partnership with Engels, openly 
admired Engels’ empirical accounts of the condition of the working 
56 
 
classes in England (Kent, 1981: 43). 
 
In the study that is generally considered to have founded quantitative 
sociology, Suicide (1897), Emile Durkheim used statistics to illustrate 
how the individual was dominated by a moral reality greater than himself. 
According to Durkheim, statistics revealed a collective impulse that could 
not be reduced to individual averages as Quetelet had thought. For 
Durkheim, data on numerous individual actions revealed the social 
tendencies that were the actual reasons behind individual behaviour 
(Porter, 1986: 69). Later on, Durkheim attempted a critique of statistical 
knowledge and distanced himself especially from Quetelet’s notion of 
the average type. For Durkheim, Quetelet’s average man was the 
arithmetic result of selfish individuals, whereas his notion of the collective 
type was a reflection of a general will that existed before “the vote of the 
majority” (Desrosières, 1998: 101). 
 
Porter (1995) argues that in the second half of the nineteenth century 
confidence in the value and reliability of statistical laws had reached a 
point where the social science of statistics could become a model for 
certain areas of the physical and biological sciences. Analogies of social 
science were thereafter used to justify the application of statistical 
reasoning to problems such as thermodynamics, heredity, and price 
fluctuations. In light of this it is perhaps surprising that modern sociology 
has been comparatively slow to pick up a probabilistic mode of 
reasoning. This has prevented sociologists from participating in 
interdisciplinary projects to the same extent that for example economists 
have been able to. Erola (2010) suggests that one of the reasons for this 
is the fact that that the early classics of sociology, such as Durkheim’s 
Suicide, were written slightly before probability theory matured in the 
nineteen twenties and thirties. 
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2.5 How to identify the poor? The 
mathematisation of statistics in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century 
 
Although the origins of statistical mathematics lie in the advances in 
probability theory in the eighteenth century, the modern field of statistics 
only emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Desrosières (1998: 103) argues that whereas in the nineteenth century 
the aim of statistical theory had been to objectify aggregates of individual 
objects, in the twentieth century its objective became to measure the 
relationships between objects. 
 
After the Second World War, the hegemonic mode social scientific 
reasoning has been to regard environmental factors as the key in 
explaining recursive patterns in social behaviour. In light of this it is 
perhaps surprising that the origins of mathematical statistics lie not in 
social scientific work as we typically understand it today, but in an 
attempt to prove that it is in fact biology, and not the environment, which 
explains why some people end up affluent and happy, while others 
remain poor and less happy. 
 
In contemporary versions of the debate around nature versus nurture it 
is furthermore often forgotten that at least in Britain, modern Sociology 
emerged out of an institutional battle between the proponents of 
biological explanations, on the one side, and those who thought that 
biology and society were best kept separate, on the other (Renwick, 
2012). Whereas the latter camp won the institutional battle, and was 
therefore able to assert a major influence on what was to be deemed as 
the legitimate mode of reasoning in the social sciences, the former camp 
invented the statistical tools of correlation and regression widely used 
today also outside of the domain of the social sciences. 
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2.5.1 Eugenecists, social reformers, and the question about the 
nature of poverty 
 
After a period of prosperity in the mid nineteenth century, the Victorian 
boom, social tensions were again on the rise in the last decades of the 
century. A depression had decreased prices and profits, and the 
interests of capitalists and workers were once again diverging. In 
London, clearances to make way for railways, government offices and 
warehouses had created an increased pressure on housing, which had 
led to overcrowding. These conditions resulted in demonstrations, 
strikes and rioting, raising again the fears of the middle classes that 
violence might arise from below (Kent, 1981: 64). 
 
In Britain, urban degeneration was seen not just as a domestic problem, 
but also as something that was threatening the military strength of the 
empire. While some parts of the middle-classes, sometimes referred to 
as the social reformers, believed that social tensions could be alleviated 
by lifting people out of poverty through social reform, others, the 
eugenicists, believed that the problem had a biological nature, and that 
it could therefore only be solved through a biological solution. Neither 
the social reformers, nor the eugenicists believed that the working 
classes a whole constituted a problem, only its degenerate parts 
(MacKenzie, 1981: 39–40). 
 
A key methodological concern for the nineteenth century social 
reformers and eugenicists was therefore the question of how to identify 
the degenerate parts of the working classes. One solution to the problem 
was offered by the famous social explorer, Charles Booth, who, along 
with his team of researchers surveyed the streets of London and 
allocated each in to one of seven categories, from the wealthy upper-
middle and upper classes to the vicious and semi-criminal. Booth 
concluded that contrary to some popular suggestions according to which 
a third of London’s population lived in absolute poverty, the actual 
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number was in fact only eight percent. Even more importantly, only one 
percent of the entire population of London belonged to the group that 
constituted the really dangerous parts of the working classes (Kent, 
1981: 55, 1985: 56–57). 
 
Booth’s suggestions as to what should be done with these people was 
not much more humane than those put forward by the eugenicists. Booth 
argued that the very poorest should be allocated in to workhouses to be 
taught work discipline, while their children would be taken away and 
raised under strict supervision. Those that failed to work properly in 
these camps would be sent to poorhouses, and their children would be 
taken away from them for good. Those that succeeded, however, would 
be allowed to re-enter society. For Booth, this constituted a form of state 
socialism where the state was allowed to exercise its power over those 
that could not help themselves, and that constituted a danger both to 
their communities and to society as a whole (Kent, 1981: 59, 1985: 55–
56). 
 
Another solution to the problem of how to identify the degenerate parts 
of the working classes came from that part of the middle classes who 
believed that poverty resulted not from environmental factors, but from 
biology. Francis Galton (1822 – 1911) used Booth’s social classification 
as an indicator of natural individual aptitude and argued that just like 
height, genetic worth too was innate and normally distributed. Whereas 
Quetelet had viewed the normal distribution of human attributes as the 
result of a large number of variable random causes, Galton wanted to 
isolate the one cause he saw as crucial, heredity. By seeking an 
explanation to the paradox that although by knowing the height of the 
father, one could not determine the height of the son, and yet the 
dispersion from generation to generation remained constant, Galton was 
able to formulate the concept of regression (Desrosières, 1998: 113–
116). 
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Galton believed that each individual possessed a fixed quantity of the 
characteristics that made up his or her civic worth. Whereas the lowest 
of Booth’s categories corresponded to the groups with the smallest 
quantities of civic worth, the highest categories constituted for Galton the 
“brains of the nation”. Galton therefore, in effect, read the structure of 
Booth’s social classes onto nature. On the basis of this theory, particular 
social policies were put forward. “Positive eugenics” meant boosting the 
fertility of the upper classes, while “negative eugenics” meant preventing 
the lower social groups from breeding. Eugenicists did not regard 
environmental factors as having much importance, since at the end of 
the day they would only lead to acquired characteristics that could not 
be inherited (MacKenzie, 1981: 18–19). 
  
From 1860s to the 1880s, Galton worked on statistical problems with the 
occasional help of a number of mathematicians. During this period 
Galton formulated the concepts of regression and correlation, and 
thereby extended the range of statistics from questions concerning 
single variables to questions concerning many. Galton was able to 
demonstrate that genetic combinations were governed by the laws of 
probability, and that this implied a stability of inherited characteristics 
(MacKenzie, 1981: 10). 
 
These ideas had a major influence on the mathematician Karl Pearson 
(1857 – 1936), who while developing and systemising Galton’s insights, 
made many important contributions of his own. The standard formula for 
the correlation coefficient and the widely-used “chi-square” test of the 
goodness of fit between observations and theoretical predictions are 
both named after him. Pearson also became the first head of a statistical 
department at a university. In addition, he established and edited 
Biometrika, a journal which from 1901 onwards became the major 
publication venue for work in statistical theory. Pearson managed his 
own group of researchers, the biometricians, and taught the first courses 
in advanced statistical theory (MacKenzie, 1981: 10). 
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Pearon’s student George Udny Yule (1871 – 1951) became interested 
in applying statistical techniques to social problems. Yule took Pearson’s 
formulation of the correlation coefficient and laid the foundations for 
partial correlation and linear regression for any number of variables. His 
interest in the relationship between pauperism and out-relief (assistance 
given to a poor person who did not live in a workhouse) led him to invent 
“Yule’s Q”, a statistic that can be used to measure associations between 
sets of categorical data (Selvin, 1985: 74–75). 
 
Yule’s interest in the relationship between pauperism and out-relief 
(financial assistance given to poor people not living in a workhouse) was 
prompted by Booth’s studies of poverty in London. Despite this, and in 
addition the fact that Yule actually wrote a commentary criticising Booth 
for the way he had interpreted his data, Booth never used correlation or 
regression in his studies. It is interesting that despite probably being 
aware of the developments made by Galton, Pearson and Yule through 
publications such as the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, none of 
the late nineteenth century social explorers, Booth, Rowntree, or anyone 
else, used correlation or regression coefficients even though their 
accounts of poverty were otherwise highly numerical (Kent, 1981: 97, 
1985: 65–66; Selvin, 1985: 70–75). 
 
The credibility of biological explanations to social phenomenon started 
to weaken from the First World War onwards, only to completely lose 
momentum as a consequence of the atrocities of the Nazi regime during 
the Second World War. Some of the research questions of eugenics 
were integrated in to human genetics, and correlation and regression 
became widely applied in many fields of research, also outside of the 
social sciences. At this point, academic sociology became closely tied to 
an expanding government welfare apparatus (Osborne and Rose, 
2008). 
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MacKenzie’s (1981) notes on why the environmental explanations “won” 
the scientific debate after the Second World War are somewhat 
haunting. According to Mackenzie, after the war, environmental factors 
were better suited for the political context of a welfare state that wanted 
to integrate the majority of the population in to society. He (1981: 50) 
continues: 
As that accommodation comes under threat in the 1980s, it would not 
surprise me if the tactical balance begins to shift back towards 
eugenics.  
This brings to mind recent statements by the British politician, Boris 
Johnson, according to whom the recent growth in inequality can partially 
at least be attributed to the superior intellectual ability of those at the very 
top of society (Johnson, 2013). 
 
2.5.2 The method of choice of the post-war welfare state: The 
sample survey 
 
The period after the Second World War was characterised by the 
prevalence, or indeed dominance, of the sample survey. The Norwegian 
Anders Kiaer (1838 – 1919) is often attributed as the first person to have 
suggested that a representative sample should be used instead of a 
complete enumeration. In 1894, Kiaer conducted a representative 
survey in Norway that covered occupation, income, expenditure, days 
missed from work, marriage and the number of children, and soon after, 
the initiative was widely discussed at the international statistical 
congress (Kruskal and Mosteller, 1980: 172–175). 
 
Since Kiaer was not mathematically oriented, his presentations did not 
include a formal description of his method. What Kiaer wanted to 
demonstrate was that by taking some precautions in the choice of a 
sample, it was possible to obtain sufficiently good results with a few 
control variables (already present in exhaustive enumerations) to 
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suppose that the results were good enough for the other variables too. 
The technical formulation of the confidence interval was presented by 
Arthur Bowley in 1906 (Kruskal and Mosteller, 1980: 175–184). 
 
When presenting his method to the International Statistical Institute in 
1885, one of the justifications Kiaer gave for it was that in contrast to 
previous surveys, the representative sample included all classes of 
society. Kiaer emphasised that in order to properly assess the condition 
of the working classes, one had to also be familiar with the condition of 
the other classes. Desrosières (1998: 227) argues that by doing this, 
Kiaer was among the first to raise the issue of social inequality. Kiaer 
viewed his survey method as useful in creating funds for retirement and 
social security, guaranteeing social standardization, and in the statistical 
treatment of risks. 
 
Desrosières (1998: 221) suggests that the history of the sample survey 
can therefore be read in parallel with the emergence of the welfare state. 
Whereas previously statistics had been used for holistic analyses of the 
social world, by the late nineteenth century they started being used in 
applying and evaluating policies designed to affect individuals. The 
establishment of the first laws of social protection, the development of 
national consumer markets, and the possibility of nationwide electoral 
campaigns were key factors behind the increasing popularity of the 
sample survey. All of the aforementioned are indicative of a change 
whereby local modes of management began being replaced by national 
ones. 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, social surveys had especially in 
Britain been accompanied by a recommendation to improve the morality 
of the working classes. Both the social reformers and the eugenicists 
had wanted to identify the morally corrupt parts of the working classes in 
order to prevent them from causing harm to society. Poverty was in this 
context seen as fundamentally a spatial phenomenon. The early studies 
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in to urban poverty put this premise into question. One of Booth’s major 
findings was for example that poverty was barely lower in the whole of 
London than in the East End. Joseph Rowntree (1836 - 1925), on the 
other hand, discovered that the percentage of poor people was almost 
the same in York as in London. As a result, it became increasingly 
difficult to see poverty as something that resulted from the lack of 
morality of some individuals in some localities. Instead, poverty started 
being seen as a structural problem on the national level, one that could 
not be treated locally, but only with national policies (Desrosières, 1998: 
221). 
 
Another contributing factor in the growth in popularity of the sample 
survey was an increasing debate surrounding the rivalry between large 
industrial towns. The English Board of Trade received significant public 
funds to conduct a major survey of working conditions in a large number 
of different towns in different countries. A by-product of these 
international comparisons were comparisons between towns within 
countries. Although the survey did not apply probabilistic methods, it was 
therefore the first method with an international scope (Desrosières, 
1998: 221). 
 
These developments gave Arthur Bowley (1869 – 1957), an economist 
and statistician with a background in mathematics, the impetus to 
formulate and standardise the conditions that made representative 
surveys possible (Hoinville, 1985: 103–104). In contrast to Booth and 
Rowntree, Bowley did not base his assessments of poverty on visual 
impressions made during visits to households, but instead, he used 
quantifiable and constant variables. He was also not interested in the 
question of whether poverty was caused by a lack of individual morality 
or by structural forces (Desrosières, 1998: 224). Desrosières (1998: 224, 
166–167) argues therefore that by replacing moral judgements with 
neutral technical assessments, Bowley laid the foundations for a new 
profession, that of the professional government statistician. 
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After the Second World War, the sample survey became arguably the 
most important technical tool of social enquiry, utilised both by the 
government and by academic researchers. In Britain at least, the 
background for its growing use in government were the needs of the war 
time economy. There, the wartime social survey became a means of 
gathering quantitative information to supplement qualitative data 
obtained from elsewhere, concerning in particular the question of “public 
morale”. The early inquiries reflected the immediate needs of the 
wartime government, and included topics such as nutrition, prevalence 
of illnesses, and obstacles to service. After the war, the survey started 
being used as an instrument for planning in the longer term. It was 
discovered that with the sample survey, it was for the first time possible 
to for example provide a detailed picture of the housing situation in the 
country as a whole (Whitehead, 1985: 84–85). 
 
Savage (2010: 201) concludes that after the war, the capacity to conduct 
a sample survey became the key feature of a modern state. By allowing 
new ways to track changes in things such as inflation rates, crime rates 
and poverty rates, it helped to create the concept of a flat, bounded, 
homogenous national space which did not exist before then. 
Furthermore, because it allowed for the measurement of “social 
mobility”, it became a key tool in campaigns for comprehensive, rather 
than selective education (Savage, 2010: 210–211). 
  
By the 1970s, therefore, the sample survey had become a key tool for 
assessing social democratic concerns with poverty and inequality, 
applied often by the government in collaboration with leading social 
science centres. However, this constellation came in to question in 
1980s, as the British government grew increasingly impatient with the 
time demands of the surveys. As the technique matured and the findings 
became more and more mundane, the government became less 
compelled to wait for the results. At this point social scientists had 
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become increasingly able to analyse data according to their own time 
schedules and the government became more catholic and eclectic in its 
choice of research methods (Savage, 2010: 211–212). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed literature around the history of statistics 
and its sociological interpretations. From this exploration emerged the 
conceptual starting point of this thesis: that statistics emerge out of a co-
constitutive interaction between, methodological and technological 
developments, on the one hand, and changes in the political and 
administrative world, on the other. Governmental rationalities, 
particularly in relation to the question of how to best address social 
issues, have historically formed an integral component of this co-
constitution. 
  
Instead of a conclusive history, I highlighted four important 
configurations of this co-constitution in the history of statistics. I began 
by looking at early examples of official statistics when rulers of early 
civilisations produced some form of aggregate statistics on their 
populations. In seventeenth century Germany, university professors 
began using cross-tabulations to make literal comparisons between 
states, and around the same time in England, the so called political 
arithmeticians used data obtained from church rolls to calculate the first 
fertility and mortality tables. 
 
Despite these developments, statistics concerning human populations 
did not emerge properly until the nineteenth century. Desrosières (1990: 
195) argues that historically, statistics have been concerned with the 
question of “how to make things which hold together”. One influential 
answer to this question came from the Belgian astronomer and early 
statistician Quetelet, who introduced the notion of the average value and 
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normal distribution to the study of human populations. For him, the 
average physical and intellectual features of a population constituted an 
average man, a divine creation whose development the social 
statistician could study. 
 
Quetelet’s conception of social forces that existed before the will of the 
individual informed the classical authors of sociology, such as Comte, 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Although the story of the birth of the 
discipline is today usually told as a tale of a handful of geniuses inventing 
theoretical frameworks for interpreting social problems, most of the 
classics were in fact engaged in empirical social research. More recent 
commentaries have emphasised the role of the early experiments with 
statistics, such as those conducted by the political arithmeticians, in the 
formation of the “sociological imagination” (Bayatrizi, 2009). What 
Quetelet and the classics furthermore shared was the social context in 
which they operated, as they were both confronted by the rapid social 
changes brought about by the twin revolutions in France and England. 
 
The political tensions brought about by industrial capitalism formed the 
backdrop also for the mathematisation of statistics which occurred in the 
early parts of the twentieth century. Parts of the working classes were 
seen as forming a threat to society by the middle classes, and the 
statistical techniques of correlation and regression emerged out of an 
attempt to prove that it was in fact biology, and not the environment, 
which explained why some people ended up poor and dangerous. 
Poverty was seen as a local problem that could be solved by identifying 
those who were beyond helping by conventional means. 
 
The expansion of research techniques put this belief in to question. The 
unprecedented scale of the studies of Booth and Rowntree proved that 
poverty existed not just locally, but at the national level. In the wake of 
the Second World War, the nationally representative sample survey 
became the method of choice of the emerging welfare state. Whereas 
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the sample survey was the method of choice of the welfare state, it 
remains to be seen what type of a society Big Data will be a reflection 
of. It is this intellectual task that I take up in chapter four. Before that 
however, in the next chapter I explore in more detail the historical 
development of statistics in the country where my fieldwork was based, 
Finland. 
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3 A brief history of social statistics in 
Finland 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Sweden’s first national population statistics were compiled in 1749 by 
the king of Sweden, Fredrik 1. Sweden had for some time been a major 
military power in Northern Europe, but by 1749 its power was fading. 
This became ever more apparent with the results of the first population 
statistics. The government was horrified to discover that instead of a 
population of twenty million, Sweden only had two million inhabitants. In 
addition, the population statistics revealed many social problems, such 
as high mortality and migration rates, and the news about a population 
enumeration being undertaken raised such widespread interest that the 
government decided to keep the results secret. Although by now there 
had been many attempts at counting the population in other countries 
too, Sweden was the first to start compiling population statistics annually. 
As a result, Sweden and Finland (a country that was part of Sweden until 
the early nineteenth century) today have the longest consistent statistics 
on population and population changes in the world. 
 
The early interest in official statistics in the Nordic countries has 
continued through the centuries, and today, population statistics in 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark are arguably among the most 
comprehensive in the world. The first statistics were in these countries 
compiled from records of births and deaths maintained by the Lutheran 
church. Therefore, when Finland in 1990 became only the second 
country after Denmark to have its census based entirely on data derived 
from various administrative registers held within the state, it in fact 
reverted back to centuries-old data collection methods (Alho, 1999). Due 
to their perceived advantages, such as low cost and low respondent 
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burden, register-based statistics have in recent years gained increasing 
popularity also outside of the Nordic countries (UNECE, 2007). 
 
In this chapter I review the development of official statistics in Finland, 
from the parish catalogues in the Kingdom of Sweden to the modern 
administrative registers in Finland as an independent republic. As 
pointed out by for example Kitchin (2014b: 17), despite data having both 
a temporality and a spatiality, to date there have not been many histories 
and geographies of data assemblages. In this chapter, therefore, I seek 
to ground the ongoing changes in official statistics, which I will attend to 
in the empirical part of the thesis, in an understanding of historical 
configurations of the co-constitution of official statistics in Finland. 
Instead of attempting to conduct a complete taxonomy, I focus my 
attention on some of the main reconfigurations that have occurred. I 
highlight in particular shifting jurisdictions between different institutions 
involved in the production and maintenance of data and the making of 
statistics. Furthermore, I start each section with a brief historical 
overview of the period in question. Due to a limited availability of 
sources, I rely heavily on only a handful of sources especially when 
covering early configurations of statistics in Finland. 
 
I begin by exploring statistics in the Kingdom of Sweden, a country that 
Finland was part of for over half a millennium. There, the monarch’s 
administration’s initially lukewarm interest towards statistics was later 
heightened as a result of war. This increasing interest in combination 
with the arrival of new intellectual currents from central Europe 
culminated in the formation of the first national population data collection 
system in the world, Tabellverket (Tables office), in 1756. After that, I 
examine statistics in the period beginning at the start of the nineteenth 
century in which Finland formed an autonomous Grand Duchy within the 
Russian empire. In this period, a temporary weakness of Russia allowed 
Finland to take a significant step towards independence by establishing 
its own Central Statistical Office. Then, I explore statistics in the period 
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shortly after Finland gained her independence in 1917, when, despite 
the social and political turmoil surrounding it, the work of the Central 
Statistical Office continued uninterrupted.  After that I focus my attention 
on developments following the Second World War, in particular the 
period beginning in the 1960s in which a register-based statistical 
system was established as part of the technologies of an emerging 
welfare state. Following Alastalo (2009b), I define register-based 
statistics as a form of welfare state governmentality, after which I explore 
some of their uses in social scientific research along with a more general 
reflection on methodological developments in Finland. I conclude the 
chapter by drawing a number of analytical conclusions from the review 
conducted. 
 
3.2 Statistics in Finland: From parish catalogues 
to governmental registers 
 
3.2.1 Statistics in the Kingdom of Sweden (c. 1250 – 1809) 
 
Though interesting to both the Catholic Church in Sweden and to the 
Greek Orthodox Church in Novgorod (Russia), up until mid-twelfth 
century, the land area that today constitutes Finland was a political 
vacuum. In the thirteenth century, however, the struggle for the political 
and economic control of the coastal region of the Gulf of Finland 
intensified into a battle of which Sweden eventually came out on top. A 
peace treaty was signed between Sweden and Novgorod in Nöteborg in 
1323, which assigned only eastern parts of Finland to Novgorod, while 
the western and southern parts of Finland were tied to Sweden and 
hence to the cultural sphere of Western Europe (Meinander, 2011: 8–
10). 
 
Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Finland developed 
into an economically and militarily important part of the Swedish realm. 
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As a result of Swedish rule, Sweden’s social and judicial systems took 
root also in Finland. Since feudalism was not a part of this system, 
Finnish peasants never became serfs, but were always able to retain 
their personal freedom. In that time period, Finland’s most important 
economic and cultural centre was Turku, a town in the east coast of 
Finland, and a notable trading post already in the Viking period (800 – 
1025 AD). The castle of Turku, built between the thirteenth and the 
sixteenth centuries, is still today Finland’s most important religious 
edifice (Meinander, 2011: 6–17).  
 
By the mid sixteenth century, the Reformation set in motion by Luther 
had reached Sweden, and eventually, the Catholic Church lost out to the 
Lutheran faith. As a consequence of the Lutheran conviction that the 
fellowship with God was personal and direct, and that therefore all 
Christians should be able to read the Bible for themselves, Finnish-
language culture started to rise.  Although some historians have 
estimated that the same tongue has prevailed in Finland for more than 
ten thousand years, there was no written Finnish language before the 
sixteenth century. In 1548, The New Testament was translated into 
Finnish by the Bishop of Turku, Mikael Agricola. Despite this 
achievement, it was not until the 1880s that Finnish overtook Swedish 
as the official language in Finland. Until then, the language of the court 
and the aristocracy was Swedish (Meinander, 2011: 23–25). 
 
Between 1617 and 1721, Sweden was at the height of its power. During 
this period, often described by popular historians as the Great Power 
period, Sweden extended its realm around the Baltic, and managed, due 
to the temporary weakness of Russia, to push the Finnish border further 
to the east. With consolidation of power in Stockholm, uniform Swedish 
rule was extended in Finland. The newly established civil service 
departments were often led by Swedes, a factor that helped to 
strengthen the relative position of the Swedish language in Finland 
(Meinander, 2011: 35–39). 
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The earliest forms of governmental statistics in Finland therefore trace 
back to the time when Finland was still a province of the Kingdom of 
Sweden. From the sixteenth century onwards, the Swedish monarch’s 
administration maintained various registers of people that could be 
taxed. Land registers contained detailed information on individuals 
practicing agriculture and the customs authorities kept records on 
foreign trade. Information from various parts of the country were sent to 
the capital, Stockholm, where a national summary was compiled. By the 
seventeenth century, the central government had started using this data 
for investigation and planning (Luther, 1993: 21). 
 
Another important source of early statistics were the parish catalogues 
maintained by the Lutheran church. These registers included records of 
births, marriages, deaths, and lists of parishioners, also known as 
Communion books. Following the example set by countries in central 
Europe, registers on marriages, christening and burials were ordered 
compulsory in the 1686 church law (Myllys, 1981: 55). Already at that 
time the parish catalogues included information on where “a person had 
come from, how he had behaved and where he had gone” (Nieminen, 
1999: 8). Even though the registers were initially collected to serve the 
church’s internal purposes, their usefulness in enumerating social 
phenomenon was quickly discovered. The first mortality and fertility 
tables were in Sweden calculated by Lutheran ministers in the early parts 
of eighteenth century (Nieminen, 1999: 8–9). 
 
However, it was not until the Great Northern War (1700 – 21) that the 
government truly became interested in the possibilities offered by 
statistics. The war, which saw Sweden lose its hegemony over the Baltic, 
resulted in many casualties, raising the government’s concern whether 
a sufficient workforce still existed. In addition, the government believed 
that outmigration was posing a serious threat to the future existence of 
the country (Nieminen, 1999: 9). The war had furthermore brought an 
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end to absolute monarchy, and the resulting power shift from the 
monarch to a parliament led by the estates resulted in a heightened 
interest in the wellbeing of the common people (Luther, 1993: 21; 
Meinander, 2011: 56–57). 
 
Already in the early parts of eighteenth century, some members of the 
board of trade had suggested that a population count based on parish 
catalogues should be undertaken. This suggestion was initially objected 
out of a fear that it would lead to the same dire consequences as to King 
David in the bible, who having decided to count his kingdom’s population 
had ended up with widespread plague in his kingdom (Luther, 1993: 23). 
These types of worries were, however, soon set aside by the arrival of 
new intellectual currents from central Europe. 
 
One sign of the arrival of the Age of Enlightenment in Sweden was the 
formation of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in 1739. In 
addition to its central tasks of advancing research in the natural sciences 
and establishing conditions for economic prosperity, since early on its 
member also held an interest in demographics (Luther, 1993: 23). As I 
covered in more detail in the previous chapter, the eighteenth century 
was in general a period of increasing interest towards quantitative 
descriptions of social phenomenon. Although Sweden was 
geographically in the periphery, many of its intellectuals were offered the 
opportunity to study abroad, which helped to ensure that the Swedish 
academy was kept up to date on the latest developments in science. 
Through its connections to science societies in other countries, such as 
to the Royal Society of London in England, the Swedish academy was 
aware of the developments in political arithmetic (Luther, 1993: 23; 
Nieminen, 1999: 9). 
 
In 1746, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences handed the parliament 
an estimation of the population count of Sweden and around the same 
time, army officials suggested that a population count should be 
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conducted on a yearly basis. In 1749, the first official population statistics 
were compiled with the support of the parliament, and seven years later, 
the first national population data collection system in the world, 
Tabellverket (Tables Office), was established (Luther, 1993: 23). 
Although Tabellverket is often regarded as a predecessor to the modern 
statistical agency, its tasks were modest in comparison. 
 
Three separate steps were used to gather the data in the original 
population data collection system. First, Lutheran ministers copied the 
information from the parish catalogues on to forms prepared by the 
Tables Office. Each church then forwarded its forms to a provost, whose 
task it then was to prepare a summary for the municipality. Summaries 
of municipalities were combined in to a summary for the entire province 
which was then sent to the capital, Stockholm, for a national summary. 
As I mentioned already in the introduction, the results of the first data 
collection were treated as a highly sensitive state secret (Myrskylä, 
2011). 
 
The first population enumeration was conducted with three different 
forms. Two forms were used for births, deaths and marriages, and one 
form was used for the population count divided in to age groups. Initially 
ministers had to inform the population count on a yearly basis, but later 
the interval was reduced to three years in order to reduce the work load 
on the ministers. Births, deaths and marriages were categorised 
according to gender and month, and each birth was also categorised 
according to whether it took place within or outside of a marriage 
(Nieminen, 1999: 12). 
 
Initially only those burials that took place on the churchyard were 
reported. From early on, children that died before their first birthday were 
reported separately from others. This practice allowed for the first time 
the examination of infant mortality. Deaths were classified according to 
the cause of death and the deceased’s marital status. The classification 
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of diseases caused uncertainty among the ministers, who were later on 
handed guidelines on the typical signs of different diseases (Nieminen, 
1999: 12–13). 
 
Even the earliest data collection forms included a section on a social 
stratification. In the eighteenth century, the Swedish society was strictly 
divided in to two halves. The first half was formed of those who belonged 
to one of the estates, nobility, clergy, burghers or the land owning 
peasants, and the latter half was formed of the majority of the population, 
who did not belong to any of the estates (Nieminen, 1999: 12). The early 
data collection forms are illustrative of how strong social divisions were 
also in those days. Knights and nobility were included as one group, 
while burghers, clergy, and land-owning peasants formed a group of 
their own. Additional groups included those public servants that did not 
belong to the nobility, and those artisans that were not considered as 
being part of the burghers. As a consequence of the fixity of the estate 
system, the estateless population grew fast. A clear division also existed 
between cities and rural areas. Most trading activities were not allowed 
outside of the cities, but eventually the government could not prevent it 
from taking place at the countryside as well (Nieminen, 1999: 14–15). 
 
The reformation of data collection forms in 1802 showed signs of the 
crumbling of the estate system. From there on, people were no longer 
divided in to six estates, but instead the new forms included a section on 
a person’s occupational status. Scholars, store-assistants, journeymen 
and apprentices were each considered to form a group of their own. With 
this classificatory scheme, it was for the first time possible to distinguish 
between the employed and the unemployed population (Nieminen, 
1999: 14–15). 
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3.2.2 Statistics in the Grand Duchy of Finland (1809 – 1917) 
 
The second major turning point in Finland’s history occurred as a 
consequence of Russia’s rise to dominance in the Baltic region in the 
eighteenth century. In this period, Sweden lost its position as a major 
power in the north and was forced to adapt to a new power balance in 
Europe. As a result of the 1808 – 1809 war between Sweden and 
Russia, Sweden lost its eastern part to Russia (Meinander, 2011: 55) 
 
During the Swedish reign, Finland had been a mere group of provinces 
lacking a sense of national identity, and governed from Stockholm, the 
capital of the provinces at that time. However, when Finland in 1809 
became a part of Russia, it was established as an autonomous Grand 
Duchy within the Russian empire. The Russian Emperor, Alexander I, 
became the Grand Duke of Finland, and one of his representatives 
assumed the position of Governor General (Meinander, 2011: 77). In this 
period, Finland’s highest governing body was a Senate that consisted 
entirely of Finnish members. Matters concerning Finland were presented 
directly to the Emperor in St Petersburg without interference from other 
Russian authorities (Meinander, 2011: 78–79). 
 
By granting Finland extensive autonomy, Alexander I gave Finland the 
opportunity to develop in to an independent state. In 1812, he decided 
to move the capital from Turku to Helsinki in order to gain a strategic 
advantage over the Gulf of Finland. The university which had been 
founded in Turku in 1640, was also relocated to Helsinki. By making 
Helsinki the administrative capital of the Grand Duchy, Alexander I 
hoped to reduced Swedish influences in Finland (Meinander, 2011: 77–
81). 
 
The union with Russia gave rise to a nationalist movement in Finland. At 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, more than 85 percent of the 
population in Finland spoke various Finnish dialects, but Swedish 
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remained the language of the administrative elite. In this period, a 
number of prominent cultural figures, notably Elias Lönnrot (1802 – 
1884), J.L. Runeberg (1804 – 1877), and J.V. Snellman (1806 – 1881) 
became convinced of the intrinsic national spirit of the Finnish language 
and decided to mould ancient Finnish folk poetry in to a literary whole. 
The Finnish national epic, The Kalevala, written by Elias Lönnrot, was 
published in 1835 (Meinander, 2011: 87–92). 
 
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War resulted in growing autonomy for the 
Grand Duchy. In 1863, after a break of more than half a century, the Tsar 
allowed the Grand Duchy’s parliament to assemble. Over the next four 
decades, the estates met regularly to discuss the language question, the 
modernisation of society, and the Grand Duchy’s constitutional status 
within the empire. The Conscription Act of 1878 gave the Grand Duchy 
its own army (Meinander, 2011: 97–100). 
 
The years from 1899 to 1917 are often described as a period of 
“Russification” and oppression in historical literature. Although it is true 
that in this period the Russian authorities made many attempts at 
strengthening their grip on the Grand Duchy, it was also a time period of 
growing commercial activity and a thriving civic society. Positive social 
developments freed resources to defend the gradually more outspoken 
independence within the Russian empire. In 1906, Finland’s four estate 
parliament was replaced by a single-chamber legislature, and the 
following year its first two hundred members were elected by universal 
suffrage. Finnish women therefore became first to gain full eligibility to 
vote in parliamentary elections in Europe (Meinander, 2011: 117–119). 
 
The transition to Russian rule had hardly any noticeable effect in the 
daily lives of the people, and many governmental practices that had been 
initiated under the Swedish reign, including the regular compiling of 
population statistics, were kept in place. In 1812, the area of the so called 
Old Finland that had previously been part of Russia, was incorporated in 
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to the Grand Duchy, and as a result, Finland received a considerable 
Orthodox population. In addition, many Russian officials and soldiers 
moved to Finland. This population was however never included in the 
official statistics, since those were based on the Lutheran parish 
catalogues (Nieminen, n.d.). 
 
As I covered in detail in the previous chapter, the early parts of the 
nineteenth century was a period of growing enthusiasm towards 
statistics, eventually leading to the formation of statistical societies and 
agencies across Europe (Hacking, 1982). The international statistical 
congress organised every second year provided a forum for debate and 
collaboration across countries (Westergaard, 1932). 
 
These developments raised an awareness that the Grand Duchy of 
Finland also needed its own statistical agency. In 1865, during a period 
of a temporary weakness of Russia, the Russian emperor accepted the 
senate’s request of permission for the founding of a Central Statistical 
Office (Myllys, 1981: 59). The office’s first task was to gather the data 
scattered around different parts of the government in to one place. As a 
result, the first Statistical Yearbook of Finland was published in 1870 
(Luther, 1993: 55–57). 
 
The late nineteenth century was a period of rapid social change also in 
peripheries such as Finland. One sign of the changing tides was the 
gradual crumbling of the estate system. Industrialisation and 
urbanisation brought with them new occupational groups, and as a result 
the church found it increasingly difficult to keep a record of its members. 
Traditionally an individual’s occupation had been determined by the 
occupation of the head of the family, but in the new social circumstances 
this was no longer necessarily the case. The rapid social changes in the 
late nineteenth century therefore significantly weakened the reliability of 
the parish catalogues (Nieminen, 1999: 20). 
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In a letter sent to the senate in 1869, the Central Statistical Office 
suggested that due to the unreliability of the parish catalogues, a 
separate census would need to be conducted in the larger cities (Luther, 
1993: 71). Sweden had recently began gathering its population data on 
individual level forms, and this was in Finland too seen as the solution 
for the problems that existed with the parish catalogues. Fearing an 
increase in their work burden, these plans were initially ferociously 
objected by the Lutheran ministers (Nieminen, 1999: 21) 
 
Despite the objections, population statistics were in 1870 gathered on 
individual level forms in Helsinki, Turku, Vyborg and Oulu. This was to 
be the first modern census conducted in Finland. In each city, the census 
was undertaken by a committee led by the county governor. The 
committee was formed of people that were familiar with the local 
conditions, such as the vicar, the mayor and the chief of police. Cities 
were divided in to separate areas that each had their own calculation 
office undertaking the actual counting. House owners provided the 
calculation offices with lists of houses and their inhabitants (Luther, 
1993: 71). 
 
One major problem with the parish catalogues was their inability to 
provide a sufficient level of detail on living conditions. To address this 
problem, the 1870 censuses gathered information separately in each 
household and classified them according to neighbourhood and block. 
Each person was categorised by marital status, mother tongue, literacy 
rate, religion and occupational status. In addition, information was 
collected on the blind, the deaf and the mentally disabled. This was also 
the first time that information was gathered on the number of 
households, apartments and buildings (Nieminen, 1999: 21). 
 
Preliminary announcements about the purpose of the censuses were 
unable to alleviate the widespread suspicion that they raised. Especially 
the poor were eager to leave the city for until the perceived threat was 
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over. In order to address this issue, the police was commissioned to 
conduct the information gathering in the poorer neighbourhoods a few 
weeks after the initial data collection had taken place (Luther, 1993: 71). 
 
Another important step towards national census in the modern sense 
was the statistics reform in 1877. After this, national population statistics 
were still compiled from information provided by the parish catalogues, 
but the accuracy of the information improved somewhat. Births and 
deaths were for example now reported yearly, which made it possible to 
calculate accurate life expectancy tables. Statistics on migration were 
also now reported yearly, unlike previously, where this had been the 
case only in the larger cities. Whereas previously only those divorces 
that had resulted from the death of a spouse had been reported, now 
legal divorces were also included. Classifications on the causes of death 
were simplified, and only those diseases that had clear symptoms were 
being reported (Nieminen, 1999: 20). 
 
The nineteenth century was a period of mass migration to America. 
Initially only people from the western parts of Finland had moved there, 
but eventually migration started taking place from other parts too. 
Migration to and from Russia was common as well. The inability to keep 
statistics on these migration patterns was a big problem since it meant 
that the actual population was in many municipalities much higher than 
officially reported (Nieminen, 1999: 23). 
 
Like today, migration was seen as the cause of many social problems. 
Vaasa and Oulu, the two cities that had experienced the largest amount 
of out-migration, were the first to start reporting migration numbers. Soon 
this practice was taken up in other cities and municipalities as well. From 
1900 to 1980 migration statistics in Finland were derived from passport 
catalogues. From early on, migrants were categorised according to sex, 
age, marital status and occupation (Nieminen, 1999: 24).  
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In spite of numerous efforts, a national census based on individual level 
forms was not undertaken in Finland during the nineteenth century. The 
Russian government had planned to conduct one in mid 1910s, but the 
plan was postponed when the First World War broke out in 1914 
(Nieminen, 1999: 22). 
 
3.2.3 Statistics in Finland after a declaration of independence 
(1917 – 1945) 
 
In 1917, the Finnish parliament approved a declaration of independence 
drawn up by the senate. Shortly after, the breach between the left-wing 
and the right-wing parties became irreconcilable, and the Russian 
Revolution started to spread to Finland. The revolution in Russia 
intensified existing social divisions also in Finland and the battle for 
independence quickly evolved in to a civil war. The short but bitter and 
bloody war resulted in victory for the centre- and right-wing forces, who 
had enjoyed the support of German military troops. In 1919, K.J. 
Ståhlberg was elected president, and Finland became a republic 
(Meinander, 2011: 125–130). 
 
When Finland gained her independence the work of the Central 
Statistical Office continued uninterrupted. Soon after the war, the Central 
Statistical Office returned to its normal routine and was even able to 
improve on its practice. The war had caused many severe social 
problems, such as food shortages, that demanded official reports. 
Research was conducted on, for example, how the civil war had affected 
the economy and on the living conditions of the war orphans (Luther, 
1993: 154–155). 
 
The newly established health and welfare cabinet quickly reinstated 
research on the living conditions of the working classes. This was seen 
as a necessary step in order to alleviate the deep social injustices that 
had led to the civil war. In 1919, the health and welfare cabinet set in 
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action measures to count all the buildings in the cities. The results were 
to function as the basis for governmental housing policy. The prohibition 
law was established in 1919 and brought along with it many new social 
problems as well. To these the Central Statistical Office responded by 
conducting research on the assumed links between alcohol consumption 
and crime (Luther, 1993: 162–163). 
 
As always, also in the early years of independence financial statistics 
were one of the main areas of concern for the Central Statistical Office. 
In particular, the Central Statistical Office was commissioned to improve 
the data on national wealth and personal incomes. This task was made 
easier in 1921 with the introduction of wealth and income taxes. Data 
from tax returns were used to calculate how the taxation system could 
be made more just. Regular economic forecasts started also being 
conducted as had been requested by the banking authorities (Luther, 
1993: 165). 
 
The statistical authorities had long hoped that population statistics would 
be gathered with individual level forms instead of lists of names collected 
from the highly unreliable parish catalogues. As I mentioned in the 
previous section, individual level forms had been used in the larger cities 
since 1870, but the majority of the population still remained outside of 
these calculations (Luther, 1993: 177). 
 
In 1923, a committee suggested that each municipality should have its 
own population register that would be kept by the police chief in the 
counties and by the register office in the cities. Churches were 
unenthusiastic about the proposal. On the one hand they did not want to 
lose their monopoly on population statistics and on the other hand the 
ministers objected to having their workload increase by having to collect 
the data on separate forms for each individual (Luther, 1993: 177). 
Despite these objections, it was gradually possible to increase the 
number of cities in which a census was conducted. In 1900, a census 
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was undertaken in four cities, in 1910 in seven cities, in 1920 in ten, and 
by 1930 in twelve (Luther, 1993: 178). 
 
The Central Statistical Office kept introducing more and more advanced 
forms of data analysis. In 1920, the first mortality and fertility tables and 
the first calculation of marital fertility were introduced. In addition to these 
improvements, the Central Statistical Office published its first population 
projection in 1932. The projection was only concerned with the capital, 
Helsinki, but a few years later a projection was conducted for the entire 
country. It estimated that Finland’s population would never exceed four 
million (Luther, 1993: 178). Finland’s population is today close to five and 
a half million (Statistics Finland, 2017). 
 
Other innovations in official statistics in the years shortly after 
independence included the marriage law in 1930, which made it possible 
to obtain individual level data on divorces from court records. Migration 
statistics had been derived on individual forms from passport catalogues 
since the beginning of the century, but the problem was that they could 
not be linked to other population statistics (Nieminen, 1999: 29). 
 
Another important move towards individual level data occurred in 1936, 
with the introduction of death certificates. Before this, the cause of death 
had been obtained from parish catalogues, and unsurprisingly the 
reliability of the statistic improved considerably after the reform. In 1939, 
birth statistics were also supplied on individual forms by churches 
(Nieminen, 1999: 29). 
 
There had been many attempts at conducting a national census based 
on individual forms ever since the formation of the Central Statistical 
Office in 1865. The need for information on households, living conditions, 
and buildings became more and more pressing during the early years of 
independence. International cooperation between national statistical 
institutes had increased in the early parts of the twentieth century, and 
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by 1930 Finland and Albania were the only countries in Europe not to 
have conducted a national census based on individual level data. 
Although Finland had by then been gathering population statistics for 
over two hundred years, they had not been based on people filling in 
their own data (Nieminen, 1999: 31). 
 
In 1938, the Finnish parliament stated a law according to which a 
national census was to be conducted every decade. This was to be done 
in direct contact with the people and with one form for each individual. 
The first national census based on individual level forms was meant to 
be conducted in 1940, but the plan was set aside when the Second 
World War broke out in 1939. The census in 1940 was still conducted 
the highly unreliable parish catalogues (Nieminen, 1999: 31). 
 
3.2.4 Statistics in Finland after the Second World War (1945 – 
1960) 
 
Despite conciliatory measures, such as allowing the Social Democrats 
to participate in parliamentary elections, the wounds sustained in the 
Civil War would not heal before a national unification in the Second 
World War. In 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the so called 
Molotov – Ribbentrop pact, a non-aggression agreement that included a 
secret protocol relegating Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. Stalin 
feared that Hitler would invade northern Soviet Union across Finnish 
territory, and decided therefore to attack Finland. The "Winter War" 
(1939 – 1940) ended in a peace treaty in 1940, giving south-eastern 
parts of Finland to the Soviet Union (Meinander, 2011: 146–149). 
 
When German offensives broke out all over Europe, Finland was left with 
no other option but to ally itself with Germany. After fighting on the 
German side against the Soviet, Finland eventually broke its ties with 
Hitler. The allied leaders had agreed that if Finland committed itself to 
end its alliance with Germany, it would be allowed to remain a sovereign 
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nation after the war. The "Continuation War" (1941 – 1944) ended in 
armistice in 1944. In addition to the areas already lost to the Soviet Union 
in the Winter War, Finland ceded Petsamo next to the Arctic Ocean, and 
was forced to lease out Porkkala Peninsula, only thirty kilometres west 
of Helsinki, as a Soviet military base. In addition, Finland was forced to 
pay 300 million dollars in war reparations to the Soviet Union 
(Meinander, 2011: 152–157). Therefore, despite two bloody wars fought 
against the Soviet Union, Finland was able to maintain its independence 
through the Second World War. 
 
After many failed attempts at conducting a nationally representative 
census during the first half of the twentieth century, one was finally 
successfully conducted in 1950. After the war, the United Nations gave 
a recommendation on information that should be gathered in national 
censuses. In addition, Finnish statisticians visited statistical institutes in 
other Nordic countries to look for examples (Luther, 1993: 242). 
 
The census in 1950 was conducted with the help of accountants who 
distributed the census forms to the heads of household’s three days 
before the final count. In addition to age, sex and marital status, 
information was gathered on the place of living, place of birth, language 
proficiency, religion, nationality, literacy level, education, family structure 
and occupational status. Whereas previously information had been 
based on municipalities, this time the information was based on 
conurbations. The smaller level of granularity of the data made it more 
usable in town planning (Nieminen, 1999: 32–33). 
 
In connection with the census in 1950, a survey was carried out on the 
living conditions of the population that had been displaced during the 
war. The fact that the census now included information on marriages and 
childbirths made it possible to calculate fertility rates for different age 
groups (Nieminen, 1999: 33). The war had a big impact on both mortality 
and fertility, and the population projections that were calculated after the 
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war differed significantly from the ones conducted in the 1930s (Luther, 
1993: 267). 
 
While the results of the first census were still being calculated, a 
committee was assigned to investigate how official statistics could be 
improved. In particular, the committee had an interest in improving the 
accuracy of regional data. The rapid economic and social developments 
after the war had created a need for municipal level town planning, and 
data on regional demographic trends were vitally important for its 
functioning. In 1950, the census had for the first time included 
information on conurbations, but the committee felt there was still much 
room for improvement (Nieminen, 1999: 34). 
 
In addition, the committee paid attention to the problems with the existing 
population statistics. Migration statistics in particular had long been 
inaccurate and the situation became even worse when the Nordic 
countries decided to remove the requirement of having a passport when 
travelling between them. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1960s that the 
Nordic started to collaborate in keeping statistics on migration 
(Nieminen, 1999: 34). 
 
The committee had also proposed that population forecasts were to be 
conducted on a regular basis. At the time the committee’s suggestions 
were considered radical, but the rapid development of computers in the 
1960s opened up possibilities that would have been unimaginable ten 
years earlier. The census in 1960 largely followed the format of previous 
one. This time however, the results were calculated with a computer, the 
IBM 1401. From here on, the compilation of most important statistics was 
no longer dependent on calculations done by hand, as even the most 
complicated calculations could now be done with computers. By the mid-
twentieth century, individual level data was available on all of the most 
important demographic variables (Nieminen, 1999: 29–35). 
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3.2.5 Advances in computational techniques, the emergence of 
the welfare state and the forming of electronic registers 
(1960 - ) 
 
After the Second World War, the sample survey technique had been 
successfully applied in various fields of research particularly in the US 
and in India (Luther, 1993: 230). An appreciation of the advantages of 
sample methods highlighted the need for registers from which samples 
could be drawn when needed. The development of computers from the 
late 1950s onwards had made it technically possible to maintain 
registers on the population, economy and agriculture (Luther, 1993: 
260). 
 
The prospect of developing registers was first brought up in the Nordic 
statistical conference in Helsinki in 1960, where the head of department 
at the Central Statistical Office in Finland, Olavi Niitamo, suggested that 
the next step in the development of official statistics would be the 
production of various kinds of forecasts. According to Niitamo, modern 
statistics would be able to answer questions such as “what happens if…” 
and “what should be done in order to…”. A general consensus emerged 
that statistical offices should place more emphasis on analysis instead 
of just on compiling the data (Luther, 1993: 260). 
 
During that same conference, the head of the statistical institute in 
Norway, Svein Nordbotten, suggested a model on how official statistics 
could be remade in to a statistical archiving system. According to 
Nordbotten, the old model had involved compiling and publishing 
statistics only once and then sending them into the archives. Now 
however, it was technically possible to gather statistics continuously and 
without necessarily having to form separate entities of data collected at 
the same period in time. Instead, information on single units (person, 
family, household, building etc.) could be linked to information on the 
same unit at a previous period in time. This would be made possible by 
assigning each unit a unique identification code. Nordbotten’s ideas 
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quickly gained momentum and soon all Nordic countries were reviewing 
their practices against the model presented at the conference (Luther, 
1993: 260–261). 
 
In addition to the advances in computer technology, another important 
precondition for the development of population registers was the 
construction of a comprehensive welfare state. In stark contrast to today, 
the economic consensus of the post war years posited that income 
redistribution was in fact beneficial for the overall health of the economy. 
Between 1950 and 1980, three major social reform packages were 
passed in Finland. First, a compulsory national insurance scheme was 
introduced, second, health and social services were expanded, and 
third, the entire education system was restructured. The period also saw 
the introduction of income-related pensions for all, the forty-hour work 
week, and improvements in unemployment benefits (Meinander, 2011: 
172–173). In the five decades following the Second World War, Finland 
turned from a war-ravaged agrarian society into one of the most 
technologically advanced nations in the world. Between 1948 and 1979, 
Finland’s annual GDP rose faster than that of almost any other West 
European country, and the average income more than doubled. By the 
end of the Seventies, Finland had joined the richest third of the European 
states (Meinander, 2011: 167–168). 
 
The new forms of benefits introduced, such as universal earnings based 
pension in 1961 and universal sickness insurance in 1963, required a 
system that would be able to identify individuals unequivocally 
(Kinnunen, 1998: 118). And since, after intense political battle, the 
decision was made to extend sickness insurance to all members of 
society instead of just for workers, also those who resided outside of the 
workforce, such as students and the elderly, needed a unique identifier 
(Kinnunen, 1998: 122–123).  
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The task to develop such a system was handed to the mathematician, 
Erkki Pale, who had served as a code-breaker in the Second World War. 
Although no documentary evidence proves that Pale benefitted from his 
experience of breaking Soviet codes during the war when inventing the 
logic behind the social security number, his former colleagues have 
thought this to have been likely. Pale got the initial idea for the number 
from Sweden, where a personal identity card had been introduced 
already in the 1940s. In accordance with the Swedish model, the first six 
numbers in the Finnish social security number consist of a person’s 
birthday, -month, and –year. These numbers are followed by a minus 
sign for persons born in the 20th century, and a plus sign for those born 
in the 19th. Following the seven numbers is a three-digit personal number 
that can be used to distinguish between individuals with the same name 
born on the same day. For men, this number is odd, and for women, 
even. In the end, the Finnish model ended up being far more accurate 
than the Swedish one, as the former was developed at a time when 
computers could be used to assist in the information processing. 
Afterwards, Pale’s model has been assessed as a nearly perfectly 
accurate way to identify a person (Kinnunen, 1998: 119–121). 
 
Around the time that the social security number was being introduced, 
the Ministry of the Interior was planning to introduce a civil registry 
number for the purpose of identifying individuals in the newly established 
governmental registers. In order to avoid a situation whereby multiple 
identification systems would co-exist simultaneously, a decision was 
made to merge the two numbers. The social security institution KELA 
was handed the task of assigning an identity number for each citizen and 
reporting them to other register holders. Between 1964 and 1968, KELA 
assigned identity numbers to all Finnish citizens, and from there on, it 
assigned them as people were born or moved in to the country 
(Kinnunen, 1998: 123–124). 
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In addition to KELA’s register, various other electronic registers were set 
up by different governmental institutions in the 1960s. For example, the 
board of education started to keep a register on teachers, the ministry of 
finance on public servants, and the universities and polytechnics on 
completed degrees. The Central Statistical Office started a vehicle 
register in 1965 and the health authorities established one for cancer 
patients. A central business register was established in 1970 (Luther, 
1993: 262). 
 
As a result of the international collaboration between Nordic statistical 
authorities cited above, the Central Statistical Office was aware of the 
opportunities offered by governmental registers already before any had 
been established. Therefore, from very early on, the Central Statistical 
Office actively sought to gain a foothold in the design of the registers. In 
the early 1970s, the Central Statistical Office was renamed Statistics 
Finland and was given a statutory right to both receive data from the 
various register holders, and to provide them with advice on how the 
information in the registers should be gathered and maintained. 
Gradually, as registers became more standardised, Statistics Finland 
lost its legislative right to influence the design and maintenance of the 
registers (Alastalo, 2009b: 178–179). According to the most recent 
statistics act adopted in 2004, state authorities have a statutory 
obligation to supply data from their possession to Statistics Finland. 
Furthermore, Statistics Finland can use direct information gathering only 
when the information is not already available in the registers (Statistics 
Finland, 2015). This means that in Finland, governmental practices have 
a major influence on the content of official statistics (Alastalo, 2009b). 
 
As I have documented in the previous sections, population statistics 
were in Finland for centuries maintained by two separate institutions, the 
government and the Lutheran church. A solution to the problems that 
emerged from having information stored in two places was presented in 
1969 with the introduction of the Population Register Centre. Since then, 
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official population statistics have been held in one electronic register, 
The Population Information System, which includes all individuals living 
permanently in Finland. In addition to all citizens in Finland, the register 
includes details on all buildings, their owners, and the people living in 
them (Population Register Centre, 2015). All Nordic countries 
established their own Population Register Centre’s between 1964 and 
1969 (Alastalo, 2009a). In 1974, the task of assigning identity numbers 
to new citizen’s was handed over from KELA to the Population Register 
Centre (Kinnunen, 1998: 124). The digitisation of government and 
church records was far from a straightforward task, and required a 
decade of meticulous work (Alastalo, 2009b: 181). It is interesting to note 
therefore that in contrast to general perception, the government at least 
in Finland has in fact been a forerunner in taking advantage of the 
affordances of digitisation.  
 
The Evangelical Lutheran church was involved in the upkeep of 
population statistics in Finland all the way until 1999. Since then, the 
maintenance of the Population Information system has been the 
responsibility of the Population Register Centre and the Registry Office. 
The Population Information System is updated through statutory citizen 
notifications and has been used in elections, taxation, the justice system, 
administrative planning and in research. Many third- and private sector 
organisations are also regularly granted permission to access some of 
the information in the system (Population Register Centre, 2015). 
 
The social security number was first used in the 1970 census. The 
number of each member in a household was pre-entered in to a form 
that was then sent to the household to be filled. The social security 
number was also used to retrieve information from other registers 
regarding a person’s religion and place of birth. Compared to previous 
census forms, the form in 1970 no longer included a question on 
occupational status, but instead asked for a person’s main source of 
income, and whether that came from pension or employment. The 
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census also included a new scale for socio-economic status. In 
connection with the census, two cohort studies were undertaken, one on 
fertility and another on the demographic characteristics of some minority 
groups (Marjomaa, 2000: 275–276; Nieminen, 1999: 41). 
 
The census in 1980 was to a large extent identical with the previous one. 
However, since the reliability of the Population Information System had 
increased year by year, by 1980, the census was no longer the only way 
one could discover the size of the population. Instead, it now functioned 
more like a large-scale social scientific study that was able to provide a 
more detailed picture of society than what would have been possible by 
relying solely on information from the Population Information System 
(Marjomaa, 2000: 276; Nieminen, 1999: 42). 
 
The main data gathering was still conducted by sending out forms, but 
many electronic registers were also used. Educational data was 
retrieved from the degree register maintained by Statistics Finland and 
information on incomes was retrieved from the tax register. In addition, 
the social security institution, KELA, provided information on people on 
benefits (Marjomaa, 2000: 270; Nieminen, 1999: 42). 
 
By 1990, the electronic registers had become so comprehensive and 
reliable that the census could for the first time be conducted entirely 
without census forms. Basic information such as age, sex, gender, 
marital status and place of birth had since 1970 been available in the 
Population Information System, but forms had been needed to discover 
people’s occupational status (Marjomaa, 2000: 279; Nieminen, 1999: 
43). 
 
In addition to the Population Information System, the following registers 
were used in the 1990 census: the Tax Administration’s registers, the 
Central Pension Security Institute’s employment registers, the State 
Treasury employment register and Municipal Pension Institute’s 
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employment register, the Social Security Institute’s register on 
pensioners, different student registers, the register on job applicants, 
Statistics Finland’s Business register and register of Completed 
Education and Degrees (Myrskylä, 2011). 
 
Finland was only the second country after Denmark to have its census 
entirely register based. The total cost of the census in 1990 was one 
tenth of the fifty million euros (in today’s money) paid for the census in 
1980. The low cost of the register-based census has made it possible to 
conduct one every year, and today, the annual cost of data collection for 
the census is around one million euros (Myrskylä, 2010). Today, a total 
of 185 registers are maintained by 16 different register holders (Alastalo, 
2009b: 173–174). Up to 95 % of official statistics produced by Statistics 
Finland are derived from information held in the registers (Marjomaa, 
2000). 
 
3.2.5.1 A tool of welfare state governmentality? 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that historically, statistics have 
emerged out of a co-constitutive interaction between, on the one hand, 
methodological and technological developments, and changes in the 
administrative and political world, on the other (Desrosières, 1998). This 
analytical framework can be fruitfully applied to the emergence of 
register-based statistics as well. As Alastalo (2009a) explains, register-
based statistics emerged as part of the technologies and arrangements 
of the welfare state, and should therefore be understood as a form of 
welfare state governmentality. As a result, constructing a similar system 
elsewhere would constitute far more than a mere technical task, as many 
countries have recently begun to find out. Whereas technically it might 
be feasible, the social and political circumstances that make it possible 
to put in place an extensive governmental data collection system are 
more difficult to establish. 
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Kinnunen (1998: 124) describes the social security number on which 
registers rely as the outcome of “a union between the welfare state, 
mathematics and technology”. According to her, the development of the 
social security number was inherently connected to the question of who, 
in Finland in the 1960s, had the power to determine the structure of 
social security. Far from being a mere technical tool therefore, the social 
security number emerged out of a political process whereby a welfare 
state was established on universalistic principles. After its introduction, 
all citizens, men and women, children and the elderly, have been 
registered in governmental systems in Finland first and foremost as 
individuals. This practice, which seems mundane at first, is not devoid of 
political consequences. 
 
Kinnunen (1998: 126–127) sees it for example as being tied to the 
question of how Finns have come to view women’s role in society. For 
long, Nordic researchers have had to explain to foreign colleagues why 
it is not sufficient to classify women’s socio-economic status based on 
their husband’s status. In Finland, where women’s labour market 
participation rate is equal to men’s, a return to classifications based on 
households would constitute a step back in time (Kinnunen, 1998: 126–
127). According to Kinnunen (1998: 131), the social security number 
produces a modern notion of individuality, a way to understand oneself 
and one’s relation to others. As Totto explains (1989: 17–18) the social 
security number indicates that a person is no longer a nameless member 
of a family, tribe, profession or caste, but an equal citizen with the same 
rights and responsibilities as everyone else. 
 
On the other hand, the social security number is also a powerful tool with 
an element of coercion built in to it. In terms of gender for example, one 
cannot choose outside of the traditional dichotomy between male and 
female, but must be one or the other at all times. Ultimately, for Kinnunen 
(1998: 131), the politics of the social security number boil down to the 
question of who has the power to determine how and for what purposes 
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the number is being used, and what rights remain for the individual to 
contest these uses. 
 
3.2.5.2 An example of register-based research: Mortality 
 
An important part of the welfare state order that emerged after the 
Second World War was in retrospect the enormous public status enjoyed 
by social scientists. The writings of leading sociologists, such as Erik 
Allardt, were carefully read even at the very top of the political 
establishment (Eskola, 1993). Although perhaps not the most important 
reason behind the success of social scientists in this period, the 
possibility of combining data from many different registers opened up 
previously unimaginable opportunities for quantitative social researchers 
in Finland. 
 
The following topics have for example been examined with register data 
in Finland: Socioeconomic differences in cause-specific mortality; the 
consequences of alcohol tax changes on alcohol-related harm; ageing, 
long-term care use & end-of-life care; social determinants of crime; 
partner choice; determinants and outcomes of union dissolution of 
cohabitations and marriages; determinants of teenage pregnancies and 
pregnancy outcomes; socio-demographic determinants of fertility 
behaviour and enterprise demography and job flows (Ilmakunnas et al., 
1999; Väisänen, 2013). 
 
Perhaps the most impressive register based dataset so far has been the 
EKSY (acronym of the Finnish project name, which translates as ‘Living 
conditions and causes of death’) dataset used mainly by demographers 
at the University of Helsinki. Since the late seventies, demographers at 
the University of Helsinki have in collaboration with Statistics Finland and 
the Institute of Occupational health used the personal identity code to 
link mortality data to census, and other register data. For example, in the 
first data linkage in 1978, data on all deaths (approximately 250,000) 
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during 1971 – 75 was linked with the 1970 census, which covered the 
total population of 4.6 million at that time. Since the initial dataset, a new 
one has been compiled every five years. Whereas the initial dataset 
included information on only 50 variables, the dataset in 1990 covered a 
total of 245 variables (Valkonen and Martelin, 1999: 213). 
 
The EKSY dataset has allowed both descriptive and explanatory studies 
on variations in mortality. In terms of descriptive studies, mortality 
differences have been examined by social group, education, region, 
marital status and mother tongue. Although methodologically these 
studies have not offered much new, the availability of data on individuals 
has allowed for a much greater freedom in forming different 
combinations of population groups than what has been previously 
possible. The number of cells in the tables can be massive, sometimes 
in excess of 100,000. In such a big dataset, all differences that are of 
relevance to the conclusions are usually statistically significant. By 
contrast however, not nearly all significant differences have any 
relevance to the conclusions (Valkonen and Martelin, 1999: 216). 
 
The EKSY dataset has for example been used to test hypotheses 
concerning factors influencing mortality. Traditionally studies designed 
to test hypotheses have faced the methodological problem of selection 
bias. In previous studies, it has been difficult to determine whether it is 
unemployment itself, and not the personal characteristics of the 
unemployed, that affects mortality. Because register-based datasets are 
so large and comprehensive, they can be used to identify even relatively 
small groups that have been exposed to the factors that the researcher 
is interested in, without having their personal characteristics influence 
their exposure. For instance, a study conducted on the relationship 
between unemployment and mortality in the deep recession years of the 
early nineties did not lend support to the assumption that unemployment 
had a clear impact on mortality, at least in the short term. This is an 
example of how register data has helped to elaborate on an observed 
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difference between sub-groups in the population (Valkonen and 
Martelin, 1999: 221). 
 
3.2.5.3 An example of register based research: GIS 
 
Another interesting example of the application of registers comes from 
the field of Geographic Information Systems, or GIS. In Finland, a 
national register on buildings and dwellings was established in 
conjunction with the census in 1980. Data on dwellings and buildings 
were collected with questionnaires and saved in the Building and 
Dwelling register maintained by the Population Register Centre. Since 
then, the register has been updated with statutory notifications from 
municipal building authorities and local register offices. Register-based 
statistics on buildings and dwellings have been produced annually since 
1987 (Harala and Tammilehto-Luode, 1999: 60–61). 
 
What this means in practice is that nearly all individuals in Finland can 
be linked into families and household-dwelling units, and to the dwelling 
or building in which they live. All individuals can also be linked with their 
employers and to the building in which they work. In addition, all of these 
units can be located on  maps using geo-coordinates. Since 1970, 
Statistics Finland has provided data in 1 km x 1 km grid squares. These 
spatially stable units can easily be combined into larger areas (Harala 
and Tammilehto-Luode, 1999: 62–65). 
 
Since 1992, the GIS-unit at Statistics Finland has provided spatially 
referenced data to public administrations, the private sector, and 
academic researchers. Applications of grid square data in social 
research have included, for example, studies on the regional incidence 
of diseases, unemployment, changes in rural industrial structure, 
regional polarisation, and migration (Harala and Tammilehto-Luode, 
1999). 
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3.2.5.4 Advantages and disadvantages of registers 
 
Population registers are often seen as having a variety of advantages in 
comparison to sample surveys. First, they provide longitudinal data sets 
with massive sample sizes and many different sampling strategies. In 
addition, the level of granularity is higher than with samples, as is best 
demonstrated by small area statistics. Unlike sample surveys, registers 
do not suffer from low response rates (UNECE, 2007) and with registers, 
the time spent on data collection can be reduced significantly, and 
studies can be easily repeated (Gissler, 1999: 245). Furthermore, 
registers can be used to correct non-response bias in sample-surveys 
(Lehtonen and Veijanen, 1999). Other standard praises for registers 
include that they are relatively cheap, they reduce the burden on 
respondents, they often cover entire populations, and that they are 
automatically gathered in a machine readable format (Myrskylä, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, the main disadvantage with registers is the 
researcher’s inability to exercise control over content. By relying solely 
on register data, the academic researcher or official statistician runs the 
risk of letting governmental practices decide what aspects of the social 
world can be studied and known (UNECE, 2007).  
 
Overall, in contrast to sample surveys, there have not been many critical 
examinations of register based statistics. One of the few to have done 
so, Alastalo (2009b: 174), calls for more critical scrutiny upon the 
process whereby “information produced in local administrative practices 
is transformed in to statistical facts”. She points out that registers are 
produced and maintained in local administrative practices, and that 
changes in them are recorded only when individuals come to interact 
with the public administration. She highlights four problematic attributes 
of register based statistics (Alastalo, 2009a: 59–60). 
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First, registers contain information that has been collected first and 
foremost for administrative purposes. Hence, when registers are used 
for official statistics, not nearly all the information is included. The 
practices and processes according to which information is chosen and 
then made into official statistics usually remains invisible both for the 
users and producers of official statistics. For example, the mathematical 
rules for handling  conflicting information in different registers so that 
they can be combined remain largely black boxed (Alastalo, 2009a: 60). 
 
Second, registers are susceptible to changes in administrative practices 
and legislation. For example, when the Finnish Tax Administration 
began using pre-filled tax return forms, it meant that information on job 
titles would no longer be available, and Statistics Finland had to start 
looking for alternative sources for the information. Similarly, as a result 
of the abolishment of the wealth tax in 2006, it became nearly impossible 
to describe and study changing wealth dynamics within the population 
(Alastalo, 2009a: 61). 
 
Third, registers are sensitive to local recording practices, which are also 
poorly documented, and fourth, registers are not necessarily updated 
when an individual’s life circumstances change, unless he or she is in 
contact with the register holders. As register based statistics have 
become mundane, their problematic aspects have been largely ignored 
(Alastalo, 2009a: 61). 
 
3.2.5.5 Privacy concerns 
 
Especially since register data can be mapped so precisely onto space, 
identification of units has become a crucial issue. Whereas a social 
researcher might be content with data that is statistically significant at a 
larger geographical level, other users, such as town planners, 
sometimes need to know the exact location of a phenomenon. 
Consequently, data anonymity has presented a considerable challenge 
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to statistical authorities, in particular to those dealing with geographically 
referenced data (Harala and Tammilehto-Luode, 1999: 67). 
 
The data protection rules that apply to Finnish official statistics are 
prescribed in the Statistics Act, the Personal Data Act and the EU 
Regulation on Community Statistics. According to the Statistics Act, 
state authorities have a statutory obligation to supply data for statistical 
production, whereas enterprises, municipal organisations and non-profit 
institutions are obliged to supply data on matters separately prescribed. 
Before the data can be used for research purposes, it must to be 
anonymised. The data must also be made less detailed in order to 
prevent indirect identification. In 2011, around 200 sets of register data, 
relating mainly to persons and housing, were supplied to researchers 
working outside of the statistical office (Statistics Finland, 2013: 3) 
 
Decisions on the provision of statistical data sets for research purposes 
are made by the Directors of the respective statistics departments or by 
the Director of the department of Standards and Methods. In special 
cases, such as in data requests from abroad, the requests are 
considered by the Ethics Committee of Statistics Finland (Statistics 
Finland, 2013: 3).  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the public opinion towards population registers 
remains positive, and no severe data protection violations have been 
reported. However, one must question how many Finns are aware of the 
granularity of the data that their government possesses. Of some 
significance must also be the fact that register based statistics emerged 
as part of a governmental system whose function was to distribute 
benefits to the population. The social state that developed after the 
Second World War guaranteed a high level of trust towards public 
administrations in all Nordic countries (Alastalo, 2009b: 182). Alastalo 
(2009a: 183) points out that because the register-based system is 
dependent on a high level of trust between citizens and the state, it is 
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not inconceivable that this trust could be jeopardised as a result of 
political changes in such a way as to make the use of data from registers 
for official statistics difficult. In the next section I review methodological 
developments in social research in Finland. 
 
3.3 A note on methodological developments in 
social research in Finland 
 
Sociology has been an academic subject in Finland for twice as long as 
in the other Nordic countries. Already in 1890, Edward Westermarck was 
named Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Helsinki. 
Westermarck was also the first Professor of Sociology at the London 
School of Economics, a factor which helped Sociology to become 
accepted as an independent academic subject in Finland as well. 
Between the two World Wars Finnish social science was dominated by 
Westermarck’s school of Evolutionary Sociology (Allardt et al., 1993: 13–
14). 
 
In his studies, Westermarck often looked for the origins of social 
institutions in human biology, and today, his work might be considered 
social or cultural anthropology. In 1890, Westermarck published The 
History of Human Marriage, in which he argued against the common 
belief that promiscuity had been the initial state of human marriage. 
Westermarck argued that monogamy had been the natural order of 
things later verified by law. He also fiercely attacked Freud over the idea 
of the Oedipus complex. According to Westermarck, people who live in 
close domestic proximity during the first few years of their lives naturally 
become desensitized to later sexual attractions (Allardt et al., 1993: 44–
49). 
 
In his research methodology, Westermarck emphasised the importance 
of cross-cultural comparisons. Westermarck’s source materials were the 
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descriptions of life in primitive tribes written by travellers and 
missionaries, which he cross-examined in order to find universal social 
norms and institutions. According to Westermarck, it was not sufficient 
to use the comparative method only to categorise social norms and 
institutions in different societies in different time periods, but one had to 
search for an answer to the question of why the norms existed in the first 
place. For Westemarck, the key question was how to best explain the 
existence of similar norms and institutions across different cultures and 
the answer was often found in human biology and human emotions. 
Westermarck and his students advocated strong empiricism and 
rejected purely theoretical speculations (Allardt et al., 1993: 52–53). 
 
Around the same time with Westermarck’s branch of Evolutionary 
Sociology, another tradition of social research was emerging outside of 
academia. As I documented in more detail in the previous chapter, in the 
nineteenth century industrialisation and urbanisation raised an interest 
towards the living conditions of the working classes especially in 
England, where the industrial revolution first began (Kent, 1981). In 
Finland, studies in to the living conditions of the urban and rural poor 
began to emerge from the 1860s onwards. The founding of The Central 
Statistical Office in 1865 contributed to the emergence of a tradition of 
empirical social research in Finland (Alapuro and Alestalo, 1993: 78). 
 
Already in 1848, the philosopher, statesman, and nationalist J.V 
Snellman had shared his concern about the growing number of poor 
people in the countryside. Resembling contemporary debates, Snellman 
had been particularly worried about what would happen to the poorest 
people in a situation where agriculture would no longer be able to employ 
as many people as it had done before. Snellman concluded that the 
eventual disappearing of agriculture would mean that a significant part 
of the population would have no other choice but to emigrate abroad 
(Luther, 1993: 91). 
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For Snellman’s relief, wood processing turned out to be an industry that 
would replace the jobs lost in agriculture. Free trade was established in 
1868, and as a result, other industries had started to grow as well. 
Although industrial capitalism saved many Finns from starvation, it 
brought along with it many new social problems as well. And irrespective 
of the new jobs in industrialised cities, the large estateless population in 
the countryside still formed a major social issue (Waris, 1932). 
 
The first empirical social studies in Finland were often conducted by 
individuals who were also active members of the newly formed political 
parties. Inspired by the German Verein für Socialpolitik, an organisation 
that had been established to conduct research and to promote social 
security legislation, the Economic Society was established in 1891. Its 
members were pioneers in statistical descriptions of social problems. In 
1915, Edvard Gylling published a thorough analysis of population growth 
in the recently industrialised capital, Helsinki. O.K. Kilpi wrote an analysis 
of the development of different social classes from 1815 to 1875 based 
on information derived from the parish catalogues and Eino Kuusi 
examined seasonal variations in unemployment and considered ways to 
reduce them (Alapuro and Alestalo, 1993: 81–91; Luther, 1993: 91). 
 
This was also a time period in which many non-governmental 
organisations started conducting their own research on social conditions 
in the country. The Worker’s Association was established in 1886, and 
since early on, one of its main tasks was to keep a list of the salaries of 
its members. In 1888, August Hjelt began a study on the condition of the 
working classes in Helsinki, which Oskar Groundstroem then led to a 
successful completion in the 1890s. Another member of the Worker’s 
Association was the medical doctor Wilhelm Sucksdorff, who completed 
a study on household conditions in the working class districts of Helsinki 
in 1904. The Worker’s Association kept publishing research, data and 
graphs in its monthly publications throughout the twentieth century. The 
Women’s Association that had been established in 1844 kept a 
105 
 
systematic record on women’s salaries and pension benefits (Luther, 
1993: 92). 
 
The estates were also interested in the social problems experienced by 
the urban and rural poor. In 1888, the parliament appointed a committee 
to gather social statistics in order for them to be used in planning health-
, accident- and old age insurance’s for the working classes. As a result, 
various forms of social insurance were established in the early part of 
the twentieth century. Consequently, the government became 
increasingly aware of the importance of having accurate social statistics 
at its disposal (Luther, 1993: 92–94). 
 
The tradition of empirical social research eventually developed in to 
more modern forms of social policy research, often conducted within the 
universities. When social research established itself as a serious field 
within academia after the Second World War, it became difficult to draw 
clear distinctions between social policy, social history and sociological 
research (Alapuro and Alestalo, 1993; Haatanen, 1993). 
 
The strong emphasis towards empiricism that was present both in 
Westermarck’s Evolutionary Sociology and in the tradition of empirical 
social research was a contributing factor when Finnish sociology 
became heavily influenced by American positivism after the Second 
World War (Rahkonen, 1995: 13). One reason for this development was 
the fact that, after the war, American universities had started to offer 
scholarships to talented young researchers in Finland. After the First 
World War, Finland had been the only country in Europe to repay its debt 
to the US and to reward this, the US set up a fund for exchange programs 
for promising young Finnish scholars. In the decades that followed the 
Second World War, nearly half of all the professors in the social sciences 
at the University of Helsinki had at some point in their career spent a 
year at an American university (Sinnemäki, 2005: 53). 
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The first social scientist to visit the US was Heikki Waris, who spent the 
academic year 1934 – 1935 at the University of Chicago, where the 
methodological currencies had started to shift towards a strong 
emphasis on the importance quantitative methods (Bulmer, 1986; 
Mäkelä, 1996: 149). After the Second World War, American sociologists 
were leading the way in applying statistical techniques to researching 
social questions. In Finland, sampling techniques had been used in 
forestry research already in the 1920s, but social researchers were far 
behind. As a result, when Waris in 1934 used the correlation coefficient 
in his study on the working classes in Helsinki, he was seen as a 
forerunner (Luther, 1993: 174). Being a powerful figure in Finnish 
academia, Waris’ emphasis on the importance of rigorous application of 
statistical techniques had a major impact on the methodological 
currencies in post-war social sciences in Finland (Mäkelä, 1996: 154). 
 
Hence, after the war, the scientific mode of inquiry became the 
methodological ideal also for the social sciences. At first, social surveys 
and quantitative methods were used alongside other source materials 
and methods, but by 1960, the large majority of doctoral theses at the 
department of sociology were based on quantitative analysis of survey 
data. In particular, the factor analysis technique was applied in nearly 
every thesis (Alastalo, 2005: 73–80). 
 
In the 1960s, Sociology became a popular subject in Finnish academia. 
The leading figure of Finnish social science at the time, Erik Allardt, 
enjoyed popularity even at the very top of the political establishment. In 
a Durkheimian fashion, Allardt applied a variety of research methods in 
his attempts to demonstrate that sociology did indeed have its own 
unique research area that set it apart from all the other sciences (Eskola, 
1993: 267–273). Allardt utilised both official statistics and other research 
materials in his studies (Luther, 1993: 255). 
 
The consensus regarding the use of quantitative methods started to 
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crumble in the 1960s. The Frankfurt school had become influential 
globally, and through its influence arrived a Marxist paradigm that 
challenged the credibility of the branch of American sociology that had 
long been advocated by prominent figures such as Allardt. The 1960s 
was a time when the epistemological assumptions and the ideological 
linkages of social science were heavily debated both globally and in 
Finland. As a result, a strong shift towards an emphasis on qualitative 
methods occurred in the 1970s and 80s. During the 1990s, only one third 
of the doctoral theses published at the department of sociology in 
Helsinki included any form of quantitative analysis whatsoever (Alastalo, 
2005: 88–103). Erik Allardt has later noted that when the most heated 
methodological debate was over, sociological research emerged more 
pluralistic and richer than what it had been before (Allardt, 1994: 161). 
  
It is indeed fair to say that Finnish sociology is today methodologically 
pluralistic. The availability of register data since the 1990s has 
guaranteed that Finnish quantitative research has been leading edge 
even globally. Collaborations between qualitatively oriented sociologists 
and quantitatively oriented GIS-experts from the geography department 
have led to comprehensive studies on large issues such as the 
increasing regional polarisation within the capital region. Following an 
international trend, Science and Technology studies have also gained a 
foothold in the Finnish social sciences.  
 
Despite these examples of a shift towards methodological pluralism old 
tensions between quantitative and qualitative methods still exist beneath 
the surface. Some senior figures have for example recently argued that 
some of the big names within the field of Science and Technology 
studies advocate such an extreme form of social constructivism that it 
no longer advances the development of the social sciences. According 
to these commentators, Sociology should instead re-engage with its past 
as a subject that tries to find the origin of social institutions in human 
biology (Roos, 2011). Similar arguments have been made against 
108 
 
feminist criminology (Kivivuori, 2012). 
 
Despite the fact that sociologists and demographers today work in the 
same department in Helsinki, cooperation has often proved difficult. One 
senior figure within the department of Sociology explained the situation 
as a result of the fact that “demographers can count, but they cannot 
think” and that for demographers “that which cannot be counted, cannot 
be spoken of” (anonymous, personal communication, 2014). In 
interesting ways therefore, the methodological debates of today bear a 
resemblance to debates that have been going on for at least a century. 
Furthermore, in relation to the history of official statistics it is interesting 
to note that although the formation of the Central Statistical Office in 
1865 played some role in the emergence of empirical social research, 
methodological currencies in Finnish social science seem to have been 
far more influenced by internal debates than advances in research 
technologies or official statistics. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the development of official statistics in 
Finland, from the parish catalogues in the Kingdom of Sweden to the 
modern administrative registers in Finland as an independent republic. 
The purpose of the review was to ground my understanding of ongoing 
changes in the production of data for official statistics, which I will attend 
to in the empirical part of the thesis, within historical reconfigurations of 
the co-constitution of statistics. With that aim in mind, I draw three major 
analytical conclusions from the chapter. First, the analysis indicates that 
historically statistics have been produced from data produced by the 
dominant institution of its time. Whereas the earliest forms of statistics 
were compiled by the ruler and the church, their modern form is tied to 
the centralised authority of the nation state. In light of this we should 
perhaps not be surprised by the increasing centrality of private 
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corporations in the generation, harvesting and analysis of Big Data, 
which is a theme I will attend to in the next chapter. Second, the 
increasing centrality of private actors in the production of data suggests 
a historical break from its centralised production by states. Although data 
production in the private sector has long historical roots, it is not until 
recently that states have considered this data a viable source for official 
statistics (NSIs have previously collected data from companies 
regarding their own operations, but not their customers). Finally, a 
prerequisite for the extensive governmental production of data in Finland 
has been the high level of trust of citizens towards the state and it is not 
inconceivable that this could in the future change in such a way as to put 
under scrutiny the state’s role in collecting and managing information on 
the population. 
 
Continuing with the understanding that statistics evolve in interaction 
with political contingencies, in the next chapter I situate the evermore 
production of data in the private sector in the context of contemporary 
forms of advanced liberalism. Whereas data production in the public 
sector in Finland particularly in the period of the welfare state has been 
underpinned by social welfarist concerns, aims and objectives, what type 
of a rationality is driving the increasing production of data in the private 
sector? 
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4 Big Data: A harbinger of utopia, but a 
utopia for who? 
 
4.1 Introduction. Myth or revolution? 
 
According to Mosco (2004: 29) myths are neither true or false, but rather 
living or dead. Understanding them therefore requires more than proving 
them to be false. Instead, it requires figuring out why they exist, why they 
are so important to people, what they mean, and what they tell about 
people’s hopes and dreams. For Mosco, myths are stories that lift us out 
of the banality of everyday life into the possibility of the “sublime”, and 
they exist to help us deal with the inevitable and often unresolvable 
contradictions in life. Whereas in pre-modern society myths were 
typically embodied in religion and nature, today we usually find them 
within the realm of information technology. 
 
Indeed, new technologies have always been surrounded by myths. 
When first introduced, the telegraph, electrification, the telephone, radio, 
and television were all accompanied by claims that they would bring 
about the end of history, geography, and politics. Gradually however, as 
each of them became normal parts of everyday life, they stopped 
inspiring grand visions of social change. Ironically, it was at this very 
point that they became truly influential (Mosco, 2004: 2). 
 
Not so long ago, it was the internet’s turn to be celebrated as the 
technology that would bring about a revolutionary transformation in 
society. Especially in the late nineties and early two-thousands, many 
commentators, some of which were popular while others were more 
academic, were convinced that the internet would quickly bring about a 
new type of society. In the so called Information Age, communication 
technology would be available to everyone at a low price. Where 
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previously people had worked with their hands, in the new society they 
would work mainly with their heads. Where previously a persons’ choice 
of community had been limited by the accident of birth, in the Information 
Age it would be entirely open to choice, renewal and change. Since 
everything that had come before the Information Age was prehistory, 
there was no need to place it in a larger historical context, or so the 
argument often went (Mosco, 2004: 35). 
 
Little more than a decade since the biggest hype took place, the internet 
has already broken most of its utopian promises. Instead of liberating 
individuals and bringing about true global democracy, we have recently 
been shocked by revelations that it is being used as a means of mass 
surveillance by the world’s most powerful government (Lyon, 2014). 
Totalitarian governments in eastern parts of the world, on the other hand, 
have demonstrated that contrary to often heard claims, the internet can 
indeed be successfully censored. The internet has not thrown off 
dictatorships, nor has it brought democracy to centrally controlled states 
(See for example Murthy, 2013). 
 
Perhaps even more disappointing is the realisation that the internet has 
not solved the issue of ever-increasing social and economic inequality in 
our societies. Instead, in the period of the internet’s existence, income 
inequality has accelerated towards pre Second World War levels in 
many western countries (Piketty, 2014). Particularly in the centres of the 
digital economy, the labour market has differentiated into a steep 
polarisation between a small group of people working in the highly paid 
information industries, and a large pool of people working in poorly paid 
service jobs (Florida, 2012; Saxenian, 2014). 
 
Therefore, instead of claiming that information technology turns society 
into a utopia, a better way to approach them would be to say they always 
map on to, and sometimes even intensify, pre-existing social structures 
and inequalities (For an analysis along these lines, see Halford and 
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Savage, 2010). Highly uneven distributions of economic capital create 
deep wounds between people regardless of whether the disparities are 
created by industrial or digital capitalism. 
 
And as the internet has become a mundane part of everyday life in 
Western polities, other mythical technologies have emerged to take its 
place. A recent all-encompassing technological myth, and one that is 
already being replaced by other concepts, is Big Data (Couldry, 2013). 
In the popular discourse around Big Data it is no longer the internet itself, 
but rather the information deluge made possible by it that is going to 
bring about “a revolution that will transform how we live, work and think” 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013). For some of its advocates, Big 
Data marks the moment when “the information society finally fulfils its 
promise” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 190), whereas for 
others it promises to bring about the end of theory, and therefore of 
science as we know it (Anderson, 2008). As I have already mentioned, 
these revolutionary proclamations must be understood in the context of 
a much longer tradition of utopian thinking around societal changes 
brought about by new information technologies. 
 
In light of the discussion about myths and information technology above, 
are there any reasons to take the recent hype about Big Data seriously? 
In public discourse, Big Data has been presented as a solution to the 
very persistent social and economic problems that exist in societies, and 
often accompanying such claims has been the notion that the digitisation 
of society leaves no room for petty politics. For example, the 
digitalisation of public services is one of the main goals of the right-wing 
government elected in Finland in 2015. According to its “Vision 2025”, 
“…Finland has by then made a productivity leap in public services and 
the private sector by grasping the opportunities offered by digitalisation, 
dismantling unnecessary regulation and cutting red tape” (Ministry of 
Finance, 2015). Attached to this section of the government program is a 
report “Let’s take a digileap!” by former politician and current Microsoft 
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advisor Mikael Jungner. In addition to celebrating the many universally 
shared benefits that digitalisation supposedly will bring about, the report, 
commissioned by the Confederation of Finnish Industries, warns about 
the dangers of digitalisation becoming “subject to political passions”. 
According to Jungner, who curiously enough only recently used to be a 
key politician in the Social Democratic party in Finland, “A central feature 
of digitalisation is outsourcing”. He thereby demands that “digitalisation 
must not be subjected to any kind of political passions”, or otherwise “it 
might be brought to a halt in Finland and in Europe”. Instead, he 
encourages us to unanimously embrace the opportunities brought about 
by digitalisation, a task that will, if carried out successfully “rescue the 
Finnish welfare state, our way of living and being” (Jungner, 2015). If 
myths are, as argued by Mosco (2004: 30) “depoliticized speech”, this 
surely is a great example of them. 
 
However, a sociologist must be wary of simple technological 
determinism in which a technological development, such as 
digitalisation, is imagined as if it dropped from the sky fully formed and 
then exerted effects on society from the outside. Decades of scholarship 
especially in the field of Science and Technology Studies reminds us that 
technology is in fact deeply embedded in and shaped by social 
processes and choices (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). These 
processes and choices are also far from innocent when the ways in 
which technology then exerts its impact on society is considered. What I 
want to do in this chapter therefore is to consider the political and 
economic purposes that Big Data is currently being mobilized for. By 
doing so, I ground my understanding of Big Data in an appreciation of 
not only its technical qualities, but also in a consideration of the social, 
political and economic circumstances in which much of it is being 
generated. 
 
In contrast to Jungner’s notion that digitalisation leaves no room for 
politics, social theory teaches the exact opposite. Barry (2001: 2) for 
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example argues that political analysis can no longer be confined to the 
study of political institutions and identities alone. Instead, he suggests 
that we speak of the government of a technological society, by which he 
means that technology dominates both the sense of the kinds of 
problems that government and politics should address, and the possible 
solutions to them. For him, technology is political not just as an 
instrument to be used in political battles, but because it is fundamentally 
tied up with what it means to be human, and with how social institutions 
function. As a result, ideological battles over the social order often 
involve efforts to contest the development and deployment of technology 
as well (Barry, 2001: 8–9). In a world characterised by widespread 
apathy towards parliamentary politics, technology, in essence, is politics. 
 
In midst of the recent hype around Big Data, it is worth reminding that 
sociologists have been debating the societal impact of information 
technologies at least since the 1970s. Computerisation, automation, 
artificial intelligence, the internet, social media and Big Data all fall under 
the rubric of information society theory, a theme widely debated over 
many decades now. I therefore start this chapter by situating Big Data in  
this debate. Rather than a radical rapture from the past, I argue that Big 
Data should in fact be seen as a more recent chapter in a much longer 
development. 
 
This problematisation points me further towards an investigation into the 
political and economic circumstances in which the computerisation of 
society was kicked into motion in the 1970s. Although technological 
progress, and progress more generally, therefore, is today usually 
associated with the policies of the economic right, this was not always 
so. In fact, as I will demonstrate, the wide scale introduction of 
computers, the enablers of Big Data, was strongly associated with a 
larger ideological shift in what kinds of ideas would dominate societies. 
The ideologues on the economic right understood from very early on that 
for free market policies to seem modern, they had to be seen as an ally 
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of the most modern of technologies, the computers. In sum, I argue that 
computers sided market liberalism with modernity, which is a crucially 
important point to keep in mind when I move on to consider the purposes 
that much of Big Data is currently being mobilized for. 
 
Once that investigation is complete, I turn my focus to Big Data. By 
critically examining widely circulated popular accounts of Big Data, in 
particular Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s, Big Data: A Revolution That 
Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think (2013), I suggest that one 
of the functions of such work has been to provide a fresh face for the 
claim that information technology transcends history, geography, and 
politics as they have come to be known. Next, I explore academic 
reactions to Big Data. I argue that in celebrating the opportunities offered 
by Big Data, computational social scientists in particular have tended to 
fail to account for the fact that much of the data that they use for their 
research is also now absolutely central to the functioning of modern 
capitalism. I argue that any reflections on the practical, methodological 
and ethical issues around Big Data cannot go far without accounting for 
this fact. 
 
Following from this, I use the final part of the chapter to situate Big Data 
in the context of political economy. This investigation reveals that behind 
the many myths surrounding Big Data still exists a material reality of a 
capitalist mode of production ultimately not that different from its 
industrial predecessor. In sum, drawing on the conceptual starting point 
of this thesis, that statistics evolve in interaction with political 
contingencies, I suggest that increasingly, the production of data comes 
to be underpinned by a market and profit rationality, rather than the 
welfarist concerns that underpinned much of the production of data in 
the period of welfare states. 
 
Popular discourses on Big Data necessarily come to influence also how 
NSIs conceive of the phenomenon and of its significance for their 
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practice. For this reason as too, the analysis in this chapter is absolutely 
central in order to make sense of the empirical findings of my thesis, 
which I will turn to in the next chapter. 
 
4.2 The making of a Big Data world 
 
4.2.1 Do we live in an information society or in capitalism? 
 
Many influential commentators have recently argued that we now live in 
an information society. Broadly speaking, the information society is often 
described as the successor to the industrial society. For its advocates, it 
is a society in which computer technology has facilitated a new social 
order, one in which information has replaced labour and fixed machinery 
as the central organizing principle of society. In these visions, computer 
technology has had a profound impact on not just the economy, but on 
all aspects of life. 
 
In midst of current debates around imminent social transformations that 
will be brought about by the latest wave of information technologies, it is 
important to remember that the information society debate has been 
ongoing at least since the 1970s. Already back then, scholars were 
debating familiar sounding issues, such as “the end of work”, “the advent 
of the leisure society”, and “fully automated factories”. These themes 
then went briefly out of fashion only to reappear in the 1990s with the 
advent of the internet (Webster, 2014: 2–3) . More recently, many have 
enthusiastically assigned socially transformative powers to concepts 
such as Social Media and Big Data, and perhaps even more recently 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. 
 
Webster (2014: 8–9) places information society theories along a 
spectrum, where at the one end are those that endorse the view that a 
significant shift from the past has occurred, and on the other end those 
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that emphasise continuity between past and present social structures. In 
addition, he identifies five different criteria by which information society 
theorists have tried to define the concept: Technological, economic, 
occupational, spatial and cultural (Webster, 2014: 10). 
 
Technological accounts of the information society focus on the many 
technical innovations that have taken place since the 1970s. Authors 
such as Toffler (1980), Negroponte (1995) and more recently Shirky 
(2008), just to name a few in a very long list, have each on different 
occasions argued that recent technological innovation has in fact been 
so profound that it has essentially reconstituted the social world. These 
accounts are often criticised for being technologically deterministic, that 
is, they imagine technology as something that comes from the outside 
of society fully formed and then exert their impact on society in an 
autonomous way (Webster, 2014: 10–14). 
 
A second way to define the information society has been to chart the 
growth in economic worth of informational activities in proportion to the 
GDP. Authors such as Machlup (1962) and Porat (1977) were 
forerunners in demonstrating the growing economic worth of information 
industries such as education, law, publishing, media and computer 
manufacture to the US economy. The rising curve was taken to 
demonstrate that western societies had indeed become information 
societies. Many have questioned whether it is possible to infer qualitative 
changes from purely quantitative indices. The world might in fact today 
be surrounded by informational activity with very little social and political 
consequences. For critics, “a nation of pleasure seeking couch potatoes 
hardly constitutes an information society” (Webster, 2014: 15–16). 
 
Occupational definitions are closely associated with the work of Bell 
(1973), who coined the term “post-industrial society”. He, along with 
many others, interpreted the decline of manufacturing employment and 
the rise of service sector employment as the loss of manual jobs and its 
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replacement with white-collar work. Later on, influential commentators 
such as Reich (1991) and Castells (1997) argued similarly that the 
modern economy was in fact led by people whose main characteristic 
was the capacity to manage information. Critics have argued that by 
lumping together qualitatively different occupations in to categories such 
as “information workers”, these authors have ended up obscuring the 
power hierarchies that necessarily exist between different occupational 
groups (Webster, 2014: 17–19). 
 
Spatial definitions of the information society, most notably advocated by 
Castells (1997) and Urry (2000), highlight the influence that information 
networks have on the organisation of time and space. By connecting 
locations, information networks such as the internet, are thought to 
radically reduce the importance of physical time and distance (Webster, 
2014: 19–21). Finally, cultural definitions emphasise the increase in 
information that ubiquitous media in particular have brought about in to 
our daily lives (Webster, 2014: 21–23). 
 
One the other side of Webster’s spectrum are theorists such as Herbert 
Schiller, David Harvey and Jurgen Habermas, who rather than arguing 
for a radical rupture from the past, see informatisation as a process most 
distinctively marked by the continuation of pre-existing capitalist 
relations (Webster, 2014: 7–9). Scholars on this side of the spectrum 
often view the information society as an ideological concept whose 
function is to legitimate social conditions in favour of dominant economic 
and political forces. 
 
Recent research by Piketty (2014) certainly suggests that in the context 
of a longer history of capitalism, nothing much has changed, but that 
societies are in fact quickly reverting back to levels of inequality more 
familiar to the period depicted in Jane Austen’s novels. By fully 
embracing the notion that we today live in an information society where 
none of the old rules apply, we risk neglecting the analysis of broader 
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historical patterns such as those demonstrated by Piketty. Indeed, his 
work has contributed to a recent growth in scepticism towards “epochal 
thinking” in the social sciences (Savage, 2014). 
 
What this brief review suggests is that we ought to be cautious of grand 
proclamations that epochal social changes are just around the corner 
due to latest advances in information technology, whether that is Big 
Data or something else. Be that as it may, there is no denying the 
increasing role that information technology now plays in our lives. Its 
growing importance is in fact such that we largely take it for granted. 
Instead of trying to prove or disprove the information society hypothesis 
therefore, I will instead illustrate some of the ways in which information 
technology has acted as an important site of ideological and political 
battle in the past few decades. A key aspect in this history is their 
connection to the political and economic ideology of Neoliberalism, a 
European construct which later found its most vocal expression in North 
America  (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). 
 
4.2.2 The emergence of computers and the rise of Neoliberalism 
 
4.2.2.1 The demise of Fordism and a new push for automation 
 
One way to understand the rise of information society rhetoric is to look 
at the political and economic response to the crisis of Fordism in the 
seventies. Hassan (2008) provides us with a framework from which we 
can begin to understand the connections between computerisation and 
Neoliberalism. 
 
After the Second World War, Fordism, a mode of industrial production 
based on mass production, mass consumption, and the insertion of 
organisation and planning in to the business cycle had become the 
standard model of economic production across western countries. 
Fordism was more than a system of production however, as the effects 
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of planning and strong partnerships between organised labour, 
businesses and government, were felt widely across all spheres of life. 
In stark contrast to today, many countries experienced practically full 
employment and Keynesian economic policies were the norm rather 
than the exception. This was also the hay day of Social Democracy, with 
comprehensive health care and education programs being widely 
introduced. Importantly, throughout this period the majority businesses 
were territorially bound to the nation state (Hassan, 2008: 42; Webster, 
2014: 75). 
 
This highly regulated economic and social order started to break down 
in the 1970s. One explanation for the economic crisis that hit western 
countries particularly hard after the sudden rise in oil prices in 1973, was 
the problem of over-accumulation, which occurs when the rate of 
production outweighs the rate of consumption. In the wake of the war’s 
destruction, capital’s need for space and flexibility was guaranteed by 
the fact that many countries had to be rebuilt practically from zero. By 
the 1970s however, the world market had become crowded and to make 
matters even worse, many areas of the economy had been rendered off-
limit for private investment by a wave of nationalisations that had taken 
place after the war. The lack of investment and strong union power also 
meant that research in to new technologies to increase the speed, 
flexibility and efficiency of the production process was low and heavily 
regulated (Hassan, 2008: 43–44). 
 
It was in this context that an increasing number of business leaders, 
economists and politicians started to view regulation as the sole reason 
for the economic stagnation that had taken place. Arguments that labour 
unions and left-wing governments alone were to blame for the economic 
crisis started to gain increasing momentum. And with the crisis of 
Fordism as a mode of economic production, began the decline of 
Socialism and Social Democracy as viable frameworks for how to view 
and organise society (Hassan, 2008: 44–45). 
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In the context of a perceived need to free up capital, computers were 
from early on seen as way to radically improve the speed, flexibility and 
efficiency of the production process. During the cold war, both the US 
and the USSR had invested heavily in to research in computer 
technology, and especially the US had believed that in order to respond 
to a nuclear attack, a system would have to be put in place that was pre-
programmed to be executed automatically. These lessons of automated 
forms of control through computing were not missed by the business 
community, which had started to automate parts of its production 
processes. With computer assisted automation, productivity could at 
least in theory rise endlessly. The important point to take out of this brief 
history is that despite originating in the sealed off world of military 
research, computers were in fact from the very beginning developed to 
a large degree from the perspective of capitalist management (Hassan, 
2008: 45–48). 
 
Up until the economic crisis of the 1970s, the then powerful unions had 
rejected almost any form of automation. Even though businesses were 
not necessarily happy about this, they had gone along with it because 
these were the boom years after the war in which profits rose steadily. 
All of this changed however with the crisis of the seventies. As profits 
plummeted and unemployment rose rapidly, a relatively tight-knit group 
of right-wing economists, politicians and media personalities seized the 
opportunity and began to offer a radically new way of doing things (For 
a detailed history of Neoliberalism's rise to dominance in the west, see 
Mirowski, 2013; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). A major part of this newly 
revitalised right-wing intellectual elite’s energies went into pressing for 
as much automation of industry as possible. Although this was not the 
first time that big corporations were offering computer applications to the 
private sector, the collapse of the post-war social contract between 
labour, businesses and government meant that the way for unrestricted 
and widespread automation was now clear. Right-wing governments 
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especially in the US and the UK pushed through the political conditions 
for automating as much of the production process as possible. In sum, 
computers contributed to a development whereby from the 1980s 
onwards, capital’s bargaining power far exceeded that of labour’s 
(Hassan, 2008: 48–50). Despite a near total collapse of the capitalist 
economy in 2007, this development shows no end in sight. 
 
4.2.2.2 A cultural symbol for the superiority of the free market 
 
The economic restructuring that took place from the 1970s onwards 
could not have taken place without a shakeup in cultural values as well. 
The move towards a strongly market oriented society required in the 
words of Harvey (2005) the “construction of consent” or as Hassan 
(2008: 67) puts it “…the engineering of a shift in what kind of ideas 
dominate society and to make these ideas so deep-seated that they 
appear as ‘common sense’”. Computers played no small part in the 
ideological battle that ensued. 
 
Streeter (2011) documents these developments from the North 
American perspective. He points out that although the US is often 
thought of as a country where market freedom is seen as the archetype 
of freedom, market individualism has in fact always been only one part 
of a much larger mix of ideologies. In fact, in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, new technology and progress in general were more 
associated with the American left than the right. Many of the things that 
made the US the richest and most powerful country in the world, such 
as the rise of powerful corporations, the effects of the New Deal, and the 
centrally organised war effort, were accomplished not by entrepreneurs 
working on their own, but by a close cooperation between the 
government and large centrally organised businesses. Keynesianism 
was standard for all political parties, and government regulation of many 
aspects of society was seen as rational, professional, and forward-
looking. Still in the 1960s, calls for rollbacks in government regulation 
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and praises for free markets had seemed old-fashioned (Streeter, 2011: 
72–73). 
 
This was the context in which the newly revitalised group of right-wing 
intellectuals realised that in order to regain their intellectual authority they 
had to figure out a way to make market individualism seem modern 
again. The way that they went about this was to argue that markets were 
not only generally a more efficient way to organise things, but more 
specifically, they were superior at handling the most modern of 
technologies, such as radios, jet planes, and the relatively new invention 
at the time, the computers. From the late 1960s onwards, therefore, 
different strands of neoclassical economic thought combined to produce 
an intellectual framework for the idea that free markets were in fact good 
for the development of high technology. Right-wing economists, lawyers 
and intellectuals, many of whom were based at the University of 
Chicago, began attacking airline regulations, antitrust laws, and the 
regulation of radio waves. The proponents of the new paradigm argued 
for the deregulation of the exact same industries that a previous 
generation of regulators had seen as the prime examples of the limits of 
free markets. According to the new generation, regulatory bodies could 
make robust and progressive decisions by thinking in terms of consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency, instead of focusing on notions of the 
public good. In the context of a stagnating economy, these thinkers 
offered not just criticism of previous ways of doing things, but a way out 
of the crisis that would not mean giving up on established wealth and 
ways of life (Streeter, 2011: 74). 
 
In the 1980s, neoclassical economics intersected with information 
society theory. A decade earlier, the notion of an information society had 
competed with many other concepts, such as “technetronic society”, 
“telematics society” and “compunications”. The reason information 
society came out on top was that from the perspective of capital, 
information had the advantage of being something that could be 
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imagined as thing-like, and therefore as property. For example, still in 
the 1970s, the idea that software was something that someone could 
own was at best controversial. One of the things that the neoclassical 
law and economics movements did was to revive the language of 
classical property rights, which then lent itself to the notion that the more 
rights there is the better. The infusion between the ideas that information 
was property and that markets were a superior way of organising things 
laid the foundations for the inflation of the notion of intellectual property. 
From the 1980s onwards began a process that saw the extension of 
patents to things like genes and software, the look and feel of computer 
programs, aspects of a pop stars personality, and eventually to business 
models such as Amazon’s online ordering system (Streeter, 2011: 76–
79). 
 
In sum, by the 1980s there had been a general shift in the logic of legal 
decision making. Whereas previously the burden of proof had been on 
those that wanted to extend property protections, from here on the 
burden of proof was on anyone that wanted to prevent legal 
commodification (Streeter, 2011: 78). After this point: 
Technology and modernity were no longer on the side of planning or 
the public good or an example of what democratic government could 
accomplish; they were on the side of rights, and government was their 
enemy, just as it was the enemy of rights. (Streeter, 2011: 79) 
There were also more practical ways in which computers became in this 
period a symbol for the superiority of the free market. For example, the 
popular myth that the computer industry had emerged solely from the 
initiative of entrepreneurial individuals such as Steve Jobs and Bill Gates 
had a big impact on the discourse around big business. Whereas 
previously the business world had been seen by many as a system 
dominated by a few large corporations in league with the government, 
the rise of the computer industry revived the belief that perhaps the 
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business world was in fact the result of innovative risk-taking individuals 
in competition with each other, after all (Streeter, 2011: 87). 
 
The idea that computers were made possible by capitalist entrepreneurs 
and inventors alone also defined the social meaning attached to them. 
Streeter (2011: 88) argues that in contrast to countries such as France, 
where the first computers were experienced as part of a 
telecommunications system provided by the government, in the US: 
[…] the experience of reading about, buying and using 
microcomputers created a kind of congruence between an everyday 
life experience and the neoclassical economic vision – the vision of a 
world of isolated individuals operating apart, without dependence on 
each other, individuals in a condition of self-mastery, rationally 
calculating prices and technology. 
Therefore, in the US, computers provided an everyday experience that 
made the market-ideology feel right (Streeter, 2011: 88). American 
cultural hegemony being so strong, we can reasonably assume that this 
has been the way that computers have been experienced in many other 
parts of the world too. 
 
4.2.2.3 Neoliberal globalisation facilitated by information 
networks 
 
The claim that computers were from early on developed to a large 
degree from the perspective of capitalist management makes much 
sense when we consider another important factor in the downfall of 
Fordism, namely, the globalisation of production and information and 
communication services. Indeed, although some businesses have 
always maintained a global presence, it is only in the last few decades 
that there has been an exponential growth in their number. In fact, today 
there are over 50,000 transnational corporations, and whereas in 1950 
the majority of North American companies had subsidiaries in fewer than 
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six countries, today only a few operate on such a small scale (Dicken, 
2010). Major corporations are today global to the extent that they no 
longer necessarily see themselves as being tied to any particular nation 
state. As is well known, a large company might have its headquarters in 
the US, design facilities in Europe, and manufacture operations in Asia 
(Webster, 2014: 79). 
 
The by-products of the globalisation of production have been the 
globalisation of information services such as advertising, banking, and 
consultancy, and the globalisation of communications, such as mass 
media. The development of computer networks, the deregulation of 
stock markets, and the abolition of exchange controls in particular have 
led to a vast increase in the volume and velocity of international financial 
transactions. As a result, the financial sector has become so powerful 
that when nations lose the confidence of markets, governments must act 
rapidly to restore “confidence”, or otherwise face the collapse of their 
currency (Webster, 2014: 80–81). 
 
What is important to take out of this is the point that these processes 
have been key in undermining the organisational premise of the Fordist 
system, the nation state. The Fordist order was based fundamentally on 
the on national government’s capacity to devise and implement policies, 
on relative immunity from foreign competition, and on distinctively 
national corporations. Under an ever more global market system, these 
conditions have become rare. Although the nation state still remains 
important especially in terms of people’s identities, its economic and 
political significance has witnessed a steep decline. The rise of 
transnational corporations has for example obscured what is owned by 
any given nation. This has then raised the disturbing question of to 
whom, if anyone, are these transnational corporations accountable to. 
Most nations are now forced to seek investments from transnational 
corporations, and the usual precondition for receiving them is the 
subordination to priorities set by them (Webster, 2014: 83–84).  
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What does any of the analysis above have to do with Big Data? It is 
important to remember that transnational corporations could not have 
risen to global dominance without information technology. As commerce 
became more and more global, ways of handling information and 
information flows, an “informational infrastructure” even, was put in place 
(Webster, 2014: 82). Without the worldwide spread of information 
technology, transnational corporations could simply not operate at the 
scale that they do today. Surely this must be at least part of the reason 
why so much of the hyperbole around information technology comes 
from the business community. After all, their power in this world depends 
on their widespread application. 
 
Big Data can therefore be thought of as both the facilitator and result of 
corporate globalisation. As Herbert Schiller noted already many decades 
ago, the information explosion of the post-war years is to a large extent 
a consequence of corporate capitalism’s triumphant expansion. Let us 
not forget this when we today celebrate Big Data for its potential to be 
used for good in the world. For in addition to whatever benefits Big Data 
might end up yielding for society, it is also tightly connected to the 
growing power that transnational corporations now exert on the world 
stage. 
 
What the section above has also shown us is that computers, and the 
information society rhetoric that accompanied them, were far from free 
of political ideology. Instead, the wide scale introduction of computers 
was a process deeply embedded in a major transformation in what kind 
of ideas that would dominate society. The scale of corporate 
globalisation that has taken place in the last few decades has been made 
possible by computers, which themselves have become a symbol for the 
superiority of the free market. The political conclusions that we have 
drawn from the increasing role that information technology plays in our 
lives must therefore be seen as a reflection of these broader economic 
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and social developments. Let us keep this in mind when we today hear 
political commentators arguing that digitalisation is both inevitable, and 
ultimately beneficial for everyone. In the next section, I review Big Data 
as a topic of both popular and academic debate. 
 
4.3 What is Big Data? 
 
A quick analysis using Google Trends global search reveals that it was 
only towards the end of 2010 that the term “Big Data” had begun to 
register, just ahead of an explosion of interest from 2011 onwards 
(Google, 2015). Since then, Big Data has become a buzzword commonly 
used in business circles, news media and science magazines. In popular 
accounts, Big Data has been presented as a “problem solver” for almost 
anything, from breast cancer to low cost governance, from better security 
to predictive systems, from smart cities and better traffic and water 
systems, to an end to urban squalor (Uprichard, 2014). 
 
Others have been more critical and argued that the term itself has 
become so wide-ranging in definition that it no longer constitutes 
anything meaningful. More recently, the debate on digital data has 
started to centre around Artificial Intelligence and its related concepts, 
such as Machine Intelligence and Deep Learning. 
 
To be sure, governments and businesses have been gathering and 
analysing large datasets for a very long time. In fact, as I pointed out in 
chapter one, practically all known societies that have existed since the 
art of writing was invented have practised some form of information 
gathering (Starr, 1987). In the next section I review some of the ways in 
which it has been argued that Big Data signals a significant shift from the 
past. 
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4.3.1 3Vs? 
 
Although a myriad of definitions of Big Data exist  (for a review of twelve 
different definitions, see Press, 2014), most of them have tended to 
stress the importance of the so called 3Vs of volume, velocity and variety 
(Stapleton, 2011). 
 
The first of these, growth in volume, has to a large degree been the result 
of digitisation. Even if very large datasets, such as the census, are 
nothing new, there is no denying the major impact that information 
technology has had on our ability to store and process information on a 
daily basis. Indeed, the numbers behind such claims are truly staggering. 
On the internet alone, Google now processes more than 24 petabytes of 
data, or thousands of times the quantity of all printed material in the U.S 
Library of Congress, in just one day. Youtube users upload over an hour 
of video content every second, while Facebook gets over 10 million new 
photos uploaded every hour. On Twitter, on the other hand, over 400 
million new messages are posted every day (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier, 2013: 8). And these examples are now a few years old. 
 
In addition to volume, Big Data is said to be distinguished by its high 
velocity. In contrast to traditional forms of data, which tended to present 
only a snapshot of the world at a particular time, Big Data is generated 
on a continuous basis, or sometimes even in real time. Digital devices 
have generated a persistent stream of information unlike previously 
possible. 
 
Finally, Big Data is said to arrive in much greater variety than previous 
forms of data. Instead of just numbers on a sheet, Big Data can be 
pictures, sound or video, or a combination of these. The tendency 
towards greater variety is reflected in database design, where there has 
recently been a move from structured designs to ones that can handle a 
variety of sources and formats. 
130 
 
 
Kitchin (2014b) elaborates on the standard definition by adding four 
more characteristics to the list. In addition to the 3Vs, Big Data is 
according to him exhaustive in scope (covering whole populations 
instead of just samples), fine-grained in resolution and uniquely indexical 
(objects have unique identifiers which allow them to be tracked through 
time and space), relational (made up of common fields that enable 
linking), and flexible and scalable. For him, together the seven 
characteristics of Big Data constitute a significant shift, a revolution even, 
from previous forms of data gathering and analysis (Kitchin, 2014b: 79). 
 
Furthermore, coping with such data is said to require new analytical 
techniques, from data mining and pattern recognition, to prediction, 
simulation, optimization, and new forms of data visualization techniques 
(Kitchin, 2014b: 101). The person with the skills to perform such 
analyses has been referred to as “the data scientist”, someone who 
“combines the skills of software programmer, statistician and 
storyteller/artist to extract the nuggets of gold hidden under mountains 
of data” (Cukier, 2010). 
 
4.3.2 Correlation over causation and the end of theory? 
 
A heated debate was started a few years ago by the former editor-in-
chief at Wired magazine, Chris Anderson, who famously declared that 
Big Data signalled a new era of knowledge production characterized by 
“the end of theory” (Anderson, 2008). For Anderson, the ability to 
automatically analyse large volumes of data is making the scientific 
method obsolete. With Big Data, correlation becomes more important 
than causation, and science no longer needs theories and hypotheses 
to advance. Many similar commentaries have appeared during the past 
few years often, but not exclusively, from the business community. 
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Perhaps the best known popular take on Big Data, Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier’s “Big data: a revolution that will transform how we live, work 
and think” (2013), reaches the same conclusion as Anderson. The book, 
which starting from its topic is a good example of modern myth-making 
around information technology, argues that Big Data is resulting in three 
shifts in how data is analysed. 
 
First, since Big Data tends to be exhaustive, sampling is no longer 
required to the same extent as before. Whereas previously zooming in 
to sub-population usually meant losing statistical significance, Big Data 
can detect small anomalies and outliers. As a result, inferential statistics 
will increasingly be replaced by Big Data methods able to mine for 
anomalies in large datasets (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 27–
31). 
 
Second, because the volume of data is big, statisticians will have to learn 
to accept its in-exactitude. Big Data increases the likelihood of errors in 
the data, which however no longer remains a problem because the risk 
of individual data points biasing the overall analysis is very small (Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 32–34). The focus on exactness is 
replaced by calculation “with messiness in mind” and where statisticians 
previously set aside their interest in large samples in favour of more 
randomness, with Big Data they will have to learn to deal with more 
imprecision in return for more data (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013: 40–41).  
  
These two shifts constitute the preconditions for the most important shift 
of all, the move from causation to correlation. In contrast to the previous 
era of hypothesis driven science, datasets are fast becoming too 
complex to be examined with a hypothesis in mind, but instead, with new 
computational techniques it is possible to let mathematical algorithms 
determine the best way to approach the data. As a result, data analysis 
is moving from a hypothesis driven search for causation to a computer 
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mediated search for correlations. Increasingly, “knowing what without 
knowing why is often good enough” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013: 55). 
 
Therefore, although seemingly critical of Anderson’s proclamation 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 72), Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier end up confirming it. All in all, the book functions as a modern 
example of myth making around information technology. For its authors 
“the IT revolution is evident all around us” (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier, 2013: 78), and we have now arrived at the moment where “where 
the information society finally fulfils its promise” (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013: 190). In contrast to previous myth-makers whose 
focus was on technology, however, this time we are encouraged to 
“recast our gaze to focus on the I, the information” (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013: 78), which takes on an almost magical power to 
change the way we know the world. It provides, as Poon (2016: 1091) 
puts it, “a message that business people are eager to believe: with big 
data, truth, progress, and the pursuit of profit will finally resonate in 
perfect harmony.” Ultimately, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s book 
reminds us of why Big Data has been much more than a technical 
development. For without a doubt, one of its functions has been to 
provide a fresh face for the claim that information technology transcends 
history, geography, and politics as we have come to know them. 
 
4.3.3 Responses from the social science community 
 
Considering that most Big Data, is social data (Uprichard, 2015), it is not 
surprising to find the topic widely discussed amongst social scientists. 
As Halavais (2015: 583–584) points out, the challenge that Big Data 
poses to the social sciences is in fact the very same one that has always 
been at its core, that of “…connecting the micro-connections between 
individuals to the vast social structures that shape us (and are shaped 
by us) as a society.”  
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As is well known, the social sciences have often found themselves 
caught somewhere in between the Sciences and Humanities, and so it 
is also in relation to responses to Big Data that a distinction can be made 
between social scientists who follow a more strictly scientific approach, 
and those who identify more strongly with the humanities tradition. 
 
4.3.3.1 Not the end of theory, but the beginning of it? 
 
For leading computational sociologists, Big Data signals, not the end of 
theory, but the beginning of it. Macy (2015) for example argues that what 
Big Data really implies is a move from statistical significance to 
theoretical significance. Speaking metaphorically, for him, Big Data has 
finally granted the social sciences its very own telescope, but theory is 
still needed in order to know where the telescope should be pointed at. 
With so much data around, statistical significance no longer works as a 
proxy for whether a correlation is meaningful or not, but what is needed 
instead is some notion of theoretical significance. 
 
A second major shift brought about by Big Data is for Macy a move from 
individualistic to relational explanations. In contrast to traditional 
surveys, which treated individuals as isolated objects with various 
attributes (gender, age, education, occupation etc.), Big Data makes it 
possible to examine how individual behaviour is influenced by social 
networks. The big breakthrough with Big Data is therefore for Macy not 
that it signals the end of theory, but that it grants us access to relational 
data at a population scale. 
 
Pentland (2014), another founding figure in the field of computational 
social science, argues similarly that with Big Data, the “old” language of 
markets and social classes will increasingly be replaced by concepts 
from what he terms “Social Physics”, such as “exploration”, 
“engagement” and “social learning”. Similarly to Macy, Pentland (2014: 
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191–192) argues that in contrast to the traditional concepts and 
methods, Big Data is able to account both for individual differences and 
for the relationships between individuals. 
 
In general, computational sociologists such as Macy and Pentland tend 
to stress the opportunities with Big Data rather than the obstacles and 
dangers. Optimistically, they believe that practical solutions can be found 
to the problems associated with Big Data, such as those that exist 
around ownership and privacy (Pentland, 2012). What they reflect less 
on however is the central role that the very same data that they use in 
their research plays in the functioning of modern capitalism. Examined 
more critically, what this implies is that addressing the problems with Big 
Data must necessarily go beyond practical solutions to a deeper 
consideration of what the productive forces and relations of production 
in contemporary capitalism are. I will return to this theme in the last part 
of this section. 
 
4.3.3.2 A threat or an opportunity? 
 
More traditionally trained social scientists have identified Big Data both 
as a threat (Savage and Burrows, 2007) and as an opportunity (Lupton, 
2014). Uprichard (2013) takes a strong position in the debate by arguing 
that now is the time when social scientists must reflect on just what kind 
of a social science they want to be part of. She argues polemically that 
left solely in the hands of physical, engineering, computational, and 
mathematical sciences, Big Data risks creating nothing short of a 
“methodological genocide” for the social sciences. According to her, we 
are “slowly but surely, becoming complicit to a deeply positivist, 
reductionist kind of social science, where variables are the be all and 
end all, where causality is devoid of meaning, and where non social 
scientists are the ones ruling the roost in terms of access, collection and 
analysis - of Big Data, which is social data.” (Uprichard, 2013: 3–4). For 
her, Big Data remains very limited in its capacity to address the core task 
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of sociology, that of identifying and visualising where power networks lie. 
She therefore calls on sociologists to fight back, not just by training up 
their skills in data analysis, but also by starting to pose questions such 
as “…who is doing the counting?  Who is making the decisions? Who is 
deciding what is counted and measured and how these counts and 
measurements are used and for whom?” (Uprichard, 2013: 4). 
 
Not least due to the fact that funding agencies are increasingly 
refocusing their resources on projects that involve the analysis of large 
datasets (Kitchin, 2014b: 143), some social scientists have recently 
teamed up with computer scientists to explore the opportunities afforded 
by Big Data to sociological analysis. Reflecting on experiences from one 
such project, Housley et al. (2014: 4) see in Big Data an opportunity to 
“‘digitally re-master’ classic questions about social organization, social 
change and the derivation of identity from collective life.” More 
specifically, by making it possible to capture “naturally occurring or ‘user-
generated’ data at the level of populations in real or near-real-time”, 
digital social research “…offers the hitherto unrealizable possibility of 
studying social processes as they unfold…” (Housley et al., 2014: 4). 
Furthermore, by fostering new relations between researchers and the 
researched, Big Data offers an opportunity to “motivate a renewed 
interest in the programme for a ‘public sociology’, characterized by the 
co-production of social scientific knowledge involving a broad range of 
actors and publics” (Housley et al., 2014: 1). 
 
Reflecting similarly on an interdisciplinary project involving both 
sociologists and computer scientists, Tinati et al. (2014) argue that social 
science has so far been slow to pick up on the promise of Big Data due 
to methodological restrictions. For them, the emergence of Big Data 
mirrors recent theoretical concerns of sociology, such as the move from 
seeing the social as society bounded by nation-states to understanding 
it as the mobility and flow of people, objects, images and information 
(Urry, 2000). With publicly available Big Data it is now possible to start 
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exploring these issues empirically, but so far, social science methods 
have been unable account for the key characteristics of Big Data, which 
are its scale, proportionality, dynamism and relationality. Hence, they 
call on social scientists to start expanding their methodological 
repertoire, by amongst other things, forming collaborations with 
computer scientists, like they have successfully done. 
 
Many have also reflected on the inherent problems that exist in large 
scale data sets. Lewis (2015) for example warns against treating Big 
Data as “naturally occurring” and unproblematic. First, he points out that 
although Big Data is often celebrated for being able to grant access to 
complete populations, it is in the end still a sample. Certain kinds of 
people are more likely than others to turn up in certain kinds of datasets, 
and the information available for each individual may vary hugely. 
Second, in contrast to the notion that Big Data captures “natural” 
behaviour, our interactions are in fact constrained by technology in ways 
which can be difficult to discern. Third, just as Big Data cannot be 
interpreted independently of the technology through which it is 
generated, neither can it be interpreted without some understanding of 
the cultural context in which it has generated. For example, friendship 
dynamics on social media can operate in entirely different dynamics to 
real life. Hence, for Lewis, Big Data poses a set of new challenges rather 
than a simple straightforward solution. Elsewhere, Busch (2014) 
identifies a total of twelve problems with large scale from distortion to 
errors, bias, and misinterpretation. Not least because Big Data might 
increasingly be used to make policy decisions, understanding the 
manner of its construction is now of key importance. Diesner (2015) 
points out similarly that conducting data analytics always involves a 
plethora of small decisions, many of which can have enormous 
consequences for research outcomes. Hence, she calls for increasing 
awareness in documenting and accounting for these decisions. 
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Ruppert (2016), on the other hand, offers a Science and Technology 
Studies perspective on Big Data. According to her, sociologists should 
recast their focus from the 3Vs, which for her are qualities, rather than 
definitions, to the changing data practices which they are an outcome of. 
She points out that Big Data “are generated and sustained through 
multiple and selective sociotechnical practices that include not only 
technologies and people but also norms, values, conventions and rules.” 
(Ruppert, 2016: 2–3). As a result, a focus on what she terms “data 
practices” can account for the changing relations to data that cut across 
different contexts, which are of four kinds. First, the digital actions that 
generate Big Data are also inventive of new forms of sociality. Social 
networking sites, blogs etc. “instantiate social relations that are part of 
who we are as individuals and collectives in novel ways.” (Ruppert, 2016: 
3). Second, Big Data gives rise to new method relations. Various actors 
are now inventing and experimenting with different methods to represent 
and enact social worlds with Big Data. A third set of relations comes from 
the fact that people are now ever more aware of the ways in which they 
are “being made into ‘data subjects’, analysed and known” (Ruppert, 
2016: 3), as the recent revelations by Edward Snowden have made 
clear. Finally, Big Data practices are also changing research relations 
for social scientists, as academia is very much part of both generating 
Big Data and defining the themes, concepts and concerns that make it 
up as a field. For Ruppert, the ethical challenge for social science is now 
“to find ways of being accountable, answerable and responsible to the 
effects of our methods that take up Big Data and the worlds and ways of 
being they elevate and promote.” (Ruppert, 2016: 4). In sum, for 
Ruppert, Big Data is not just about its qualities, but about new forms of 
organising data as well. Following this idea, in the next section I analyse 
the social context in which much of Big Data is being generated. 
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4.3.3.3 A corporate takeover of social knowledge production? 
 
A classic study by Graham and Marvin, Splintering Urbanism (2001), 
documents the many ways in which public infrastructure provision of 
power, transport, communication and water are being “unbundled” and 
“splintered” as a result of a widespread movement towards privatisation 
and liberalisation across many countries and continents. There is good 
reason to argue that this privatisation, or neoliberalisation, of 
infrastructure now extends to the production of data as well. After all, it 
is largely private companies that are collecting, organising and owning 
the data that is generated by our transactions with various, often 
commercial, platforms both online and offline (Van Dijck, 2013). Many 
public sector institutions, such as national statistical institutes, which 
used to hold a monopoly over the production of data for the making of 
official statistics, now fear that they will increasingly have to negotiate 
with private companies for access to the best data (Struijs et al., 2014). 
 
boyd and Crawford (2012: 673) have voiced the concern that because 
Big Data is mostly owned by private companies, it might be creating new 
hierarchies between researchers with access and those with little or 
none at all. After all, as things currently stand, only a handful of 
companies have access to very large social data, which means that they 
alone set the rules for who can use it and for what purposes. Therefore, 
in addition to creating hierarchies between researchers, Big Data might 
also lead to a situation where private companies will increasingly start to 
impact, if not dictate, the types of questions that are being addressed by 
social scientific research. The fear is that researchers with access to Big 
Data might be less likely to choose questions that are contentious to 
social media companies if they think it may result in their access being 
cut (boyd and Crawford, 2012: 675). 
 
There is much reason to suggest that the ethical concerns with Big Data 
go far beyond the question of access. For example, as Thatcher (2014) 
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points out, currently only a handful of companies get to decide what can 
be known through and done with Big Data. Since these companies are 
ultimately driven by the profit motive, they care less about the accuracy 
of their data than about its potential use in attracting more customers. 
Hence, when researchers accept the data as inherently meaningful, they 
also accept “an epistemological framework of knowledge structured 
through capitalist imperatives.” (Thatcher, 2014: 1772). Therefore, even 
when a researcher gets access to the full volume of existing Twitter data, 
the quality and characteristics of the data are still beyond her control. In 
sum, with the move to Big Data comes to the risk that the very limits of 
knowledge will be “…set through the data infrastructure of private 
corporations.” (Thatcher, 2014: 1766). 
 
Increasingly, Big Data research can be used to not just describe society, 
but to impact it in very direct ways as well. This became clear with 
Facebook’s ‘emotional contagion study’ (Kramer et al., 2014) which 
demonstrated that by choosing what messages to show to its users, 
Facebook can directly influence their emotional state. Those users who 
were shown more positive words in their newsfeeds also then posted 
more positive words, and the same was true for negative words. 
Reflecting on the study and the public concern it raised, Schroeder 
(2014) notes that although companies have for quite some time been 
using market research and advertising to influence people’s minds, Big 
Data represents a leap in how data can be used to manipulate people in 
powerful ways. Even if Facebook claims that it would never use this type 
of research for anything else than improving user experience, it is not 
difficult to imagine how it might one day be used to for example influence 
people’s political behaviour. And were this to be the case, we would 
probably never even know about it, for as long as Facebook and Google 
remain commercial services that we use voluntarily, there is no 
obligation for transparency. Considering the public anger raised by the 
contagion study, it is in fact likely that this type of research will 
increasingly be conducted behind the public eye (Schroeder, 2014). 
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Yet another troubling development are the close links that now exist 
between academic researchers and private companies. One cannot for 
example help but to wonder whether boyd and Crawford, who I already 
introduced earlier in this section, and who are both employed by 
Microsoft, might in fact exemplify their very own critique (2012). It is after 
all likely that by aligning themselves closely to Microsoft, they have 
rendered some modes of critical inquiry in to its workings off limit. As 
Chan (2015) reminds us, we must be equally worried about what 
happens when access to Big Data is granted, as we are about the 
divides that the process might be creating. She argues that 
collaborations, just as much as divisions between researchers, are the 
source of the research norms and practices that are currently emerging 
around Big Data. Cautionary examples of the downsides of public private 
partnerships come from pharmaceutical, biotechnological and medical 
research, where an increasing emphasis on corporate funding since the 
1980s have led to a series of cases where significant amounts of 
unfavourable findings on commercial products have been censored from 
publication. One cannot therefore help but to fear that by owning the 
most valuable data, and therefore controlling access to it, corporate 
interests will begin to have an increasing impact on the direction of 
academic research and higher education more generally. 
 
This impression is further enhanced when one examines the research 
outputs that have come out of the burgeoning field of computational 
social science introduced in the beginning of this section. It is notable 
that in a leading conference in the field, International Conference on 
Computational Social Science, organised in Helsinki in June 2015, there 
were in fact not many sociologists among the presenters. Most had a 
background in computer science or physics, which was clearly reflected 
in the kinds of questions that they were addressing in their research. It 
is telling that the one presenter who did identify himself as a sociologist, 
Macy (2015), already introduced earlier this chapter, defined 
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computational social science as “computer enabled studies of human 
behaviour and social interaction”. This is an extremely narrow definition 
of social science, and one that does not address the fundamental 
questions of sociology, which have traditionally been about identifying 
structural roots of inequality and figuring out where power resides. As 
argued by Crawford et al. (2014: 1667), “Aggregated, individual actions 
cannot, in and of themselves, illustrate the complicated dynamics that 
produce social interaction—the whole of society is greater than the sum 
of its parts.” 
 
It is important to note that certainly not all Big Data is produced in the 
private sector. Kitchin (2014b: 87–98) for example lists numerous 
examples of sources of Big Data, of which only part reside in the private 
sector. Big Data relating to health, public administration, satellite 
imagery and GPS, traffic control rooms, smart city technologies, 
university research data, environmental data, are some examples of Big 
Data that are either entirely publicly produced or produced in conjunction 
with the public sector who procure the service and dictate the terms of 
its production. Much of the Big Data that governments for example are 
hoping to exploit are generated within, rather than outside of them. 
Furthermore, also civil society is in numerous ways actively involved in 
both producing and analysing Big Data. Much Big Data is volunteered 
data, generated for example as part of crowdsourcing (Howe, 2009) or 
citizen science (Gabrys et al., 2016) initiatives. On the other hand, 
growing calls for data to be made available publicly and free of charge 
(Berners-Lee, 2012) has meant that citizens and non-governmental 
organisations now have access to an increasing amount of data from 
which to draw their own conclusions and to potentially challenge 
government and corporate agendas. In sum, Big Data is not only being 
used to advance corporate agendas, but to challenge them in many 
ways as well. 
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Nevertheless, as numerous examples in this chapter have shown, 
private corporations do seem to have an increasing presence in both 
producing and analysing Big Data. It is for example noteworthy that the 
majority of presenters at the conference for computational social science 
in Helsinki were building their analyses on data obtained not from 
governments, but from businesses. A major risk with a growing need to 
collaborate with the private sector in order to access Big Data is that 
social science might increasingly become reduced to the study of 
behavioural dynamics. This is exactly the kind of research that 
companies will want to fund, first, because it yields clear practical 
applications for their products, and second, because it does not address 
the difficult questions of political economy that might end up reflecting 
badly on them. In its current form, what it amounts up to is an apolitical 
form of social science for an apolitical world. The next Nobel prize in 
social science might very well go to a computational social scientist, but 
whether the research leading up to it truly addresses the pressing social 
and political problems of our time, is a different matter entirely. For little 
do the computational social scientists reflect on the fact that much of the 
same Big Data that they use for their research is now at the core of the 
functioning of modern capitalism. I conclude this chapter by situating Big 
Data in the context of political economy. 
 
4.4 The political economy of Big Data 
 
4.4.1 Data as a key source of economic value 
 
An important part of the popular discourse around Big Data is the idea 
that data now constitutes an important form of economic currency. 
According to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 182), for example, 
“Data is to the information society what fuel was to the industrial 
economy: the critical resource powering the innovations that people rely 
on”. And they are certainly not alone in claiming that although data has 
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always been important to business, it now occupies a far more critical 
role than before. 
 
In their popular take on Big Data, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 
96) note that in the near future, everything from everyday wearable 
objects to the built environment will have chips, sensors and other 
communication modules embedded in them. As a result, language, 
location and interactions will be recorded in a quantified format for it to 
be tabulated and analysed. This data is immensely valuable for 
businesses, who use it to target their own services and to sell it to other 
third parties, such as advertisers. 
 
Especially those who are keen to promote Big Data would argue that, 
already today, Amazon knows what we buy, Google knows what we 
browse online, and Twitter knows what we have on our minds. 
Facebook, on the other hand, gathers all this information, along with our 
social networks. Mobile network operators know where we walk, who we 
talk to, and who is nearby. In a relatively short period of time, these 
platforms have become “goldmines” of data that can be used to infer 
various things about people, from their socio-economic statuses to their 
movements through space and time (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013: 96–97). 
 
As Morozov (2015b) explains, this data is now at the core of how many 
of the world’s most powerful companies operate. In contrast to pre-digital 
times, when we used cash to pay for services, today we pay for them by 
surrendering our data. For Morozov, this constitutes a process of double 
exploitation: first, we are exploited when the data we give up in exchange 
for relatively trivial services eventually ends up on companies’ balance 
sheets, and second, when the data is used to customise and structure 
our world in a non-transparent way through targeted advertising. 
Whereas cash had no connection to our social lives or life histories, data 
is in essence a representation of them, to be turned in to money by 
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internet conglomerates such as Google and Facebook. Hence, these 
companies are currently promoting free connectivity and digital inclusion 
not out of their good will, but because they want to own the right to 
monetise the lives of as many people as possible. 
 
Terranova (2000) identified the growing importance of free labour online 
at the start of the millennia. Even if the platforms she mentions are 
different from the ones we use today, the mechanism itself is familiar 
enough: 
Simultaneously voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited, 
free labor on the Net includes the activity of building Web sites, 
modifying software packages, reading and participating in mailing lists, 
and building virtual spaces on MUDs and MOOs. Far from being an 
"unreal," empty space, the Internet is animated by cultural and 
technical labor through and through, a continuous production of value 
that is completely immanent to the flows of the network society at 
large. (Terranova, 2000: 33–34) 
More recently, Ritzer and Jurgenson (2010) have argued that although 
capitalism has always been characterised by both production and 
consumption, the recent explosion in user-generated content online has 
made the two more interlinked than before. In “prosumer” capitalism, 
value is created from our voluntary use of free services online, but in 
contrast to previously, this time it is more difficult to determine whether 
the process is exploitative or not. This is firstly because users generating 
the content are enjoying themselves while doing it, and secondly, 
because online platforms also provide a wide base for resistance against 
commercialisation. Thus, these authors speculate on whether 
“prosumption” might bring about a new form of capitalism, one 
characterised by free services and an abundance of content. 
 
Fuchs (2014b: 110–111), on the other hand, explores these issues from 
a Marxist perspective. Following Marx, he argues the rate of exploitation 
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is ultimately defined by how much of worker’s work time goes unpaid. As 
users of social media do not receive any salary at all, capitalist 
“presumption” constitutes for him nothing less than an extreme form of 
exploitation. For Fuchs, the counter-argument that users of social media 
are not exploited because in return for their work they receive access to 
free services would be true only if “free access” could be further 
converted in to a salary to buy food and housing. Thus, for Fuchs, media 
in the age of the internet are still fundamentally shaped by capitalist class 
relations. 
 
Andrejevic (2014) explores the social divides that are being created by 
Big Data in more detail. According to him, Big Data is bringing about a 
structural divide between a small minority or people with the capacity to 
collect, store and mine large quantities of data, and a majority whom the 
data collection targets. For him, what is most important about Big Data 
analytics is that they grant the few people with access to the costly 
infrastructures and technical expertise required by them an 
unprecedented capability to socially sort, that is, to assign worth to 
others, who in most cases remain unaware or feel powerless to contest 
these practices. Although social sorting of this kind is currently used 
mainly in advertising, it is likely that they will become part of a growing 
variety of decision-making and forecasting operations. Hence, the big 
paradox of the emerging Big Data era is that as we overcome the digital 
divide by granting more and more people access to digital devices, we 
end up exacerbating a “Big Data divide”. 
 
As Qiu (2015) points out, Big Data can be seen as the latest wave of 
neoliberal expansion. He notes that “While the technological sphere of 
social media is new, so is the global phenomenon of Big Data worship, 
the ethical question about ‘accessing’, privatizing, and commodifying the 
commons has been a time-honoured concern that goes all the way back 
to the beginning of the capitalist world-system.” (Qiu, 2015: 1092). 
Similarly to new technologies in previous eras of capitalism, from 
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shipbuilding to mining to weaponry, media and computing, Big Data 
represents yet another way to render formerly “inaccessible” regions 
“accessible” for private wealth accumulation. Hence, for Qiu (2015: 
1092), the ethical problem with Big Data is in fact “as old as capitalism 
itself.” 
 
As a result of such developments, data is now according to many a key, 
or perhaps the key, economic asset. Many of the major companies that 
now gather large amounts of data were not originally founded with that 
purpose in mind, and recently they have realised that as it is practically 
impossible to know what uses the data might have in the future, the best 
thing to do is to gather as much of it as possible (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013: 98–102). The majority of Facebook’s share value is 
for example not based on how much money it makes at the moment, but 
on the financial potential its data holds (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013: 118–120). 
 
In addition to transforming traditional industries such as advertising, the 
economic value that data now holds has given rise to entirely new 
industries, such as the so called “data brokers” that repackage data into 
privately held data sources for rent or re-sale purely for profit. 
Companies such as Epsilon, Acxiom, Alliance Data Systems, eBureau, 
ChoicePoint, Corelogic, Equifax and Experian have databases with 
information concerning over 700 million consumers worldwide. Amongst 
other things, the data analysis products provided by these companies 
are used to micro-target advertising and marketing services, assess 
credit worthiness and socially sort consumers. The data concern all 
aspects of everyday life, from public administration, communications, 
consumption of goods and media, to travel, leisure, crime, social media 
actions, and so on. Although data brokers have been around for a long 
time, it is only recently that their operations have grown in to a multibillion 
dollar business (Kitchin, 2014b: 42).  
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According to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 123–149), in a 
world where data is the main source of economic value, companies will 
increasingly be divided into those with the data, those with the skills to 
analyse it, and those with the ability to innovate with it. Large data 
holders, such as Google, will become ever more powerful due to their 
scale advantages in storing more and more data, whereas innovative 
small companies will be able to have a large presence without big 
investments in physical resources, such as human labour. As a result, 
the industry will be polarised between a few major players and numerous 
small start-ups, with little room for mid-sized companies in between 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 123–149). 
 
Keeping in mind the key economic role that data now holds, a major 
challenge of the near future is to prevent monopolies on its storage and 
use. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 183) contrast modern day 
“data barons” with nineteenth-century robber barons who dominated 
America’s railroads, steel manufacturing and telegraph networks. In the 
next section, I will explore the possibility that just as the early 
industrialists were eventually put under control with antitrust legislation, 
similar measures might be needed to be taken with dominant Big Data 
companies. So what does the Big Data industry currently look like then? 
 
4.4.2 A global cartel in information resources? 
 
Many now argue that to some extent, a global Big Data cartel already 
exists. Indeed, few of those who so eagerly celebrate Big Data for its 
potential to be used for good in the world remember to mention just how 
unevenly its financial gains are, at least for now, being distributed. 
 
Morozov (2015e), already introduced earlier in this chapter, defines the 
business models of companies such as Amazon, Facebook, Airbnb and 
Uber as “platform capitalism”. In contrast to the previous economic 
model, where individual firms competed against each other for 
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customers, internet firms provide a platform for customers to engage 
with one another. So whereas taxi companies used to transport 
customers, Uber claims it is simply connecting drivers with passengers, 
and where hotels used to offer hospitality services, Airbnb is just 
connecting hosts with guests. 
 
Two major issues have arisen with the new economic model. First, by 
clinging on to the platform status, the aforementioned companies have 
been able to by-bass much of the consumer protection legislation that 
traditional businesses are subjected to (Morozov, 2015e). This is but one 
of the many ways in which digitalisation accompanied by free market 
ideology has started to undermine Social Democracy’s most 
fundamental principle of maintaining a market economy while granting 
the state a strong mandate to regulate it. Instead, the standard position 
in Silicon Valley is to argue that the only thing that should regulate the 
market, is the market itself (Morozov, 2015a). 
 
Second, the major platforms have in effect become monopolies. After 
all, most of the big companies located in Silicon Valley are there not by 
accident, but because it is the place where so much of the material 
resources of data, algorithms and server power demanded by “platform 
capitalism” today lie. The companies behind these platforms, most of 
which are also notorious for their ability to evade taxes, do not produce 
anything on their own, but instead rearrange what others produce in 
order to make profit for themselves (Morozov, 2015e). 
 
Mosco (2014) documents further the many ways in which the Big Data 
industry has started to resemble monopoly capitalism. According to him, 
the Big Data industry has in a relatively short period of time become 
dominated by only a handful of companies, such as Amazon, Apple, 
Google, Microsoft and Facebook. In stark contrast to their public image 
of riding the latest wave of modernity, they have in fact been following 
some very traditional strategies in economic history. 
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First, all of the aforementioned companies have recently been cutting 
prices to the point where smaller companies can no longer compete with 
them. Historically, once the smaller competitors have been pushed out, 
prices have begun to rise again (Mosco, 2014: 56–57). Secondly, what 
they have also started to do is to exercise power up and down the chain 
of production. Indeed, all of the aforementioned companies are now 
aiming to build their own computers and thereby challenge old 
manufacturers like Intel and HP. Even Facebook, which at least so far 
has not been associated with devices, has recently teamed up with 
traditional manufacturers to develop its own chip. Google has developed 
its own semiconductor and Amazon is building a global computer system 
including its own computers, storage and networking systems, and 
power stations (Mosco, 2014: 58). 
 
According to Mosco (2014: 58) the major Big Data companies are now 
“integrating internally to rationalize production from hardware to 
software, applications, and pricing”. The reason they do this is to extend 
control over markets in order to establish key positions in the 
development of informational capitalism. With no regulatory framework 
in sight, the result might soon be a global data cartel not unlike the oil 
cartel that influenced the energy markets for years. Like the oil cartel 
before it, the data cartel would “provide for the needs of organizations 
and individuals, using control over various stages in the production and 
distribution process that powers global capitalism” (Mosco, 2014: 59). 
 
The new position of power that these handful of companies now find 
themselves in is well exemplified by a recent statement from Google 
founder Eric Schmidt, according to whom Google and its competitors 
should no longer think of themselves as companies, but rather as nation-
states. Schmidt put this attitude into practice in 2013, when he travelled 
to North Korea to meet with its leadership without informing the U.S 
government (Mosco, 2014: 58–59).  
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In sum, in a world where data is the new gold, American technology 
companies are the new imperialists, constantly innovation new ways to 
suck the world dry of its greatest economic resource. Furthermore, in the 
data game, Europe is now a mere digital colony (Järvinen, 2014). 
 
Things are of course more complicated than this, as the currently 
dominant Big Data companies also face a set of challenges from a 
variety of directions, not least by the fact that by providing better and 
better cloud services they often end up cannibalizing the sales of their 
traditional products (Mosco, 2014: 62). Recent developments have 
nevertheless led many to wonder whether the cloud computing industry 
could soon face “the problem of monopoly market domination that once 
led the government to intervene against the power of Standard Oil, IBM, 
and AT&T” (Mosco, 2014: 60). 
 
Such developments have also raised the questions of whether the 
enabler of Big Data, cloud computing, should be considered a public 
utility. After all, cloud computing already shares most of the 
characteristics of earlier utilities, such as water, gas, and electricity, and 
as the market is likely to grow into one where a few providers practically 
everyone, the only thing that is missing for cloud computing to be a utility, 
is a regulator. Currently the industry is governed by market forces alone, 
but historically utility markets have tended to become government 
regulated when one or few producers have come to dominate (Mosco, 
2014: 44–45). 
 
For Mosco (2014: 42), for the time being, cloud computing is a singularly 
market driven project that shows little or no consideration for how it might 
be used to expand economic or political democracy, to increase worker 
participation in corporate decision making, or to improve citizen 
participation in national or community life. Well known political uses, 
such as its uses in election campaigns, show little consideration for how 
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it might empower citizens to participate in decision making. Rather, they 
are examples of population management and control (Mosco, 2014: 25–
27). 
 
4.4.3 Governments and Big Data 
 
And by no means is the public sector excluded from cloud computing. 
The US government for example has recently began outsourcing its 
cloud computing needs. Increasingly, the scale advantages have started 
to outweigh the security risks involved when data storage and 
processing are outsourced to private companies. And as we have 
recently learnt, contrary to previous claims, the U.S government is in fact 
working closely with the major tech companies to gather information on 
both American and foreign citizens (Mosco, 2014: 66–70). 
 
Increasing lobbying efforts from the major technology companies has not 
been a small factor in this development. In addition to lobbying for deals 
with government departments, the big technology companies are now 
also spending millions in efforts to resist the strengthening of privacy 
laws both in the US and in Europe. For long, the EU was adamant in its 
resistance to lobbying, but as a result of its weakened economic position 
it has started to give in. Many European countries are now so desperate 
for investments that they are willing to give up on privacy for free trade 
agreements with the US. And as the recent Snowden revelations have 
revealed, US legislation clearly violates the privacy of EU citizens, a big 
reason why the EU has been trying to establish its own data privacy 
regime (Bowden, 2013). In sum, for corporations, and the politicians 
supporting their agenda, privacy is increasingly seen as a barrier to 
economic growth (Morozov, 2015d). 
 
Some fear that in addition to taking over data processing and storage 
from the government, big tech companies might soon take over politics 
more broadly. Many in Silicon Valley are now promoting a data-driven 
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approach to governance – “algorithmic regulation” whereby regulations 
and law enforcement are enacted by algorithms that process the data 
collected from citizens via smart devices and computers. If all physical 
objects are embedded with digital technology, companies like Google 
will increasingly act as gatekeepers between citizens and the 
government (Morozov, 2014). 
 
Morozov (2014) defines the Silicon Valley approach to politics as 
“solutionism”: all social problems are to be dealt with apps, sensors and 
feedback loops. What it amounts up to for him is a technocratic utopia of 
politics without politics: “Disagreement and conflict under this model, are 
seen as unfortunate by-products of the analog – to be solved through 
data collection – and not as inevitable results of economic or ideological 
conflicts” (Morozov, 2014: 6). Furthermore, if regulation is outsourced to 
algorithms operated by companies, the role and purpose of the state will 
become increasingly unclear. 
 
Increasingly, the technology industry believes it can now even solve 
problems to do with social inequality. According to their reasoning, the 
rise in income inequality does not matter as long as it is accompanied by 
a decrease in consumption inequality. So the fact that the gap between 
the rich and the poor keeps growing and growing matters not as long as 
the poor have access to the services provided by tech companies, an 
argument which might be true if the tech companies also provided for 
food and housing (Morozov, 2015c). 
 
Were this to be the case however, it would raise the question of why 
bother to have a state in the first place. For Morozov (2015c: 3) the 
choice we are faced with today is not between the market and the state, 
but between “a system bereft of any institutional and political imagination 
– where some permutation of hackers, entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists is the default answer to every social problem – and a system, 
where explicitly political solutions that might question who – citizens, 
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firms, the state – ought to own what, and on what terms, are still part of 
the conversation”. 
 
4.4.4 Data proletariat of the world unite? 
 
As I have already mentioned earlier in this chapter, automation has 
generated both utopian and dystopian visions ever since the 1970s. 
Commentaries on its impact have varied from a world free of work to one 
characterised by mass unemployment, stark inequality, and widespread 
social unrest. Recently, there has been a resurgence of the debate. For 
example, a while ago, a widely reported study by Frey and Osborne 
(2013) estimated that nearly half of US jobs could be automated within 
two decades. In another recent popular take on the subject, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014: 7–8) argue that we have in fact entered “a second 
machine age”, or a period in which “computers and other digital 
advances are doing for mental power… what the steam engine and its 
descendants did for muscle power”. 
 
Many fear that the short term effect of automation is likely to be a 
negative one especially for the middle classes, which for long have acted 
as the guarantors of social peace and stability. After all, the people who 
get to work at the major technology companies constitute only a small 
elite in a global supply chain. These lucky few, sometimes referred to as 
the “tech aristocracy”, get to enjoy high salaries and workplace perks 
that normal workers can only dream of. At the other end of the supply 
chain are industrial workers in developing countries where working 
conditions are not far off from the “satanic mills” of the industrial age. In 
between these two extremes is a large pool of middle class jobs that 
often involve the production, processing and distribution of information 
(Fuchs, 2014a). 
 
Worryingly, it is the latter group of jobs that seems to be most at risk due 
to automation. Big Data analytics are making it increasingly possible to 
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subsume into technology much of the labour involved in the information 
and cultural industries today, and the dystopian future scenario is a 
labour market steeply polarised between those in low skilled/low-pay 
service work and those in the upper reaches of organizations (Mosco, 
2014: 165–167). 
 
Even the venture capitalists themselves are now actively debating the 
threat that inequality has started to pose (See for example, Ferenstein, 
2014). Lanier (2013) has popularised this debate from within the Silicon 
Valley bubble. He argues that information on a global scale is currently 
channelling in to what he calls “Siren Servers” to an extent and at a 
speed that is soon going to threaten democracy itself. In sum, Big Data 
is channelling wealth in to the hands of the very few, while at the time 
destroying middle class jobs and the social democratic political order that 
accompanied them. 
 
For Lanier, the main problem is currently that people give up their data 
to companies for free. According to him, the early years of the internet 
emphasized open access and knowledge-sharing to the extent where it 
has distracted people from demanding fairness and job security in an 
economy that is based on information. For him, the threats that Big Data 
pose could be alleviated by establishing a system whereby companies 
would compensate people for their data through micro-transactions. In 
this system, Facebook, Google etc. would have to pay royalty to the user 
whose data it was selling. 
 
As reasonable as this, essentially market-based solution to Big Data 
capitalism’s problems, sounds, it is very difficult to imagine how one 
would get the big technology companies to collaborate in establishing 
such as system, regardless of the strength of the argument that doing so 
was in their long term interest. In sum, as things currently stand, and as 
the numerous examples in this chapter have demonstrated, Big Data is 
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currently producing fewer winners than we might, and certainly should, 
hope for. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have taken up the challenging task of situating Big Data 
in the context of political economy. What the analysis has shown is that 
information technology, Big Data included, are far from free of political 
rationalities. Importantly, the introduction of computers, the facilitators of 
Big Data, was an event strongly associated with a larger ideological shift 
in societies. Amidst all the celebration about the supposed benefits that 
information technology brings, too little reflection has been paid to the 
fact that computerisation has coincided with neoliberalism’s triumph as 
a political rationality. This central point has also not been captured in the 
popular discourse around Big Data, large parts of which has been 
catered to a business audience. Instead, the narrative has done much 
to obscure and naturalise developments that are inherently political. 
 
In sum, although not all Big Data is produced by private companies, a 
significant part is and is therefore underpinned by a market and profit 
rationality. What the increasing production of data in the private sphere 
means for the production of official statistics in Finland, which, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, has for long been underpinned by social 
welfarist concerns, is a question I explore in the next chapter. 
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5 Big Data at Statistics Finland: A 
neoliberalisation of statistical practices? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I situated Big Data in the context of political 
economy and argued that its emergence reflects broader processes of 
neoliberalisation that have swept over western polities in the past few 
decades. However, my take on Big Data was similar to many others in 
that it was of a conceptual, rather than empirical nature. But how does 
the so called data revolution play out at a more practical level? As Kitchin 
(2014b: 118) points out, what we need at the moment are analyses that 
move beyond the conceptual to empirical explorations of the workings of 
Big Data within specific contexts and domains. By drawing on expert 
interviews with statisticians at the National Statistical Institute of Finland, 
Statistics Finland, in this chapter I move my focus from conceptual 
debates to the everyday practices where social transformations and 
revolutions get enacted. 
 
I draw on three main analytical principles to guide my analysis. First, I 
follow Ruppert’s (2016) suggestion to recast focus from the technical 
qualities of Big Data, such as the 3vs, to the changing data practices that 
the qualities are the outcomes of. According to her, these practices 
include “not only technologies and people but also norms, values, 
conventions and rules.” (Ruppert, 2016: 2–3). By analysing the various 
practices prompted by Big Data at Statistics Finland, I suggest that they 
are indicative of an increasing “neoliberalisation” of statistical 
infrastructures (of analysis, processing and storage) and occupational 
cultures. By neoliberalisation I mean not only the privatisation of public 
utilities, but also the extension of market rationalities, logics and values 
to most spheres of life, from the ways governments are organised and 
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managed to how people organise their social relations (See for example 
Brown, 2015; Mirowski, 2013; Peck, 2010). I understand neoliberalism 
therefore as not only an economic doctrine, but a rationality that has 
sunk so deep in to everyday life that it now passes as common sense 
(Mirowski, 2013: 28). By referring to neoliberalisation I take up Peck and 
Tickell’s (2002) suggestion to focus on the processes, such as 
institutional reforms, in which ideologies of neoliberalism are produced 
and reproduced. Finally, I take up Pelizza’s (2016) point that 
infrastructures are key sites where institutional shifts, and eventually 
state transformations even, can become visible. By attending to changes 
in information infrastructures brought about by conceptions of Big Data 
at Statistics Finland, I provide early evidence of an emerging 
reconfiguration between the public and the private sector in the 
production of data and the making of statistics. 
 
The analysis is divided in to four parts. First, instead of assuming a 
predetermined definition of Big Data such as those I have already cited, 
I start by describing how statisticians understood it and the questions 
they saw it raising their professional practice. In contrast to popular 
debates that locate its newness in its technical qualities, such as the 3vs, 
my respondents were more inclined to see the newness of Big Data in 
how the production of data was becoming organised, particularly in the 
sense that more and more institutions now had the capacity to produce 
and analyse data, which could end up challenging NSIs in their role as 
the producers of official statistics. Next, by analysing in detail Big Data 
projects that were ongoing at Statistics Finland at the time of research I 
suggest that in an age of Big Data the production of data for official 
statistics is likely to be increasingly influenced, not by the social welfarist 
rationalities of government departments, as has been the case in the 
period of register-based statistics (Alastalo, 2009b), but by neoliberal 
ones of private corporations. By interrogating further a set of responses 
to Big Data at Statistics Finland, I suggest that neoliberal rationalities 
can also be identified in the ways that Statistics Finland imagines its 
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future role and relevancy. I conclude the analysis by exploring 
companies’ attitudes towards data sharing, as perceived by my 
interviewees. I suggest that in contrast to a markedly positive picture 
painted by the interviewees, there are ways in which private sector 
rationalities are likely to come into conflict with a desire to share data for 
the advancement of social goods. 
 
It is important to note from the outset that all Big Data projects at 
Statistics Finland were still at an experimental phase, and that no pre-
existing statistics had so far been replaced. In its current form, Big Data 
did not challenge the register-based statistical system, and as noted in 
numerous policy reports and opinion pieces, many challenges and risks 
of using Big Data for official statistics remain unsolved (For an overview, 
see Kitchin, 2015). What is already clear however is that there is a 
growing perception in official statistics that Big Data challenges NSIs and 
their accustomed ways of doing things. For the time being, therefore, the 
much discussed “data revolution” manifests itself in official statistics 
most clearly in changing rationalities and mentalities, which, however, 
are already leading to some very practical outcomes in terms of 
organisational arrangements etc.  
 
In sum, following the conceptual starting point of this thesis, that 
statistics and society are co-constituted, and that governmental 
rationalities form an integral part of this co-constitution, I suggest that 
Big Data developments indicate that an increasingly neoliberal rationality 
is becoming part of the making of official statistics. Before the analysis, 
however, I start by describing my sample and the methods I have applied 
in its analysis. 
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5.2 Data and research methods 
 
My sample consists of nineteen semi-structured in-depth interviews 
conducted with statisticians at Statistics Finland between December 
2014 and September 2016. In addition, my analysis is informed by notes 
taken during three fieldwork visits to Statistics Finland during which I 
attended the meetings of a recently established Big Data team. 
Furthermore, I have also studied a number of policy documents, 
including the minutes from the Big Data team’s meetings, which I 
obtained during the fieldwork. 
 
Roughly half of my interviewees were recruited from the Big Data team 
that was established at the beginning of 2015. Initially the head of the 
team, who was also a member of the ARITHMUS Advisory Board (each 
NSI that participated in the research project had one or two 
representatives on an Advisory Board that convened annually during the 
first three years of the project), helped to set up the interviews, but later 
in the research I opted for setting up the interviews independently via 
email. Many of the members of the Big Data team that I interviewed were 
working on projects involving a new data source deemed as Big Data, 
such as mobile phone data, club card data, web scraping data or social 
media data, and this was true also for most of the interviewees that were 
not on the Big Data team. In addition to this, I interviewed two persons 
from senior management and two statisticians that had worked with 
population registers over many decades. Three sampling criteria were 
important to me. First, I wanted to include people with both technical- 
(i.e. statistics and computer science) and less technical (i.e. sociology 
and social geography) backgrounds. Second, I wanted to hear the views 
of both managers and those working in the everyday production of 
statistics, and finally, I wanted to include interviewees form both older 
and younger generations of statisticians. In total, my sample included 
seventeen participants, two of which I interviewed twice. Of the total 
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sample, 70 per cent were male, 59 per cent had backgrounds in less 
technical fields, 70 per cent worked in the everyday production of 
statistics, and 53 per cent had worked at Statistics Finland for ten years 
or more (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. List of research participants 
 
Interviewee Gender E. background Role Years at SF 
One Male Technical Manager More than ten 
Two Male Technical Statistician Less than ten 
Three Male Less technical Statistician Less than ten 
Four Male Less technical Manager More than ten 
Five Female Less technical Statistician More than ten 
Six Male Less technical Statistician More than ten 
Seven Male Less technical Manager More than ten 
Eight Male Technical Statistician Less than ten 
Nine Female Less technical Statistician More than ten 
Ten Male Technical Statistician Less than ten 
Eleven Female Technical Manager Less than ten 
Twelve Female Less technical Statistician Less than ten 
Thirteen Female Less technical Statistician More than ten 
Fourteen Male Technical Manager More than ten 
Fifteen Male Less technical Manager More than ten 
Sixteen Male Technical Statistician Less than ten 
Seventeen Male Less technical Statistician Less than ten 
Total 70% 
Male 
59% Less 
technical 
65% Stats 53% More than 
ten 
 
All of the interviews were conducted at the premises of Statistics Finland 
and they lasted from between forty minutes to one and a half hours. 
Access to this field site would have been very difficult, if not impossible, 
without my involvement in the ARITHMUS project. Having the chance to 
witness from the inside how a government institution addresses a new 
challenge such as Big Data was a privileged position for a doctoral 
researcher to be in. My membership on the ARITHMUS team also 
granted me a certain prestige in the eyes of the participants as I was 
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usually introduced as “a researcher from London” rather than a PhD 
student. Especially the earlier interviews were characterised by a 
nervousness both on the part of the interviewer and the interviewees. In 
many cases I did not get the feeling that the interviewees necessarily 
wanted to speak to me that much, this being partially at least a 
consequence of the relative newness of the topic. Although the 
interviewees were experts in the field of statistics, Big Data was a new 
thing for them also. However, as the interviews progressed I became 
more confident in my ability to conduct them, and I think that this made 
the interviews more comfortable for the interviewees also. 
 
After I had transcribed the interviews verbatim, I conducted a thematic 
analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) on the material with the assistance of the 
qualitative data analysis software NVivo (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). 
Since I expected to derive thematic codes from both the research 
questions and related theoretical framework, as well as the themes that 
would emerge more spontaneously during coding, I opted for a hybrid 
approach applying both deductive and inductive codes. When translating 
the interview quotes from Finnish to English for the chapter, I aimed at 
translating their meaning rather than literal form. 
 
Rapley (2001), amongst others, advises that when analysing interview 
data, one should dismiss the idea of gaining access to the intimate 
interior of a person, and to focus instead on what the interviews contain 
in terms of performativity and discourse. In an organisational setting a 
further challenge is to recognize when informants use institutional 
language and to find ways of moving the discussion beyond pre-
prepared statements (DeVault and McCoy, 2001). With these 
considerations in mind, I tried to construct the interview questions and 
contexts in such a way as to ensure that participants were interviewed 
as individuals, rather than as spokespersons for the organisation 
(Thomas, 1995). I hoped for example that by focusing on educational 
backgrounds and career trajectories at the beginning of the interviews, I 
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could encourage the interviewees to reflect on Big Data from the 
viewpoint of their personal experiences of studying and working in data 
intensive fields. 
 
Despite these precautions, I suspect that the material might be skewed 
towards the more positive aspects of Big Data. The interviewees were 
for example usually keener to emphasise the opportunities with Big Data, 
rather than to focus on the threats, which I suspect was partially at least 
a result of them being conscious of the fact that they were also 
representing their institution in their statements. The increasing role of 
the private sector and the actions necessitated by it were also painted in 
a more positive light than what I was expecting. Within the remit of this 
study it was not possible to account for a potential skew by for example 
triangulating the interview data with data obtained by other means. My 
meeting observations were few in number and the findings derived from 
them did not differ markedly from the interviews. 
 
In sum, I understand the interviews as performed conversations between 
me, a researcher immersed in the literature around Big Data and the 
sociology of statistics, and the interviewees, experts immersed in their 
professional discourses but interested in my research topic. In general, 
I follow an understanding of qualitative research where its purpose is to 
describe and illuminate new social phenomenon, rather than to test pre-
defined hypothesis or discern casual relationships between factors 
behind them (Silverman, 2013). 
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5.3 Findings and analysis 
 
5.3.1 The end of a near monopoly and continuity as well as 
disruption: How statisticians understand Big Data 
 
5.3.1.1 A meaningful concept or just hype? 
 
Practically all of the interviewees were familiar with the term Big Data, 
and the vast majority, whilst acknowledging the huge amount of hype 
and ambiguity surrounding it, saw it as a meaningful and important 
concept in the context of official statistics. In contrast to the discourse 
that often focuses on the technical qualities of Big Data, such as the 3vs, 
for my interviewees the most critical aspect of Big Data was the 
increasing competition between data producers that its emergence 
entailed. One manager for example explained to me that the hype 
around Big Data was here to stay, and that the increasing competition 
brought about by Big Data meant that also Statistics Finland had to 
follow it closely: 
What I always say about the hype surrounding Big Data is that it is 
hype that is here to stay. While it is of course true that we have always 
dealt with data that is “big”, and that volume is something that grows 
exponentially, the important difference today is that an increasing 
number of organisations are obtaining both data and the means to 
analyse it. It follows from this that also we must monitor the 
phenomenon closely. (Interviewee one) 
The urgency of this task was amplified by the fact that the use of Big 
Data was considered to already be the norm in large parts of the private 
sector. Importantly, the hype surrounding Big Data was viewed not only 
as something to be approached critically, but also as something 
potentially beneficial for official statistics. In the current climate where 
people are more and more reluctant to respond to traditional data 
gathering methods, such as surveys, the hype around Big Data and the 
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resulting increase in public awareness around the concept was seen to 
increase Statistics Finland’s chances of obtaining access to new data 
sources. Furthermore, in terms of the hype surrounding it, Big Data was 
not considered all that different from previous trendy concepts of bygone 
years. 
 
Despite agreeing on the importance of the concept, many interviewees 
raised the issue of its vagueness and questioned whether anyone 
actually had a clear idea of what it constituted in practical terms. One 
statistician who had done a long career working with register-based 
statistics confirmed her familiarity with the term but noted that similarly 
to Open Data, there was much ambiguity surrounding it and that different 
people had “different ideas about what it actually constitutes”. This 
ambiguity was thought to be particularly prevalent at international 
meetings, where concepts such as “The Data Revolution” and “Big Data” 
were regularly being promoted as “answers to all our problems”. Such 
discussions at international meetings were usually accompanied by a 
dearth of practical examples, a situation that had however somewhat 
improved more recently. Some interviewees also considered the biggest 
hype around Big Data to already have passed, with the term itself having 
been replaced by ones perceived as more meaningful, such as Machine 
Learning (the application of artificial intelligence techniques to analysing 
data) and the Internet of Things (the embedding of the built environment 
and other physical objects with network connectivity). 
 
5.3.1.2 A threat or an opportunity? 
 
When asked whether Big Data represented a threat or an opportunity for 
official statistics, interviewees were initially keener to emphasise the 
opportunities. A statistician with a highly technical background 
expressed his belief that due to their different nature, both Big Data and 
official statistics were needed in the future. Whereas the emphasis with 
Big Data was on timeliness, official statistics had the advantage of 
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having been validated (for example by having been compared to data 
collected at a previous point in time). He explained to me that because 
of this, official statistics would not be replaced by Big Data, but rather, 
the two would work in a complementary way: 
I do see it as more of an opportunity. After all, I do not believe that it 
removes the need for official statistics, because at least in the Big 
Data research that is currently being conducted the emphasis is 
usually on timeliness, which means that because the data has not 
been validated, it cannot be as reliable. You therefore need to 
supplement Big Data with official statistics, as well as the other way 
around. (Interviewee two) 
Indeed, Big Data was usually seen as a supplement, rather than a 
replacement for official statistics. According to some, this was because 
in contrast to the private sector, where the focus was on analysis and 
forecasting, in official statistics the focus was on producing data for 
others to use. Many also saw in Big Data an opportunity to tackle 
challenges faced by official statistics, such as increasing budget 
constraints and dropping survey response rates. One interviewee for 
example explained that for him Big Data reflected a broader change in 
official statistics where Statistics Finland needed to shift its focus from 
producing data to exploring what data already existed and finding out 
ways of accessing it: 
I see it as an opportunity because for me at least there is a clear trend 
in official statistics. Whereas previously we could obtain missing data 
by devising a survey, today this is becoming more and more difficult 
first, because of increasing budget constraints, and second, because 
people are less and less willing to respond to them. This means that 
our focus has got to shift towards exploring what information already 
exists and figuring out ways of gaining access to it. (Interviewee three) 
Furthermore, by helping to account for new social phenomenon, such as 
the digital economy, Big Data was also seen as an opportunity to ensure 
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the continued relevancy of official statistics, something perceived as 
increasingly important in the current circumstances where National 
Statistical Institutes were no longer able to take their near monopoly over 
official statistics for granted. And with the new research methods 
associated with Big Data came also the opportunity to analyse 
population registers in novel ways. In addition to guaranteeing an 
exceptional level of combinability between different registers, the 
existence of a unique identifier for each Finnish citizen in the form of a 
personal identity number meant that in theory at least population 
registers could be treated as Big Data. A statistician with a highly 
technical background explained: 
If you know how to link the data it should be perfectly possible to infer 
similar things from population registers as for example from internet 
search query data. So for example, although you might not be able to 
get a direct answer, you could infer that because a person has not 
been active in this or that register it is very likely that she can be found 
in this or that one instead. So really there are a lot of opportunities 
outside of the hype as well. (Interviewee two) 
Despite preferring initially to emphasise the opportunities, respondents 
were keenly aware that unless attended to, Big Data could end up 
undermining the role of official statistics. A senior manager explained 
that were Statistics Finland to fail to attend to Big Data, there were plenty 
of other actors that would take advantage of it, potentially undermining 
the role of official statistics:  
The threat [with Big Data] is that if nothing is done, there are other 
actors both within the private and the public sector that will take their 
share of it, and because it offers a practically endless source of data, it 
could end up substituting the statistics that we produce. (Interviewee 
four) 
According to many, in the worst-case scenario the emergence of new 
competitors could lead to the question being raised whether 
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governmentally produced statistics were needed in the first place. This 
the interviewees saw as a potentially dangerous development because 
few other institutions took in their eyes methodological rigour and 
comparability of data seriously. Ultimately, the development could 
according to them endanger the continuing need to assess the validity 
and reliability of the numbers that circulated in the public, as recently 
demonstrated in the discussion around a “post-fact” era in politics. 
 
Table 2. Opportunities and threats of Big Data for Official 
Statistics 
 
Opportunities Threats 
 Hype increases awareness 
of statistics and is therefore 
useful when negotiating for 
access to new data sources 
 Produce more timely outputs 
 Supplement existing data 
sources 
 Cut costs 
 Compensate for dropping 
survey response rates 
 Ensure continued relevancy 
of statistics by capturing 
social phenomenon currently 
not accounted for 
 Obtain novel insights from 
population registers with new 
methods 
 
 Becoming redundant due to 
increasing competition 
particularly from the private 
sector 
 Losing jurisdiction as 
validator of official numbers 
thereby contributing to a 
“post-fact” era in politics 
 Losing grasp of how data 
gets generated in the first 
instance 
 
Table 2 summarises the opportunities and threats of Big Data for Official 
Statistics identified by the interviewees. It highlights one of the main 
arguments of this thesis, that rather than being a settled thing, there are 
numerous ways of thinking about Big Data and what its implications are, 
not just between, but also within professional fields such as official 
statistics. Whereas the aforementioned largely mirror points previously 
raised in the literature around Big Data and Official Statistics (Kitchin, 
2015), thus highlighting the transnational character of official statistics, 
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much more ambiguity surrounded the question whether Big Data 
constituted a clear break from past ways of dealing with data. 
 
5.3.1.3 “Just another register” or a new data paradigm entirely? 
 
Much of the initial confusion around the concept of Big Data was related 
to the question of whether register based statistics constituted a part of 
it. When asked whether, as is regularly put forward in the hype, Big Data 
signalled a revolution in how data for statistics were being produced, 
many interviewees noted their hesitation. A statistician with a long 
experience of register based statistics for example explained to me that: 
I am not so sure about it because often when I hear these arguments 
it makes me think that we here at Statistics Finland have been dealing 
with Big Data for quite some time now. (Interviewee five) 
Although most interviewees initially argued that register-based statistics 
did not constitute Big Data, particularly those that had worked in projects 
involving a Big Data source, such as club card data and mobile phone 
data, noted the many similarities between the two. Notwithstanding their 
unprecedented volume, the data sources in question did for example not 
differ much from governmental registers in terms of their form. According 
to one interviewee, Big Data was “just another register”, this time 
however owned by a private company: 
One the one hand there is nothing new in this, because also until now 
we have produced our statistics largely from registers obtained from 
elsewhere. One way to see it [the Big Data source in question] is to 
think of it as just another register, this time however owned by a 
private company. In this sense the work that we do here in this project 
is not that different from what we did earlier. (Interviewee three) 
As I covered in more detail in the previous chapter, the popular discourse 
around Big Data often posits that whereas previously, the production of 
statistics began with a research question followed by data gathering and 
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analysis, in an age of Big Data the starting point would be to identify what 
data already existed followed by a consideration of the questions that 
could be answered with it. In contrast to this, some interviewees 
questioned whether the so called traditional model had ever been 
followed and maintained that their approach had instead always been 
more of a mixture. A statistician whose career in official statistics 
spanned many decades reflected on this particularly after having 
attended the Big Data team’s meetings: 
Especially since I have started participating in the [Big Data] working 
group it has become clear to me that we have never really followed 
the traditional model all that consistently. Instead, it has always been 
the same as here [with Big Data] that we have started with a data 
source which we have then supplemented with data from somewhere 
else. (Interviewee six) 
Consequently, many of the challenges with Big Data bore resemblance 
to the challenges with register-based statistics. The fact that Big Data, 
like population registers, were originally created for purposes other than 
official statistics, had at least two important consequences. First, 
similarly to population registers, the way Big Data was produced and 
stored might undergo abrupt changes. Whereas a government 
department might have changed the way it filed information in a register 
as a result of a legislative change, a Big Data company could change its 
business model or go bankrupt. In both cases, Statistics Finland would 
have to look to other sources of data as replacement. 
 
Second, because the data had in both cases originally been produced 
for purposes other than official statistics, it had to be cleaned, conjoined 
and modified before it could be used. Alastalo (2009a: 183) defines the 
production of register-based statistics as a process in which information 
produced in local administrative practices gets transformed in to 
statistical “facts” and according to my respondents, the process with Big 
Data was not all that different. One senior manager for example 
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explained to me that although with Big Data came the risk that Statistics 
Finland could lose its grasp on how the data got generated in the first 
instance, the challenge had existed already with population registers. 
The manager elaborated on the many similarities between Big Data and 
population registers: 
Yes there is a risk of that [losing grip over how the data gets 
produced] but it does not really differ from what went on previously. It 
is a very similar process to how we for example ensure that something 
that the tax office collects is meaningful for the “real world” out there. 
The data structure of the tax administration is dictated by a well-
defined legal framework, and what we do is that we fit that framework 
to official statistics. It is basically a classification process that has 
taken place over a very long period of time, so since ancient times 
really we have started to look at what they have available and began 
negotiating with them about what they will deliver to us. After that, we 
have processed the data further, perhaps combining and linking some 
of its elements. All of this is currently happening in relation Big Data. 
(Interviewee seven) 
Yet, despite the similarities, Big Data nevertheless signalled for the 
manager a fundamental shift in the production of data for official 
statistics. Rather than an abrupt revolution however, Big Data was 
instead a continuation of processes long in development. The manager, 
whose career in official statistics spanned many decades and who was 
now involved in setting up a Big Data infrastructure for Statistics Finland, 
reminisced that digitisation had been ongoing at Statistics Finland at 
least since the eighties, and that more recently even the last paper based 
processes had disappeared. The final remaining survey studies used a 
wealth register data as their base and systems had become more and 
more integrated. Still, Big Data was a major change, one resembling the 
move to the registers, with the difference that this time it centred upon 
the private sector: 
If one thinks about the statistics profession in general it is a rather 
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peculiar profession in the sense that already when I started here at the 
end of the eighties the house was much further digitised than many 
other places. Recently even the last paper based processes have 
disappeared and whereas previously our production consisted of 
multiple smaller studies, now everything is becoming more integrated 
and even the few remaining survey studies that we conduct use a 
wealth of register data as their base. So the process has been moving 
in that direction [increasingly digitised and integrated] for a long time. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of Big Data is major change, perhaps a 
rather similar one to when we started using registers as our main data 
source. I am inclined to see it as a similar shift as the move to 
registers, with the difference that this time it centres upon the private 
sector. (Interviewee seven) 
In sum, and in contrast to the popular discussion on Big Data, which 
often locates its novelty in its technical qualities, such as the 3vs, my 
respondents, although by no means denying the importance of the 
technical aspects, were nevertheless more inclined to see the newness 
of Big Data in how the production of data was becoming organised. More 
specifically, in the new circumstances more and more institutions had 
the capacity to produce and analyse data, which could potentially end 
up undermining the role of official statistics. In sum, my respondents 
identified in Big Data the end to the near monopoly on data concerning 
whole populations, economies and territories long held by statistical 
agencies. 
  
Second, in contrast to the hype that posits Big Data as an abrupt break 
from previous ways of producing and analysing data, my respondents 
identified many similarities between old and new forms. Importantly, 
many of the challenges with Big Data were similar to ones encountered 
previously with population registers. Long before the emergence of Big 
Data sources, Statistics Finland’s production had relied on data 
produced elsewhere, and accessing it had meant similar negotiations 
and arrangements that were currently necessitated by Big Data. 
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However, the new negotiations would no longer take place within the 
public sector, but increasingly, Statistics Finland would have to negotiate 
with private actors for access to data. As I indicated already in my 
conceptual analysis of Big Data in the previous chapter, it is here that I 
identify the most central aspect of the “data revolution” currently under 
way. In other words, Big Data reflects the broader processes of 
neoliberalisation that have had a major influence on cultures and 
economies in the past few decades in that it is increasingly produced 
and accumulated in the private rather than the public sector. And as I 
suggested already in chapter three, the increasing centrality of private 
actors in the production of data suggests a historical break from its 
centralised production by states. 
 
In the next section I interrogate in detail ongoing Big Data projects at  
Statistics Finland at the time of the research and suggest that they are 
indicative of a neoliberalisation of data infrastructures of processing, 
analysis and storage in at least two ways. 
 
5.3.2 A neoliberalisation of data infrastructures? Big Data 
projects at Statistics Finland 
 
5.3.2.1 Big Data projects at Statistics Finland at the time of the 
research 
 
At the time of the research, Statistics Finland was examining the 
feasibility of multiple Big Data sources, of which perhaps the most 
promising ones were club card data, mobile phone data, web scraper 
data and POS terminal data. In the period in which the research was 
conducted, a heated debate was ongoing in Finland about the size of the 
public sector amidst a prolonged economic recession. For the first time 
in its history, Statistics Finland had been forced to undergo layoffs, and 
its budget had been reduced for some years in a row. Following a 
relevancy assessment, which had been initiated also as a result of 
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outside pressure, multiple statistics had been discontinued. This 
background perhaps helps to explain why the motivation behind all of 
the Big Data projects initiated was to some extent at least connected to 
the question of whether costs could be saved. 
 
Important to note is also that developments at Statistics Finland were 
taking place within a transnational field of statistical practices (Scheel et 
al., 2016). As I highlighted already in chapter two, international 
collaboration in official statistics has long historical roots (Westergaard, 
1932). However, especially since the founding of the European Union, 
collaboration between statistical agencies in Europe has become even 
more central. The majority of the Big Data projects at Statistics Finland 
were partially at least funded by the statistical office of the European 
Union, Eurostat, and similar experiments were taking place at other NSIs 
across Europe. In relation to Big Data, Statistics Finland was in fact a 
late comer in comparison to some other statistical institutes, most 
notably CBS in the Netherlands. Statisticians from different countries 
convened regularly to share experiences and to work collaboratively in 
projects funded by Eurostat. 
 
The stated motif behind the examination in to club card data at Statistics 
Finland was the rapidly falling response rates of traditional data 
gathering methods. Until now, the only way to gain information about 
people’s consumption habits had been to devise a laborious household 
budget survey which had required respondents to keep a diary of their 
consumption habits over a period of two weeks. Despite a change 
introduced at the start of the new millennium whereby instead of keeping 
diaries, participants only needed to keep the receipts of their shopping, 
response rates had fallen to a critical level. Especially since retail in 
Finland was so heavily concentrated (two chains controlled around 80 % 
of the market), club cards were seen to offer a potentially rich data 
source concerning people’s consumption habits. At the time of the 
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research, Statistics Finland had made preliminary inquiries to the two 
biggest retailers about accessing their customer data. 
 
The project examining mobile phone data had been initiated by Eurostat, 
who, following the example of Estonia, where an arrangement had been 
put in place whereby a private company obtained the data from mobile 
phone operators and distributed it forward to other institutions, including 
the National Statistical Institute, had wanted to examine the feasibility of 
accessing mobile phone data in other countries too. Statistics Finland 
approached the data source especially from the viewpoint of tourism 
statistics, where traditional data gathering methods were proving 
increasingly inefficient. Whereas before it had been possible to interview 
people at the borders, the increasingly borderless nature of the EU had 
made the undertaking much more difficult. Since almost everyone now 
carried a mobile phone, the data collected by mobile phone operators 
offered in theory a near full enumeration of travel patterns between and 
within countries. At the time of the research, Statistics Finland had 
initiated a dialogue with the largest mobile phone operators in Finland 
about data access. 
 
Of all the ongoing Big Data projects at Statistics Finland, the joint project 
examining web scraper data and POS terminal data was the closest to 
moving in to production. This project too was made possible by Eurostat, 
who had provided funding for a period of one and a half years with the 
hope that it would contribute towards automating the production process. 
The first part of the project explored whether online store data retrieved 
with a web scraper could be used to produce the producer price indices 
for services and the second whether POS terminal data could be used 
for the consumer price index. The construction of the web scraper and 
associated classification machine were outsourced to a private IT 
company after a call for bids. Statistics Finland had successfully 
completed both parts of the project and tests were ongoing whether the 
statistics produced could be moved in to production. Notably, in relation 
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to POS terminal data, one company had agreed to act as a permanent 
data provider for Statistics Finland. 
 
5.3.2.2 Legal, technical, and organisational challenges in 
accessing data 
 
The challenges in accessing Big Data for Statistics Finland can be 
divided between the legal, technical and organisational. In practice, the 
three typically intertwined and interlaced in important ways, which is 
something I will describe in more detail below. Rather than covering all 
the problems in each project, I will give examples from each that I think 
typify one of the different problem areas. I will conclude by suggesting 
that many of these challenges reflect an increasing neoliberalisation of 
data infrastructures of processing, analysis and storage. 
 
Perhaps the biggest factor hindering Statistics Finland’s access to Big 
Data was the legal framework in which both it, and the companies 
providing the data, operated. Although Statistics Finland had extensive 
legal powers to obtain data from companies about their own operations, 
this right did not extend to customer data. Nor did the companies usually 
have the right to pass the data, at least in the rather detailed format 
usually required by Statistics Finland. Unlike is the case with 
multinational internet conglomerates, typically the terms of agreement of 
the Finnish companies in question did not include the right to pass the 
data on to a third party. A respondent that had participated in the project 
examining the use of mobile phone data explained that at the heart of 
the legal conundrum was the question of what constituted personal data: 
When we requested an anonymised sample for experimental 
purposes from the [mobile phone] operators they got back to us 
saying that we needed to get in touch with the Data Protection 
Ombudsman because they themselves weren’t allowed to touch the 
data. We then got a response from the Ombudsman saying that 
according to the Personal Data Act, personal data cannot be used 
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without the person’s consent. The question then becomes whether a 
piece of data should be deemed personal data or not. So for example 
a travel pattern, where you can see that a person has arrived from that 
place, gone to that other place, spent two weeks in the country and 
then left, is that personal data? Even though there is no personal 
identifier in the data, such as a personal identity number, in the Data 
Protection Ombudsman’s interpretation the possibility of indirect 
identification could not be ruled out, and therefore it fell within the 
Personal Data Act. This means that under the current legislation, in 
order to use the data we would need the consent of everyone who 
uses a mobile phone. (Interviewee three) 
The prospect of data sharing was, therefore, a new thing for the 
companies also. For many respondents the biggest challenge with Big 
Data were therefore not the technical issues related to it, but rather the 
question of the appropriate legal framework for its utilisation. The 
respondent cited above explained to me that in Finland concerns around 
using data of such high precision ran deep, and that he did not consider 
it at all self evident that Statistics Finland would be given a statutory right 
to access it: 
For me, technical issues are not the biggest challenge, but instead the 
legal framework and its interpretation. Based also on my discussions 
with the Data Protection Ombudsman the concern around using data 
of this level of precision run deep. Is society ready for it or does it 
violate some very basic rights that we have? I do not think it is at all 
clear that a law will be passed that will give us the right to see just 
about anyone’s location (even though we are only interested in the big 
picture). At least it will not be done just like that without discussing it 
first. (Interviewee three) 
He speculated that one of the reasons why Estonia had been successful 
in putting in place a working model for data sharing was the relatively 
strong mandate under which its NSI operated. In contrast to Statistics 
Finland, Statistics Estonia had the legal right to request third party data 
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from companies. Furthermore, even though the broad legislative 
framework for data sharing was set by the EU, in practice each member 
country interpreted it differently, some more loosely and some more 
strictly. 
 
The question of whether and under what conditions companies were 
allowed to pass their data was further complicated by the different 
organisational structures of different companies. This point was well 
demonstrated in the project examining club card data, where, although 
only two companies dominated the market in Finland, they did so with 
very different organisational structures. Whereas one of them operated 
with a centralised structure, meaning that decisions regarding individual 
stores were made from the headquarters, the other built its operations 
around a franchising model, where local storekeepers enjoyed relative 
autonomy. In relation to the question of who owned the club card data, 
in the first case the answer was clear, but in the second less so. In theory 
at least, local storekeepers owned their customer data, meaning that 
Statistics Finland would have to negotiate with each of them separately 
for data access. The one instance where a company had agreed to act 
as a permanent data provider for Statistics Finland had been made 
possible by the centralised structure of the company and the fact that 
Statistics Finland had only asked for sales data which did not include 
information about customers per se. 
 
A further challenge related to the organisational aspect was the multitude 
of data collection practices that existed between companies, a point also 
best demonstrated in the project examining club card data. In order for 
it to be useful for Statistics Finland, data needed to be collected in a 
format where individual purchases were recorded at the product level. 
At the time of the research however, only one of the potential data 
providers collected data at the required level of granularity, and even 
then there was no guarantee that other technical specifications required 
by Statistics Finland would be met. In contrast to the establishment of 
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the register based statistical system, where Statistics Finland had initially 
at least had a say in the content of the registers (Alastalo, 2009a: 179), 
in relation to companies’ data collection practices Statistics Finland 
enjoyed no such authority. 
 
Finally, after all the aforementioned challenges remained the question of 
how the data sharing and processing would be organised in practice. 
The question was made all the more important by the fact that Big Data 
did in practice require expertise that Statistics Finland did not possess. 
In the project examining web scraper and POS terminal data Statistics 
Finland outsourced both the construction of the web scraper and the 
system that processed the data at Statistics Finland’s end to a private 
company because, as one respondent put it, “if we talk about daily or 
even weekly data, our systems are very quickly on their knees.” The 
respondent admitted openly that although part of the budget had from 
the start been allocated to consulting the private sector, its role had 
become more important than initially planned due to the increasing 
budgetary constraints under which Statistics Finland operated. He 
explained: 
These acquisitions [from the private sector] have been part of the plan 
all along, but what has happened since is that as I already mentioned 
before because we don’t have that many resources for development 
at the moment we have not been able to recruit the manpower needed 
because even if you are offered the money to hire someone from 
within [the] house, the basic tasks of a statistical unit are what they 
are, meaning that everyone have their normal responsibilities to think 
about as well. In practice therefore we have been running the project 
with incomplete staffing as a result of which the role of outside actors 
is very likely to grow. (Interviewee eight) 
In relation to this particular project, one private consultant especially had 
expressed a desire to offer Statistics Finland Big Data solutions beyond 
what was needed in the first instance. The respondent interpreted this 
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as a sign that the company aspired to gain a foothold in the larger 
statistics market: 
In contrast to the other service providers, one company has talked 
specifically about wanting to offer a Big Data solution to us. My 
impression is that were we to go in that direction [building production 
around a Big Data infrastructure] this company would be eager to take 
part in the discussion. It would certainly be an advantage for them if at 
that point they could refer to already having successfully completed a 
trial. (Interviewee eight) 
However, were a private company to provide Statistics Finland its Big 
Data infrastructure, it would raise the question of where the data would 
be stored. Whereas Statistics Finland’s in house server capabilities were 
insufficient for Big Data, data storage in the cloud was deemed as a 
serious risk to data protection and confidentiality, the building blocks of 
Statistics Finland’s public mandate. According to one respondent, 
Statistics Finland’s attitude towards data storage was “better safe than 
sorry”: 
The attitude here could be defined as “better safe than sorry”. The 
traditional perception has been that as long as the data exists in one 
format or the other within the walls of Statistics Finland it is safe, but 
as soon as it leaves the house it’s jeopardised. More recently this 
attitude has relaxed perhaps a little bit but at the end of the day it’s still 
pretty close to that. (Interviewee eight) 
At the time of the research the conundrum regarding data storage 
remained unresolved. For many respondents, the most obvious solution 
was the construction of in house Big Data capabilities at Statistics 
Finland. Companies, on the other hand, were aware of the issue and 
had begun offering Big Data solutions with servers located at the 
premises of the customer. 
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As previously mentioned, despite all these challenges, Statistics Finland 
had successfully obtained access to one Big Data source. A senior 
manager explained that what had made this possible had been the 
outsourcing of the data aggregation to the company that produced the 
data: 
What we are doing here is that we are not even thinking about 
obtaining the detailed data, but instead we ask them to deliver daily or 
monthly averages according to their own product classifications. This 
we way do not at this point need to worry about the computational 
problems related to Big Data since we’ve subcontract the data 
aggregation to them. (Interviewee seven) 
The manager did admit that this was far from ideal, and that it would 
bring to the fore the question of whether Statistics Finland had a 
sufficient grasp on how the data was produced: 
In relation to mobile phone data we are more interested in having 
access to the micro level data, but since the current legislation states 
that only the operators can access it we are forced to specify the 
request to them. This again is problematic in the sense that we would 
need to have an understanding of the type of data that is generated to 
the operators and it’s a question in itself what can be digged out from 
it. (Interviewee seven) 
In addition to the fact that Big Data is primarily produced and 
accumulated in the private, rather than the public sector, the material 
above indicates an increasing neoliberalisation of data infrastructures of 
processing, analysis and storage in at least two ways. First, in midst of 
public sector cuts Statistics Finland was hard pressed to find resources 
to adequately tackle Big Data, which was likely to result in a more central 
role for private actors than originally planned. Perhaps in connection to 
this, some private actors had begun offering infrastructural solutions 
beyond mere technical consultancy, raising the question whether 
Statistics Finland would at some point have to store its data on private 
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servers that existed outside of its premises. Though the cuts were not 
historically unprecedented, nor do I want to assess their necessity in this 
instance, they have taken place in a political moment where economic 
downturns are also in former strongholds of the Nordic welfare state 
model, such as Finland, regularly attributed to inefficiencies in the public 
sector. Just to give one example of this tendency, the current Finnish 
prime minister has recently stated that Finland has not hundreds, or even 
thousands, but indeed tens of thousands of civil servants too many 
(Helsingin Sanomat, 2014). Therefore, if current political trends 
continue, and the funding of the public sector reduced due to it being 
perceived as primarily a burden for the economy, the role of private 
actors in managing Big Data will possibly increase. Big Data therefore 
represents a neoliberalisation of data not just because it accumulates 
mainly in the private, rather than the public sector, but because the 
increasing resource demands brought about by it is potentially resulting 
in a more central role for private actors also at the operations of the 
governments statistical agency. 
 
Furthermore, I identify neoliberalisation also in the approach taken by 
Statistics Finland to securing permanent access to a data source. In 
order to tackle the computational issues of data aggregation and 
storage, which Statistics Finland was ill equipped to deal with, what had 
made permanent access possible had been the outsourcing of the 
majority of data aggregation and management to the company providing 
the data. Rather than getting ‘raw’ data, Statistics Finland was content 
with being handed averages based on the company’s own product 
classification schemes. Alastalo (2009b) argues that because the 
majority of official statistics in Finland are derived from data produced in 
registers, the largely black boxed governmental practices according to 
which they are updated and maintained have had a major influence on 
the content of official statistics in Finland. Building from this, I suggest 
that the increasing role of the private sector in the production and 
infrastructures of data processing and analysis means that in the future 
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the content of official statistics may increasingly be influenced, not by the 
rationalities of government departments, but by those of private 
corporations. What exactly these rationalities are demands further 
research, but since companies operate in competitive markets, they are 
likely to be connected to the profit motive. This finding is in line with 
Thatcher’s (2014) argument that with Big Data comes the risk that the 
making of knowledge will be set through capitalist imperatives. 
 
In order not to exaggerate these findings for the sake of making an 
argument, it is important to point out that the Big Data projects at 
Statistics Finland were all still experiments, and that no data produced 
for traditional statistics had so far been replaced. Despite recognising its 
potential, interviewees usually saw Big Data as a supplement, rather 
than a replacement for existing statistics. Therefore, in its current form 
Big Data did not mount a serious challenge to the register based data 
used for official statistics. Nevertheless, the findings covered here 
indicate  that the increasing production of data in the private sector is 
changing ways of thinking within statistical institutes including their roles 
not only in the production of data for statistics but the infrastructures of 
its processing, analysis and storage. And as noted previously, these 
developments seem to indicate a historical break in that data production 
is moving away from its basis in states. 
 
By exploring further practices and responses prompted by Big Data, in 
the next section I suggest that neoliberalisation can be identified also in 
the ways that Statistics Finland imagines its future role and relevancy. 
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5.3.3 A neoliberalisation of occupational culture? Tackling the 
challenge of the private 
 
5.3.3.1 A vision for the future: A trusted gatekeeper and public 
expert? 
 
In spite of the increasing competition and impeding loss of near 
monopoly on data concerning whole populations, economies and 
territories, all interviewees expressed a belief in the continued relevancy 
of NSIs. Trust and neutrality were identified as key competitive factors in 
the new circumstances. One statistician for example explained to me 
that Statistics Finland’s advantage was in being recognised as an official 
actor, and that due to their extensive experience of handling sensitive 
data in the past, NSIs would continue in a similar role in the future: 
Our advantage is in our status as an official actor. If I think about it 
from a citizen’s point of view, I would not want just anyone to access 
and manage the Big Data about me. It seems to me quite natural 
therefore that since NSIs have already until now managed very 
sensitive data, they will continue to do so also in the era of the new 
data sources. (Interviewee four) 
Many interviewees suggested that whereas previously the role of the NSI 
was to gather, produce, analyse and publish statistics, in the future its 
role would be reduced to publishing data as Open Data for others to use. 
In this role, neutrality would be key, and NSIs would be well positioned 
to ensure that everyone, from big banks to news agencies to individual 
citizens, would gain access to new data at the same time. Many 
questioned whether a private business such as Google, whose 
existence depended on making a profit, could be trusted with this role. It 
was however acknowledged that ultimately it would depend on 
politicians and voters whether such a responsibility would be handed to 
a private enterprise. 
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Some felt that Statistics Finland needed to do more to actively seek a 
role as a public expert in the use of Big Data. A statistician explained 
that in her vision for the future Statistics Finland would more 
courageously comment on misinterpretations of data of which there 
already circulated numerous examples of: 
It would be great if our role as experts was emphasised more in the 
future, that we would have the skills, knowledge and confidence to 
comment on some of the interpretations [of data] that circulate in the 
public. There are so many misinterpretations around and we have 
traditionally been rather shy to comment on them. (Interviewee nine) 
In this new role, a skilful and active use of social media was considered 
to be paramount. In contrast to previously, where statisticians had had 
plenty of time to double check with colleagues facts and figures before 
sending their replies to citizens and other stakeholders, in the fast paced 
world of social media statisticians would increasingly need to rely solely 
on their own quick assessments in their communications. 
 
5.3.3.2 Conditions for continued relevancy: New skills and a new 
mentality towards work 
 
Although Big Data was widely considered to demand new skills from 
statisticians, many preferred not to speculate about their exact form, 
since these could only be specified after access to more Big Data 
sources had been secured. A manager emphasised the primacy of data 
access but noted that the skill set of a “data scientist” would be 
increasingly sought after in the future: 
In principle they can be defined [the skills demanded by Big Data]. A 
generally accepted definition is that of the data scientist, meaning for 
example that programming skills will be in high demand. What I would 
say however is that because a lot of know how already exists at NSIs, 
the first step is to obtain the data. Only when you have the data can 
you start asking what kinds of expertise you might need. (Interviewee 
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one) 
Despite not wanting to speculate about their exact form, many 
acknowledged that the skill demands were changing. One statistician for 
example explained that contrary to received wisdom, only a minority of 
statisticians at Statistics Finland had a background in very technical 
fields, such as statistics and mathematics, and that already with the 
current tools available, more technical expertise was needed. Advanced 
data analysis skills in combination with a deep understanding of 
statistical theory were perceived as increasingly important as a result of 
an impeding automation of the more mundane tasks, such as data 
gathering. 
 
According especially to the younger interviewees, Statistics Finland’s 
future depended on whether its staff was able to adopt a new mentality 
towards its work. Many saw Statistics Finland as an institution rarely at 
the frontline of new developments, and with an aging staff very set in its 
old ways of doing things. The younger interviewees explained that in an 
age of Big Data, however, where things kept moving faster and faster, 
no institution or team could afford to stay put and do things the way they 
had always been done. Instead, when encountering problems, they 
would have to branch out to other institutions and teams and inquire how 
they had addressed them. On the other hand, new developments such 
as Open Data were seen to underscore the importance of actively and 
successfully campaigning for government funds. Whereas previously 
Statistics Finland had charged for much of the data it provided, the 
increasing demands for data to be made available publicly free of charge 
meant that that revenue would need to be generated from somewhere 
else, in practice often meaning the government. 
 
A fear expressed by many was that if the public sector failed to present 
itself as an attractive employer for highly skilled workers, the most 
innovative work around Big Data would be conducted somewhere else, 
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often meaning the private sector. And since the private sector was 
usually able to offer higher wages, the public sector had to figure out 
other ways to attract employees. One interviewee explained that Big 
Data skills were highly unevenly distributed in society and that the public 
sector was left behind already because similarly to before when highly 
skilled employees would go to work in finance, today they would go to 
work in the technology companies: 
One thing that worries me is just how unevenly distributed Big Data 
skills are in society. And similarly to before, when the best physicists 
and engineers would go to work on Wall Street, today they go to 
Google. The public sector is left behind already as a result of this. 
(Interviewee ten) 
Notably, however, when prompted about their reasons for working in the 
public sector, many interviewees, younger ones very much included, 
underscored their belief in the value and importance of public service. 
One statistician with a highly technical background for example 
explained to me that he believed there were functions in society that the 
private sector should not be entrusted with. According to him, private 
actors could for example not guarantee impartiality in the production of 
statistics in the same manner that a public sector institution could: 
I do not think I would be working in the public sector, unless I believed 
that it had an important role to play also in the future. The argument 
against it often goes that because institutions in the private sector 
must generate profits in order to exist, they are bound to do things 
well, whereas the public sector don’t have anything to worry about if 
they do not do such a good job. Personally, I do not believe in this 
argument, because I think that there are basic functions in society, 
including the production of official statistics, which cannot be left solely 
to private actors whose impartiality can easily be questioned. 
(Interviewee eight) 
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One way to interpret the material above is to suggest that one response 
to the increasing competition brought about by Big Data is a perceived 
need, especially from the viewpoint of younger employees, to adopt 
private sector ways of thinking and acting also in the public sector. 
Rather than clinging on to the values of a slow paced bureaucracy, 
Statistics Finland’s employees needed according to many younger 
interviewees especially to adopt the mentality of agile and fast paced 
organisations. Although not explicitly spelled out, descriptions of the 
desired attitude bore resemblance to those often associated with 
companies or start ups. In sum, whilst emphasising the importance of 
public service, for many the appropriate response to the increasing 
competition from the private sector was to become more like it. 
 
What is also worth noting is that the data scientist, identified by one 
manager as the highly sought after employee of the future, is an 
occupational category that originates in the private sector. Although what 
exactly the skills and expertise that constitute a data scientist are is far 
from self evident, definitions often include business types of skills and 
attributes. Writing for the Forbes magazine, Hansen (2017) for example 
explains that data scientists “utilize their knowledge of statistics and 
modelling to convert data into actionable insights about everything from 
product development to customer retention to new business 
opportunities”. Similarly Patil and Davenport (2012: 5), in another 
influential definition, refer to a recruiter at a data science company who 
explains that data scientists possess not only statistical or analytical 
capabilities, but also “certain habits of mind” meaning “a feel for business 
issues and empathy for customers”. It is also notable that one of the 
authors of the piece, DJ Patil, who was appointed as the first U.S. Chief 
Data Scientist by president Obama, has a background not as a 
government statistician, but a consultant for private companies such as 
LinkedIn, PayPal, Ebay and Skype. 
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In sum, the findings above suggest that in an age of Big Data, not only 
data, but also valuations of professional skill and expertise in its analysis 
increasingly originate in the private sector. Data is being “neoliberalised” 
not just because it increasingly accumulates in the private sector, or 
because amidst public sector cuts the private sector will come to have 
an increasing role in the data infrastructures of the public sector, but also 
because the valuations of professional skill and expertise of the modern 
data professional originate from a market and profit oriented rationality. 
 
5.3.3.3 Conditions for continued relevancy: A focus on 
partnerships 
 
In addition to new skills and a new mentality towards work, Big Data was 
perceived to require increasing efforts in building and maintaining 
partnerships, not only within the public sector, as had largely been the 
case before, but now also outside of it. A manager explained to me that 
although partnerships were not a new thing for Statistics Finland, the fact 
that they would increasingly have to be formed with actors in the private 
sector represented a new challenge: 
One crucial demand brought about by Big Data is the increasing need 
to build partnerships. This is in itself of course nothing new for us, but 
because so much of Big Data exists in the private sector, it 
necessitates completely new conventions and arrangements from us. 
(Interviewee four) 
The register based statistical system had depended on good relations 
between different government institutions, and the interviewees hoped 
that the tradition of openness and trust that had existed over many 
decades within the public sector in Finland would carry over to 
arrangements made with the private sector also. 
 
Efforts in building partnerships were closely tied to efforts in lobbying for 
new legislation. As I pointed out earlier, a major obstacle in gaining 
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access to Big Data was the legal framework in which both Statistics 
Finland and the companies providing the data operated. Discussions 
were ongoing about the renewal of the Statistics Act in Finland, and in 
these discussions, Statistics Finland had put forward the wish that it’s 
right to request data from companies would be extended to customer 
data also. One senior manager explained to me that Statistics Finland 
had lobbied for the new legislation at the Ministry of Finance, and 
although there had been other reasons for the legal review, such as a 
new EU data protection initiative that had needed to be harmonised with 
national legislation, Statistics Finland’s lobbying efforts had played an 
important part. The preparatory work for the new legislation took place 
in a working committee where different interest groups, such as the 
Confederation of Industries, some unions, customs, and various state 
departments and institutions, including Statistics Finland, were 
represented. The manager explained the process to me in the following 
way: 
The first thing that had to be accomplished was to get the Ministry of 
Finance to start the preparation of the new law. There were other 
reasons behind it too besides our new data access needs, such as the 
EU’s new data protection directive which had to be harmonised with 
our national legislation, but we of course propagated it to the ministry 
and when they were ready to start preparing it we wanted it to include 
a review of our current data access rights. The way that the process 
works is that there is a working committee where different interest 
groups are represented, such as the Confederation of Industries, 
some unions, customs, other state departments etc. We are 
represented there by a professional lawyer and a couple of 
executives. (Interviewee seven) 
Furthermore, the manager revealed to me also that on the side of these 
efforts, he and the other members of the senior management team had 
devised, what he termed “the road show”, where they visited the different 
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stakeholders explaining to them Statistics Finland’s need for data 
access: 
On the side of these efforts we have run a so called “road show” 
where me and a couple other managers have visited the senior 
management of the different stakeholders. In addition, we have also 
gone through some of the biggest companies and some state 
departments that we know have a mutual interest with us, if I may put 
it this way. Our point is that we would want an obligation to be created 
for them to deliver third party data to us. Our current thinking is that in 
many cases we will have ask people directly for the permission to use 
the data. (Interviewee seven) 
The manager described the “road show” as a sales operation in which 
Statistics Finland argued the case that their mission was to make better 
statistics in new ways, and that old ways were proving increasingly 
laborious, ineffective and expensive. As part of it, the senior manager 
and his colleagues explained to the managers of the companies that 
were the process to go smoothly, in exchange they would be able to offer 
better statistics also in relation to phenomenon that were of direct 
interest to them, such as the markets in which they operated. In addition 
to this, the manager explained that Statistics Finland did have the 
opportunity to compensate financially for the extra work required from 
the companies. So far however, Statistics Finland had not paid any 
meaningful sums as the data requests had been “fairly moderate” in size. 
 
It is interesting to reflect on these findings in light of the historical review 
in chapter three. As I explained in more detail there, the review 
suggested that historically statistics have been produced from data 
produced by the dominant institution of its time. Whereas the earliest 
forms of statistics were compiled by the ruler and the church, their 
modern form became tied to the centralised authority of the nation state. 
I noted furthermore that within the latter arrangement, Statistics 
Finland’s position of authority had witnessed ups and downs through the 
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years. When for example the register based statistical system was put 
in place after the Second World War, Statistics Finland had initially had 
a say in the content and upkeep of the governmental registers, but had 
lost this power when the registers became more standardised. 
 
As a result of the emergence of Big Data, Statistics Finland increasingly 
finds itself as one data producer amongst many. In these new 
circumstances, data access requires the devising of marketing and 
bartering strategies, such as “the road show”. The extent to which these 
strategies differ from ones used in the past demands more research, but 
considering the commercial nature of the new negotiating partners it 
would be surprising if they did not differ at all. The manager’s framing of 
the “the road show” as a sales operation speaks volume of the 
increasingly business type context in which negotiations for data access 
must now take place. It is yet another example of private sector ways of 
thinking and doing things becoming more prevalent also in official 
statistics. And even though access has so far been free or relatively 
cheap, new dependencies are being created. In light of economic history 
it is certainly not inconceivable that after having made its production 
reliant on data produced by a private company, Statistics Finland would 
find that prices had started to rise. 
  
I conclude the analysis in this chapter by interrogating companies’ 
attitudes towards data sharing, as perceived by my interviewees. 
 
5.3.4 “Not a question of desire but skill”: Companies’ attitudes 
towards data sharing 
 
As I explained in more detail in the previous chapter, a key part of the 
popular discourse on Big Data is the idea that data today constitutes an 
important form of economic currency. For Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier (2013: 182), for example, “Data is to the information society what 
fuel was to the industrial economy: the critical resource powering the 
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innovations that people rely on”. Keeping in mind the value that data 
holds, one might expect companies to be hesitant to share their data 
unless financially compensated for it. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly therefore, my interviewees did not mention this 
amongst the concerns that companies had expressed about data 
sharing. The interviewees were in general markedly more positive about 
companies’ willingness to share their data than what I was expecting, 
one interviewee describing it as “not so much a question of desire, but 
having the skill to do so”. The interviewee suspected that one of the 
reasons that had motivated a company to share its data even when not 
legally bound to do so was the good pre-existing relationship that it had 
with Statistics Finland. He explained that in Finland companies had 
many pre-existing legal obligations to supply data about their operations 
to Statistics Finland, and that in general they did not have a problem with 
this since in return they got better statistics with which to plan their 
operations. In his view, therefore, the relationship was not based on 
bartering, but on cooperation that benefitted both parts. He explained: 
Firstly, there is the legal obligation to disclose information. So, a 
company of this size already has many pre-existing obligations to 
deliver data to us based on cooperation agreements that we have with 
them. Observed from the outside it looks as if we have a good 
relationship with them and that the collaboration works. In other 
words, they feel like they are getting something in return for what they 
provide to us. To my understanding the relationship is not based on 
bartering, but instead they regard the information we produce as 
useful for them, since they constantly use our data to plan their own 
operations. Other countries have agreed to produce extra reports to 
companies in exchange for data, but I’m not aware that we would 
have taken this route. (Interviewee eight) 
Another interviewee explained that although companies had expressed 
an awareness that they “sat on a goldmine” of data, they would most 
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likely not see a financial issue in sharing it since Statistics Finland’s role 
was not to provide commercial products, but to describe society “from 
the high up”. So although they recognised the potential financial value of 
the data they possessed, they would not have a problem sharing it 
especially once they had extracted the initial value from it by for example 
selling it to advertisers. 
 
The manager who had participated in the lobbying efforts for data 
access, on his part, explained to me that modern companies took the 
notion of corporate social responsibility seriously, and that the CEOs of 
companies were usually more open to the prospect of data sharing than 
the interest groups representing them. The interest groups in particular 
were concerned about the extra work burden that the obligation to 
provide data would bring on the companies. Furthermore, because 
similarly to Statistics Finland the companies’ existence depended on 
whether the public trusted them, they had concerns that by sharing their 
data they might make themselves vulnerable to publicity scandals. The 
manager cited one instance where a mobile phone operator had shared 
its data for research purposes, only to find that some of its major 
customers had ended their contracts having perceived it as a breach of 
trust. 
 
The markedly positive attitude towards collaborations with the private 
sector documented in this section suggests that the hope expressed by 
many, that the tradition of openness and trust that had existed over many 
decades within the public sector in Finland would carry over to 
arrangements made with the private sector also, is not entirely 
unfounded. However, it is here in particular that I identify limitations in 
my sample. First, although I do not doubt the truthfulness of the views 
stated, I suspect that they might be skewed towards the more positive 
aspects of the collaborations with the private sector. Perhaps to some 
extent at least the positive narratives in these statements are part of the 
efforts to build partnerships with the new actors. Second, within the 
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scope of this study it was not possible to interview companies first hand. 
Therefore, in order to form a more complete picture of the emerging Big 
Data landscape, in a future study it would be important to identify and 
interview all the different stakeholders separately. Are for example 
companies as open to data sharing as suggested by the statisticians? 
 
One factor that could suggest otherwise is the point about the need to 
maintain customer trust that I mentioned last. For although it might be 
true as the manager said that modern companies take social 
responsibility seriously, at the end of the day they operate in competitive 
markets and exist only as far as they are able to turn in a profit. Unlike 
is the case for a government department, profits are the very 
precondition of their existence. Therefore, were the desire to contribute 
positively to society by sharing their data to come in to conflict with the 
need to turn in profits, for example by losing customers as a perceived 
breach of trust as had happened to the mobile phone operator, quite 
likely the former would give in. As pointed out by for example Schroeder 
(2014), and as I covered in more detail in the previous chapter, the public 
anger raised by Facebook’s uses of its data for research purposes 
suggests that companies are in the future more likely to conduct such 
work behind closed doors. 
 
In contrast to the positive narratives, there is therefore much reason to 
suggest that the increasing involvement of the private sector in the 
production of data is far from unproblematic. Regardless of the extent of 
companies’ desire to contribute to the common good by sharing the data 
they now produce, it is unlikely to take place, at least at the scale that 
some would like it to, should it come to conflict with the demands of 
markets. I therefore identify here, in the increasingly proprietary nature 
of data, a contradiction in how the assemblage producing official 
statistics is potentially being reconfigured. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the uptake of Big Data at Statistics 
Finland, and suggested that it is in multiple ways indicative of an 
increasing neoliberalisation of statistical practices. However, as noted 
previously, what Big Data will mean for the production of official statistics 
is by no means settled or given. The Big Data projects that I examined 
were all still in experimental phase, and no pre-existing statistics had so 
far been replaced by data produced in the private sector. Big Data was 
in general viewed as a complementary source of data, rather than a 
replacement for register based statistics. Nevertheless, the analysis 
provides early evidence of a potential reconfiguration between the public 
and the private sector in the production of data and the making of official 
statistics. Examined in the longer historical trajectory, it suggests a shift 
whereby the production of data for official statistics has started to move 
away from its historical basis in states. The analysis has furthermore 
highlighted some of the ways in which the statistical agency is changing 
its practices in relation to the perceived challenge of Big Data. I argued 
that they too reflect our current political culture in that private sector ways 
of thinking and acting are increasingly perceived as the appropriate 
organisational principle for public sector institutions also. The analysis in 
this chapter is therefore in line with the central conceptual point of this 
thesis: That statistics evolve in interaction with political contingencies 
and that changing governmental rationalities form an integral component 
of this “co-constitution”. 
 
The analysis has furthermore underscored the importance of 
understanding Big Data as not just a technical-, but also a political object. 
How much influence over the data that comes to shape the making of 
official statistics and in turn the governing of societies should be given to 
non-state actors? How should the assemblage producing statistics be 
reconfigured in order to unleash the potential of Big Data for the 
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advancement of social goods? Some of the findings in this chapter 
suggest that there are direct ways in which private sector rationalities 
are in conflict with the desire to share data for the advancement of 
collective goods. 
 
After I had written this chapter, I shared the results with the other 
researchers on the ARITHMUS team. Somewhat to my surprise, they 
informed me that the findings did not differ markedly from their own 
findings at their respective field sites. In the next and final chapter before 
the conclusion, therefore, I expand the analysis of Big Data in official 
statistics by situating my findings at Statistics Finland to the transnational 
field of statistics of which it is part. 
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6 Transcending methodological 
nationalism through an analysis of the 
ARITHMUS database 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Big Data developments at Statistics Finland were not happening in 
isolation, but rather, much like other work at a modern statistical agency, 
they took place as part of international relations involving organisations 
such as Eurostat, UNECE and others through which statisticians from 
different countries regularly engage and meet to share experiences and 
work collaboratively. One analytical pitfall would therefore be to treat the 
developments documented in the previous chapter as being unique to 
Statistics Finland and not part of these relations and connections. 
 
By starting from the idea of a transnational field of statistical practices in 
which the local, the national and the transnational overlap and intersect, 
the ARITHMUS project of which this thesis is part, has sought to move 
beyond nationally bounded case studies, or what is sometimes termed 
methodological nationalism (Scheel et al., 2016). Instead of using nation 
states “as quasi naturally given units of research, analysis and 
theorisation” the project has approached “the meaning and force of the 
national” as an empirical question (Scheel et al., 2016: 4). By mobilising 
a “transversal” method, consisting of numerous research strategies, the 
project has sought to attend to how practices and discourses travel 
between and connect sites and scales. Importantly, the transnational 
field of statistical practices is understood as a field of struggle where 
“statisticians and other stakeholders (demographers, data scientists, 
domain specialists etc.) struggle over the devices, truth claims, budgets 
and methods involved in the production of official statistics in order to 
advance their relative position[s]” (Scheel et al., 2016: 10). However, 
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instead of aiming to do a comprehensive mapping of the relative 
positions of old and new stakeholders in the production of official 
statistics, the project mobilises the concept of a transnational field of 
statistical practice as an opening “to examine what kinds of orderings 
are being done through specific practices that traverse, connect and 
operate across various sites and scales.” (Scheel et al., 2016: 11). 
 
One example of the strategies through which the project has sought to 
achieve its goal of moving beyond the national “container” is the 
approach I took after writing my previous chapter. As part of my method, 
I shared my findings with the other ARITHMUS team members who 
emphasised the similarities rather than differences between my findings 
and the things that they had discovered at their respective field sites. 
They pointed out to me that for the most part, the narratives that I 
documented were familiar to them from before. The outcome of the 
exercise thus underscored the importance of understanding the 
articulations of Big Data and its impact on official statistics that I 
discovered at Statistics Finland as very much part of and shaped by 
forces and dynamics, such as debates and practices, that cut across 
individual NSIs. As Grommé et al. (Forthcoming: 3) point out, however, 
this is not to assume that developments such as Big Data are taken up 
identically across sites. Rather, they may get their specific articulations, 
depending on for example the different histories and political 
circumstances in which the different NSIs operate. As I pointed out 
earlier, however, the ways in which national factors come to play a role 
in the uptake of developments such as Big Data at NSIs must be treated 
as an empirical question in need of further analysis. 
 
In this final chapter, therefore, I expand on my analysis by situating the 
findings of my previous chapter in a transnational context. By mobilising 
an analytic that draws on a large corpus of data collected as part of the 
ARITHMUS project, I highlight some of the ways in which the major 
themes of my previous chapter are being discussed at other NSIs and 
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at international forums, such as Eurostat and UNECE meetings. 
Although I cannot claim a comparative study, the analysis is important in 
order to broaden the scope of my so far nationally bounded 
understanding of how the assemblage producing official statistics is 
currently being reconceived by national statisticians in response to Big 
Data. Furthermore, although my aim is not to conduct a full-fledged 
analysis of the different actors and their relative positions in the field, I 
highlight ways in which supra-national organisations often come to play 
a key role in organising and leading debates and initiatives surrounding 
Big Data, not only through funding, but also through guidelines, reports, 
regulations etc. Furthermore, I raise examples of the many struggles and 
disagreements that are necessarily part of the exchanges and 
interactions within a transnational field. 
 
I start the chapter by describing in more detail the ARITHMUS dataset 
and the analytic that I have devised to analyse it. The analysis itself 
consists of three parts. First, I explore the ways in which the words hype, 
threat, opportunity and paradigm come up in the ARITHMUS data. In 
addition to reiterating numerous points that were made also by my 
interviewees at Statistics Finland, the analysis helps to shed more light 
on the more problematic aspects of the increasing involvement of the 
private sector in the production and management of data. The analysis 
furthermore points to a divergence in how administrative data and Big 
Data are distinguished from each other at Statistics Finland and at 
international forums. Importantly, the analysis also highlights some of 
the disagreements and discontents that exist between NSIs and the 
supra-national organisations that increasingly come to influence their 
work. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, I explore how the words skills, 
mentality and mindset come up in the ARITHMUS database. This part 
of the analysis also points to a close resemblance between my findings 
and the ways that these topics are being debated at other NSIs and at 
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international meetings and conferences. For example, many of the 
findings provide further evidence to suggest that increasingly, what 
“modernisation” comes to mean in practice is the adoption of private 
sector rationalities also within public sector institutions such as NSIs. In 
terms of new findings, the analysis suggests that cultural differences 
towards issues such as data sharing within government do exist between 
countries. I suggest that due to such differences, some governments are 
potentially better placed than others to take advantage of the 
affordances of Big Data. 
 
In the final part of the analysis, I explore ways in which data access and 
partnerships are debated in the documents that make up the ARITHMUS 
database. As was the case at Statistics Finland, also at international 
meetings the importance of obtaining access to more data sources is 
identified as a key concern. Partnerships, also with actors who might 
have previously be seen solely as competitors, are seen as the 
appropriate way to securing access to the new data sources. In marked 
contrast to the positive outlook of my interviewees at Statistics Finland, 
however, numerous issues with the increasing need to form partnerships 
with private actors are identified. Business interests are for example 
identified as being “transient”, and it is conceded that although modern 
companies recognise the importance of corporate social responsibility, 
it is usually not part of their core business models. Following from this, it 
is acknowledged that NSIs must in practice be able to offer companies 
something more than promises of collective contributions to the public 
good in return for access to their data. Some of the fieldwork findings of 
other ARITHMUS team members also suggest that statisticians are in 
fact far from comfortable with the increasing involvement of private 
actors in the production and management of data. Furthermore, in 
addition to having to convince external stakeholders, such as 
companies, about the importance of Big Data for official statistics, the 
findings in this section shed light on some of the internal politics that 
taking place in relation to Big Data within institutes. I conclude the 
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chapter by drawing a number of analytical conclusions from the analysis 
particularly in relation to the broader themes of this thesis. 
 
6.2 A note on data and method 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the aim of moving beyond nationally 
bounded case studies requires not only conceptual rethinking, but also 
methodological inventiveness. An attempt to analyse the ARITHMUS 
database, a collection of over three thousand documents, consisting of 
for example field work notes, interview transcripts, meeting minutes and 
various policy documents, could have easily become overwhelming. 
 
To avoid this, I devised an analytic that draws on the large corpus of 
ARITHMUS data but does so within the confines of the NVivo data 
analysis software. The ARITHMUS project opted to use an NVivo server 
environment provided by the project’s host university as its data 
management and analysis tool. The ability to have multiple users 
working simultaneously in the server environment was a precondition for 
the collaborative nature of the project. From the very beginning of the 
project, all researchers shared their data with the other researchers by 
uploading and storing them on the NVivo server. Therefore, also all the 
fieldwork material, including the interviews, that I collected, were 
included in the ARITHMUS database. 
 
My analytic consisted of choosing several keywords from my previous 
chapter, and running keyword searches on them in the ARITHMUS 
database. The NVivo software package gives numerous query options 
for text-mining large corpuses of data (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013: 248–
255). Instead of focusing solely on word frequencies, I ran “text search 
queries”, which search for words or phrases, and “compound queries”, 
which search for words in association with each other, measured usually 
by proximity, in order to locate the documents where the key words were 
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being discussed in the data. This then gave me lists of documents where 
the keywords featured. In order to limit the number of documents for 
analysis, I chose only ones where the key word featured extensively. 
 
The exercise highlighted the technical challenges that are often involved 
when analysing large collections of data (Edwards et al., 2013). Despite 
being located in a server environment provided by the university, the 
software kept crashing repeatedly when running the searches. I 
therefore often had to limit the number of documents in one way or the 
other. For example, I regularly filtered documents according to the 
researcher that had uploaded them, meaning that I usually had to run 
the same search six times. 
 
After I had chosen the documents for the analysis, I coded them in three 
separate steps. First, I coded descriptively under a keyword tag the 
sections in the documents where the keyword appeared. Once I had 
done this for all of the keywords, I then went through all the keyword tags 
and coded them further in to more analytical codes. Finally, I merged 
codes where there was clear overlap between them. As is usually the 
case with data analysis, the process was far from straightforward, and 
involved many iterative steps of going back and forth between the 
different tasks. For example, as my knowledge of the data grew, I 
discovered more keywords that touched on the themes and issues that 
I was interested in. Instead of endlessly analysing more and more data, 
however, I concluded the analysis once I felt that I had covered enough 
material to substantially expand on my analysis in the previous chapter. 
In the end, I analysed a total of 109 documents covering, as already 
mentioned, field work notes, interview transcripts, meeting minutes and 
a variety of policy documents. 
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6.3 Findings 
 
6.3.1 Hype, threat/opportunity, paradigm 
 
I started my analysis in the previous chapter by exploring how 
statisticians at Statistics Finland understood Big Data and the questions 
they saw it raising for their professional practice. What the analysis 
showed was that instead of locating its newness in its technical qualities, 
such as the 3vs, my respondents were more inclined to see the newness 
of Big Data in how the production of data was becoming organised, 
particularly in that more and more institutions now had the capacity to 
produce and analyse data, potentially challenging NSIs in their role as 
the producers of numerical facts on societies. As the topic of this section 
indicates, I chose hype, threat, opportunity and paradigm as the 
keywords through which I explored the occurrence of the 
aforementioned themes in the larger corpus of ARITHMUS data. 
 
6.3.1.1 Hype 
 
Similarly to my interviews, hype is a theme that features heavily in the 
ARITHMUS database. Hype is often acknowledged as a permanent 
feature of the discussion around Big Data, followed by an explanation of 
why it nevertheless constitutes an important topic for official statistics. 
These explanations typically underline the increasing digitisation of 
social life, and the resulting corporate harvesting and commodification 
of the data. General calls for NSIs to engage with Big Data are often 
made by individuals higher up in the organisational hierarchies. A 
Director General of a National Statistical Institute, who has been asked 
to deliver a keynote speech at an international meeting organised by 
Eurostat in 2017, for example underlines that irrespective of the hype, 
NSIs have no choice but to engage with Big Data: 
Many people are using this term as a kind of hype and a lot of people 
are saying “big data this and big data that”, but I will specify what I 
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actually mean by that. […] We leave traces all over the place, which 
means that our lives and our actions and actions of companies are 
being kind of measured more, detected more than in the past […] that 
is why big data is not a hype, it is something fundamental and it is 
something that changes the way we work as well. (ARITHMUS 
fieldwork notes 2017) 
In contrast, those working closer to the everyday production of statistics 
often caution NSIs against uncritically following the hype. According to 
some statisticians, one of the down sides of the Big Data hype is that it 
raises the expectation in users that any information deficit can now be 
solved using Big Data. By blindly embracing the poorly understood new 
data sources, however, NSIs put themselves at risk of jeopardising their 
main asset, public trust. Diverging attitudes between the users and 
producers of statistics are therefore identified as a potential source of 
growing distrust between the two. Discussions such as these typically 
end with recommendations that NSIs must find ways to balance the high 
expectations with “realistic” approaches to taking advantage of the 
opportunities presented by Big Data. 
 
Hype comes furthermore up in relation to increasing fragmentation of 
tasks within institutions. A statistician who works at Eurostat for example 
explains that due to the Big Data hype of the past few years, there is a 
widespread interest towards Big Data in the European Commission. He 
explains that what this has in practice resulted in is a situation where 
work on Big Data is scattered around different departments in the 
Commission, with some departments approaching the subject with more 
expertise than others: 
Then you have every DG [Directorate-General] is doing something 
depending on the theme […] so employment may have an interest in 
jobs and skills so whatever has to do with big data and jobs and they 
are behind it. Those who deal with humanitarian aid and external 
affairs are dealing for example with migration crisis or refugees so 
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they are impressed by all kinds of anecdotal evidence. That you can 
do miracles with big data and tracking migrants and so on. Those who 
are dealing with Energy of course there is Smart technologies. 
Everywhere you will find an interest in big data because during the last 
three/four years there was a lot of hype so […] (ARITHMUS fieldwork 
notes 2016) 
He goes on to explain that to some extent this is unavoidable, and not 
that different from national governments where themes and issues are 
also often dispersed across departments and agencies. 
 
6.3.1.2 Threat/opportunity 
 
Similarly to my interviews, Big Data comes up as an opportunity to both 
improve on existing statistics and to build entirely new ones. Resembling 
closely my findings at Statistics Finland, Big Data is identified as an 
opportunity to improve especially the relevancy, speed and cost-
efficiency of official statistics. Mobile phone data is regularly taken up as 
an example of how Big Data can potentially be used to produce more 
accurate statistics than what can be accomplished with traditional data 
gathering methods, such as surveys. It is for example argued that 
whereas the latter generally depend on respondent’s recollection and 
memory of events, Big Data tracks behaviour as it occurs. However, 
similarly to my interviews, alongside such reflections the continuing need 
for surveys is usually also underscored. Statistics produced with more 
traditional methods, which typically go back years, are still needed in 
order to for example test the “validity” of Big Data models. In building 
new products, the ability to integrate new (big) data sources with old 
ones, such as surveys and administrative data, is also often identified as 
being of key importance, this too being a finding that closely resembles 
my findings at Statistics Finland. 
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Policy documents prepared by NSIs often begin by emphasising the 
need to see the growing interest towards statistics that has resulted also 
from the debate around Big Data as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
Nevertheless, numerous threats are identified in relation to the new data 
sources. A fear that gets expressed by many is that because Big Data 
statistics can in theory at least be produced faster than traditional 
statistics, politicians and other data users might increasingly opt to use 
the former even when made aware of the potential issues in data 
accuracy. Because “decision makers will make decisions on whatever 
information they get”, as one keynote speaker at a conference of 
European statisticians organised by the OECD in 2014 summarises the 
issue, the prospect of official statistics being replaced by the unreliable 
Big Data sources is viewed as a threat to the transparency of decision 
making that a democratic political order is dependent on (ARITHMUS 
fieldwork notes 2014). 
 
The growing number of data producers, and their increasingly 
commercial nature, is also problematised on numerous occasions. 
Already in some of the earlier documents, which date back to 2013, it is 
noted that data owners are gaining an increasing knowledge of NSIs 
interest in their data, and that this might eventually lead to increases in 
the cost of accessing and acquiring that data. It is furthermore often 
noted that even when permanent data access can be secured, the 
problem of ensuring the continuing existence of time-series data 
remains. In contrast to NSIs, businesses and their interests are identified 
as being “transient”, and this is seen as a serious threat to NSIs desire 
to ensure the longevity of data. As one national statistician explains at a 
conference of European statistician organised by OECD in 2016 
explains, the crux of the issue with the increasing involvement of the 
private sector in the production of data can be summarised in the 
question “what happens when Google goes belly up?” (ARITHMUS 
fieldwork notes 2016). Statisticians also repeatedly express fears that 
other public sector institutions might increasingly by-pass NSIs and 
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instead build their own statistical products with data derived from the 
private sector. 
 
Two strategic steps are usually advocated as the appropriate means by 
which to tackle the challenges brought about by Big Data. First, NSIs are 
encouraged to explore the usability of Big Data in improving official 
statistics, especially in terms of their timeliness. Although numerous 
ethical issues with Big Data sources, especially in relation to questions 
of privacy, are identified, not engaging with them at all is also seen as a 
problem since even if NSIs did nothing with them, other actors, 
especially in the private sector, would. NSIs are therefore encouraged to 
strive towards finding a balance between adhering to their traditionally 
strict ethical principles on the one hand, and engaging with the 
opportunities offered by the new data sources on the other. Interestingly, 
one national statistician makes the point that there would also be an 
ethical concern with NSIs not engaging with the new data sources, 
because this would mean that the uses of Big Data would be left to actors 
who usually care even less about ethics. In response to a presentation 
on Big Data ethics commissioned by Eurostat in 2016, which focuses on 
the numerous potential issues with NSIs engaging with Big Data, he 
observes the following: 
I am concerned about finding the right balance. In your assignment, 
you have explored all potential objections to using Big Data in official 
statistics. But there is also an ethical concern with us not engaging 
with the data, because even if we did not use them, others still would. 
For example, we have been experimenting using Twitter data, and our 
legal experts have been complaining to us about it. But individual 
social data is already on the market. Individual psychological profiles 
can be purchased from social media companies. This is the reality, 
and in this reality we cannot be too strict about ethics. (ARITHMUS 
fieldwork notes 2016) 
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In sum, the statistician seems to be suggesting that due to the increasing 
involvement of private actors in the production of data NSIs cannot 
approach Big Data solely from within their traditional conceptions of 
ethics. 
 
Secondly, numerous discussions highlight the need for NSIs to become 
more proactive in communicating and marketing their value to society. 
One strategy document (UNECE, 2014c) for example underscores the 
need for NSIs to actively campaign for funds. It explains that this need 
is exacerbated by the growing number of data providers, because 
“[government] decisions to allocate resources [to different institutions] 
are taken on the basis of what is perceived, which may or may not accord 
with reality” (UNECE, 2014c: 3). It therefore encourages other NSIs too 
to “actively work to close any gap that might exist between perception 
and reality that have a detrimental effect on the national statistical 
office’s ability to win its ‘right’ share of business.” (UNECE, 2014c: 3). 
Again, the increasing need to actively market the value of official 
statistics and to campaign for funds are narratives that featured 
prominently also in my interviews at Statistics Finland. 
 
6.3.1.3 Paradigm 
 
A keyword search on the word paradigm reveals that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it often appears alongside descriptions of the changing 
role of NSIs and official statistics. A director of a committee on national 
statistics in one country summarises the main feature of the change 
brought about by Big Data as follows: 
We must move from a paradigm of producing the best estimates 
possible from a survey to that of producing the best possible estimates 
to meet user needs from multiple data sources. (ARITHMUS fieldwork 
notes 2016) 
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For others, the paradigm change implies that statistical agencies must 
shift their focus from producing statistics to a “more service oriented 
attitude […] to connect, aggregate and tailor” statistical information 
based on user needs (UNECE, 2015: 4). In the new paradigm, NSIs will 
be more defined by their value add activities in analysing in interpreting 
data, rather than by their data collection capabilities. 
 
Methodologically, the new paradigm means moving from sampling to an 
increasing use of modelling and machine learning techniques. 
Discussions about appropriate software and Big Data tools feature often 
in the debates, usually followed by a recognition that the change required 
goes far beyond the implementation of new technology and methods. 
Instead, the new paradigm is defined by an abundance of data, where 
the key concern becomes “what questions to pose and how to draw 
inference”. Metaphors such as “from farmers to foragers of data” often 
feature alongside efforts to define the features of the new paradigm. 
Statisticians also regularly criticise presentations that focus solely on 
questions of method and software without appreciating the broader 
change required from NSIs. One statistician for example responds to a 
lengthy presentation about the impact of Big Data on official statistics at 
a Eurostat meeting in 2016 with the following comment: 
The presentation was very much tool oriented. We are very familiar 
with all these tools and the thing that was missing from the 
presentation was an acknowledgment of the fact that what is actually 
changing at the moment is the paradigm around how we conduct 
research. With Big Data you have data first and then you ask the 
questions. The issue is therefore not what tools to use but what 
questions to ask. That’s the crux of the matter, and that is where the 
skills come in. All too often because the data is so vast and complex 
one ends up using very simple methods, such as logistic regression. 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
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A prominent feature of my interviews at Statistics Finland was that many 
respondents drew a parallel between Big Data and register based 
statistics. For some, Big Data was in fact “just another register”, this time 
however owned by a private company. The question of whether Big Data 
and administrative registers should be treated together or separately 
forms a topic of debate also at international meetings. At a Eurostat Big 
Data task force meeting in 2016, which brings together statisticians that 
work on Big Data projects at their respective NSIs, a statistician from 
another task force that focuses on helping NSIs to take advantage of 
administrative data delivered a presentation on the potential synergies 
between administrative and Big Data. In the discussion that follows, 
numerous areas of overlap are identified. According to some, Big Data 
and administrative data are similar in terms of their data structure, as 
both involve combining and integrating a multitude of different data 
sources. It is therefore proposed that quality frameworks from one 
project could be reused in the other. Questions around data access are 
identified as another area of potential overlap. Some statisticians 
however argue that the two are significantly different in terms of their 
ownership structures, and that different data access strategies are 
therefore needed. 
 
It is interesting to note that alongside calls to avoid too much overlap 
between the two projects, it is simultaneously admitted that “there is not 
always a clear distinction between administrative and big data”. The 
administrative data project’s aim, it is emphasised, is to focus on 
“classical” sources of data, such as population and tax registers. In order 
to achieve this aim, data is considered administrative “if they are 
collected to comply with regulatory obligations even if they are owned 
privately”. In distinguishing Big Data and administrative data, therefore, 
ownership is deemed less important than data structure. Privately owned 
transport data is taken up as an example of data that can be considered 
administrative since it is generated as part of a public utility. At another 
meeting, the issue of public/private ownership of data comes up in 
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relation to the outsourcing of state services, that is, a recommendation 
is put forward that contractual requirements for data access and sharing 
should be put in place as part of any agreements with private contractors 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016). Clearly much conceptual ambiguity 
over definitions of Big Data exist also beyond Statistics Finland. 
 
In addition to identifying numerous themes that were familiar to me 
already from my interviews at Statistics Finland, for example the desire 
of statisticians to see Big Data as an opportunity rather than a threat, or 
the perceived need for NSIs to shift their focus from producing data to 
collecting and aggregating already existing data, a look at the broader 
corpus of ARITHMUS documents has helped to refine the picture on at 
least two important issues. 
 
First, although my interviewees at Statistics Finland recognised the 
threat that the increasing involvement of private actors in the production 
of data posed, they did not go in to too much detail in specifying why it 
might be an issue. In the ARITHMUS data, in contrast, the growing 
number of data producers and their often commercial nature is 
problematised on numerous occasions. The interests of businesses are 
identified as being “transient” which is seen as a serious threat to 
ensuring the longevity of data. Google might for example “go belly up”, 
which would mean that the statistic produced with it’s data would cease 
to exist along with it. Furthermore, already in the earlier documents the 
point is made that as businesses gain an increasing knowledge of NSIs 
interest in their data, prices could start going up. The point is also made 
that the ethical issues with Big Data would not be solved by NSIs not 
engaging with it, since other actors, such as companies, are already 
using it in often dubious ways. In sum, whereas my interviewees often 
promoted a positive narrative about the increasing involvement of private 
actors in the production of data, in their internal debates national 
statisticians appear significantly more concerned about its potential 
problematic consequences. Partially at least this might be explained by 
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the different settings of the conversations, but perhaps also differences 
exist between countries in how the issue of having to increasingly form 
partnerships with actors in the private sector is viewed by statisticians. 
  
Secondly, it is interesting to compare the way that my interviewees took 
up the issue of the close proximity between administrative registers and 
Big Data and the way that the topic is being debated at international 
meetings. Specifically, to many of my interviewees the distinguishing 
factor between the two was not so much their different technical quality, 
but rather the fact that the former was owned by public-, and the latter 
by private sector institutions. In contrast, in the international debates 
administrative data and Big Data are not distinguished by who owns 
them, but rather by their different data structures. The point is made that 
data can be administrative, such as in the case of transport data, even 
when it is privately owned, as it might still be “collected to comply with 
regulatory obligations”. It is certainly true that in countries such as the 
UK, where the privatisation of public services has gone much further 
than in some other places, the dichotomy introduced by some of my 
interviewees would be less useful in attempts to distinguish between 
administrative and Big Data. This finding further highlights the unsettled 
and often ambiguous nature of the object of Big Data. Whether based 
on technical, or some other qualities, all definitions of Big Data seem 
impartial and far from unproblematic. Rather, what comes to constitute 
Big Data is highly contextual. 
 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that the tensions and disagreements 
that I highlighted usually took place at meetings commissioned by 
Eurostat. Whereas Eurostat statisticians often emphasised and 
underlined the necessity and urgency of the need for NSIs to engage 
with Big Data, statisticians from NSIs regularly brought up the many 
issues and challenges associated with the endeavour. Although a 
general consensus about the importance of Big Data for official statistics 
exists at these meetings, projects to engage with Big Data are being 
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promoted mainly by Eurostat, causing many frustrations amongst NSIs 
who are the ones that must see the projects through in practice, often 
amidst cuts to their general budgets. In light of the fact that one of the 
promises of Big Data is the automation of some of the tasks that 
traditionally went into the making of statistics, perhaps Eurostat’s 
eagerness to push for Big Data in official statistics can partially at least 
be understood as part of broader neoliberal agendas to reduce the size 
of the public sector in EU member states? Future research must 
disentangle in detail the rationalities and agendas of the different 
stakeholders that are currently participating in the struggle over the 
meaning and significance of Big Data for official statistics. 
 
 
6.3.2 Skills, mentality/mindset 
 
Another key finding of my previous chapter was that one response to the 
increasing competition brought about by Big Data was a perceived need 
to adopt private sector ways of thinking and acting also in the public 
sector. From the analysis of my interviews, I chose skills, mentality and 
mindset as the keywords through which I explored the occurrence of the 
aforementioned theme in the larger corpus of ARITHMUS data. 
 
6.3.2.1 Skills 
 
Similarly to my interviews, also in the ARITHMUS data the need to adopt 
new skills features extensively alongside debates about the 
modernisation of official statistics. In a typical presentation at an 
international meeting, statisticians define modernisation as a process 
consisting of new products and services, new data sources and 
methods, the optimisation of production processes and the 
enhancement of human knowledge and skills. Investments in staff skills 
are often identified as one of the key components in the required 
transformation. Although the idea familiar already from my interviews 
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that NSIs should first obtain more Big Data before discussing at length 
the skills that might be needed in its analysis features also in the 
ARITHMUS documents, many of them go in to much more detail in 
specifying the types of skills required from statisticians in the age of Big 
Data. 
 
At one international meeting organised by Eurostat in 2015, for example, 
a statistician from a European NSI explains that as part of their national 
Big Data “road map”, they have identified four levels of Big Data skills 
needed at their institute. At the highest level of hierarchy are “hardcore 
data scientists” who possess a broad overall knowledge about big data 
and a deep specialisation in some particular area, and who are usually 
more directed toward research. At the second level are “developers” who 
have a knowledge of big data systems and processes and the ability to 
go from research to statistical production systems. The third level of 
employees consists of “users” who possess know-how about big data 
issues in production environments and a good understanding of the 
specificities of big data sources. At the final level are the remaining staff 
who mainly need an awareness of the changing world and issues 
beyond Big Data. 
 
A division between soft and hard Big Data skills is sometimes included 
in such definitions. Softer skills, such as an awareness of data ethics and 
governance, it sometimes gets noted, are more difficult to define than 
“harder” ones, such as those that have to do with methodological 
knowhow or software. A final report of the results of a survey about “the 
Skills Necessary for People Working with Big Data in Statistical 
Organisations” (UNECE, 2014d) published in 2014 defines as the three 
most important skills for working with Big Data IT skills (noSQL databses, 
SQL databases and Hadoop), Statistics skills (methodology and 
standards for processing Big Data, data mining) and Other skills 
(creative problem solving, data governance and ethics). The survey 
reports that most of the skills in the “Other skills” category are present at 
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advanced and intermediate levels at statistical organisations, whereas 
“IT skills” and “Statistics skills” are often lacking, indicating a shortage of 
technical skills at NSIs as identified also by my respondents at Statistics 
Finland. 
 
Yet another familiar theme from my interviews, skills come in the 
ARITHMUS data also regularly up in relation to calls for the staff at NSIs 
to adopt a new attitude towards work. To survive in a Big Data world, 
one presenter at an international conference organised by the Royal 
Statistical Society in 2015 explains, statisticians need first and foremost 
a “willingness to learn new things”, which includes learning new technical 
skills, learning how to find datasets, figuring out who can help with issues 
and problems, and crossing “boundaries to create a community to make 
something with big data” (ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2015). In many 
documents it is noted that people with Big Data skills are hard to come 
by, and that NSIs are in competition with big businesses over the best 
employees. Job satisfaction and the ability to provide experience that 
can pay off in terms of competitiveness for private sector jobs are 
identified as advantages that NSIs have in the competition for the best 
workers. The issue around generational divides that featured 
prominently in my interviews also comes up in the ARITHMUS data. 
Specifically, the “stickiness” of personnel is identified as a key challenge 
in “the management of change”, especially since some of the older 
employees cannot in practice be brought up to the new skill levels 
needed to deal with Big Data. 
 
Similarly again to my findings at Statistics Finland, despite a widespread 
belief that NSIs should learn things by doing as much as possible by 
themselves, also at other NSIs a lack of Big Data skills has meant 
bringing in consultants from the private sector. In presentations about 
the challenge that Big Data poses to official statistics, it furthermore 
sometimes gets noted that other disciplines, such as computer 
scientists, have been quicker to adopt the skills needed to deal with Big 
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Data, thereby allowing them to take up the “high” positions in data 
analysis that once went to economists. These other professions differ 
from statisticians especially in that they are far better at “selling” 
themselves. Official statisticians, whose interests are identified as being 
markedly different, are criticised for having been far less effective in 
marketing their expertise. 
  
A final major theme of the keyword search on skills are discussions 
about the discrepancy between the expectations and reality of working 
with Big Data sources. A national statistician who has worked in a project 
examining the affordances of mobile phone data explains that funding 
for Big Data projects is often gained due to hopes that significant cost 
savings can be achieved: 
There is a general misunderstanding that new data sources will be 
cheaper than existing data-sources and if there is promise that you 
can get things done with less money this is always a major driver. 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
The statistician explains however that in contrast to popular belief, the 
costs with Big Data are unknown, and likely to be higher than expected 
due to the skill demands involved. The IT department at his institute, he 
furthermore remarks, is aware of the issue but does not speak out on it 
because it is not in its interest to do so: 
Only IT-people understand that it [Big Data] will not be cheaper […] IT 
is not cheap […] but IT-people have no interest in telling this to 
anybody […] it is very difficult to foresee the real costs of producing 
statistics with these data-sources […] the people need a completely 
different skill-set to work with these kinds of data […] and this will be 
very expensive […] data analysts are expensive. (ARITHMUS 
fieldwork notes 2016) 
Again, although the issue around the expectations versus reality of 
working with Big Data was not explicitly stated in my interviews at 
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Statistics Finland, it is a topic that I recognise from discussions that took 
place during lunch breaks and other informal occasions during my 
fieldwork. 
 
6.3.2.2 Mentality/mindset 
 
Keyword searches on the words mentality and mindset reveal again 
many similar themes to those that featured in my interviews at Statistics 
Finland, but also new ones. As I mentioned already in the previous 
section, similarly to my interviews, also at international meetings Big 
Data is identified as being disruptive of not just methods and techniques, 
but an entire mentality and mindset. The move from a product to service 
orientation, which I noted previously, is identified as involving a cultural 
change at NSIs, one that must begin with the very top level of managers. 
At a practical level, the shift in mindset involves “a willingness to accept 
different definitions of quality”, since the data sources from which data 
are derived are becoming increasingly varied. 
 
Importantly, in defining the desired mindset, private companies are often 
taken up as role models to be followed. At an international meeting 
organised by Eurostat in 2017 for example, a senior manager explains 
that not only does Google and Facebook increasingly have the (big) 
data, they also have the mindset of a big data company, which NSIs in 
contrast do not. In explaining what he means by this, he takes up the 
example of register based statistics, which, when introduced, were 
“violently opposed” for reasons of principle. He explains that the same 
thing is currently happening in relation to Big Data, and that “the first 
thing to do”, therefore, “is to get the mindset right”: 
The big advantage they [Facebook and Google] have is that they have 
the big data to do a maximum effect. They also have the mindset of a 
big data company, which the statistical community does not. When we 
started using administrative data at [our NSI] statisticians were 
violently opposed to them with fundamental principle reasons. The 
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same thing is happening with big data. “This is not statistics, this is not 
quality”, they say. The first thing to do, is therefore to get the mindset 
right. (ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
Elsewhere, the correct mindset in the new circumstances is identified as 
involving, amongst other things, being more “experimental and 
aggressive”. Here again, the close resemblance to business discourses 
is clear. 
 
Interesting to note is also that one activity through which NSIs hope to 
achieve the desired change in attitude and mentality is by organising 
events such as “hackathons”, where staff members collaborate 
intensively on projects over a pre-defined time period, sometimes in 
competition with each other. For many years, companies and venture 
capitalists have viewed hackathons as a quick way to develop new 
products and to locate new areas of innovation and funding, and it is 
interesting to note that such organisational forms are currently being 
appropriated also by government institutions such as NSIs. As I pointed 
out already based on my interviews at Statistics Finland, it seems that 
what “modernisation” often comes to mean in practice is the adoption of 
private sector ways of thinking and acting also in the public sector. 
 
One of the things that my interviewees at Statistics Finland explained to 
me on multiple occasions was that the register based statistical system 
had depended on good relations between different government 
departments in Finland, and that their hope was that the tradition of 
openness and trust that had existed within the public sector would carry 
over to arrangements made with the private sector also. The ongoing 
early experiments with Big Data that I documented provided some 
support for this view. Furthermore, interviewees were in general 
markedly more positive about companies’ willingness to share their data 
than what I was expecting, some highlighting the good pre-existing 
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relationship that had existed between Statistics Finland and many 
companies as one of the reasons for their optimism. 
 
Mentality and mindset come up also in the larger corpus of ARITHMUS 
data in relation to discussions about administrative registers. While the 
register based census remains the method of choice for only a minority 
of European countries, many of them are currently investigating the 
possibilities for conducting future censuses using administrative 
registers (UNECE Statistics Wiki, 2017). One such country, which aims 
to “achieve” a register based census by 2020, repeatedly underscores 
the importance of changes in mentality as one the preconditions of the 
register based census (Matteus, 2013: 65–66). These changes are 
needed first and foremost within government offices in charge of 
registers, who must “take the needs of statistics into account and […] not 
consider them second-rate in comparison with their administrative 
duties”. In practice, this requires “a much more serious obligation [for the 
NSI] to instruct registers [offices] on collecting statistical data, and to co-
ordinate their activities, especially in terms of activities and methods that 
guarantee data quality”. Furthermore, the NSI notes that register based 
statistics “will not work without citizens who understand the need of 
submitting data and who perform their duties”. The register based 
census therefore requires “intentional raising of civic awareness and 
regular correspondence with the public on the topic”. 
 
Another country identifies “departmental data silos” within government 
as a major national obstacle to unleashing the potential in Big Data. A 
statistician from the Royal Statistical Society explains that in contrast to 
some other countries, in this country a silo mentality exists within its 
government, where different datasets are not shared between 
departments. To address the issue, the person proposes that the NSI 
should be given a stronger statutory right to access held within different 
parts of the government, a move which would guarantee real-time 
access to what was happening in the country. The person explains: 
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One of the big problems is that there is a silo mentality within 
Government, and different datasets are held and not shared across 
departments. The single biggest opportunity is to move where other 
countries have gone- Canada, New Zealand and Ireland- in giving the 
statistical oﬃce a broad right to data access across departments. At 
the moment, the [NSI] cannot easily get hold of [..] data [held within 
different government departments]. If it could, we would have more 
real-time access to what is going on around the country […] You 
would not have the privacy issues, because the [NSI] is interested 
only in aggregate data […] they do not care about us as individuals. 
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2016: 22) 
Breaking down data silos by handing the NSI a stronger mandate is 
therefore identified as a key component of the country’s Big Data 
strategy. 
 
In sum, much of what I uncovered in this section supports the analytical 
conclusions that I drew based on my interviews. In particular, many of 
the findings above provide further evidence to suggest that increasingly, 
government institutions such as NSIs look to the private sector for ideas 
on how to organise themselves. Big Data is seen to “disrupt” not just 
methods and techniques, but an entire mentality and mindset. In 
explaining what the desired attitude looks like, private businesses are 
regularly taken up as positives examples to be followed. Hackathons, 
data camps and other organisational practices usually associated with 
the private sector are increasingly seen as necessary for government 
institutions as well. 
 
Another key theme in the section above are the discussions about the 
mentality required by register based statistics. Even though, as I have 
previously noted, the context in which NSIs operate is increasingly 
transnational, such discussions do suggest that countries differ in their 
governmental cultures towards issues such as data sharing. In stark 
contrast to the country that identified “departmental data silos” as a major 
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obstacle to unleashing the power of Big Data within its government, my 
respondents at Statistics Finland insisted repeatedly that government 
departments in Finland worked in unison and without major dispute. Due 
to its long experience of register based statistics, and the associated 
mentalities and practices of data sharing between sectors and agencies, 
both public and private, perhaps the Finnish state is better positioned 
than some other to tap in to the affordances of Big Data? This potentially 
also helps to explain why my interviewees at Statistics Finland were 
inclined to see the increasing involvement of the private sector in the 
production of data in more unproblematic terms than what I was 
expecting. Future research must explore in depth ways in which cultural 
differences come to play a role in the public-private partnerships that are 
now increasingly needed due to Big Data. Based on the findings in this 
section, it seems likely that despite the global nature of the phenomenon, 
the opportunities and challenges of Big Data do, to some extent, get their 
local articulations. 
 
6.3.3 Data access, partnerships 
 
In the previous chapter, by analysing in detail Big Data projects that were 
ongoing at Statistics Finland at the time of the research, I suggested that 
Statistics Finland had encountered legal, technical and organisational 
challenges in trying to gain access to more Big Data sources. I 
suggested furthermore that the legal and organisational aspects took 
precedence over the technical questions involved, and that the need to 
build partnerships with different actors was highlighted as a key concern. 
Some of my respondents explained to me that although partnerships had 
been very much part of the previous era of statistics also, the fact that 
they now had to be built with private sector institutions necessitated 
completely new conventions and arrangements. More specifically, 
lobbying efforts were needed on multiple fronts. A senior manager 
explained to me for example that on the side of the lobbying efforts for 
new legislation, which would grant Statistics Finland a more extensive 
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right to access data held by companies, he and some other members of 
the senior management team had devised, what he called “the road 
show”, where they visited different stakeholders explaining to them their 
data access needs. The manager, who defined “the road show” as a 
sales pitch, was also, along with my other respondents, markedly more 
positive about the prospect of increasingly having to form partnerships 
with the private sector, than what I was expecting. I ended the chapter 
by suggesting that the issue was probably far more complex than what I 
was able to discern based on my limited sample. 
 
I was therefore very curious to see how the issue of partnerships was 
taken up in the larger corpus of ARITHMUS data. In addition to 
partnerships, I conducted key word searches on data access and 
ownership in order to gauge further at the aforementioned themes. In the 
end I dropped ownership from the analysis since it did not yield any new 
analytical themes. 
 
6.3.3.1 Data access 
 
One of the things that my respondents underscored to me repeatedly at 
Statistics Finland was the importance of first obtaining access to more 
Big Data sources before discussing at length other issues such as what 
skills might be needed to analyse them. An understanding of the issues 
with Big Data could only be obtained through practical work with the 
novel data sources. Furthermore, in relation to data access, 
considerations about the appropriate legal framework took for my 
respondents precedence over any technical issues that might be needed 
to be overcome. 
 
Mirroring the findings of my interviews, data access is identified as a 
critical issue also at international meetings. At numerous meetings, 
representatives of different NSIs reiterate the centrality of obtaining 
access to more data sources in realising “modernisation” within their 
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institutes. Similarly to my interviewees, issues around data access are 
seen as being tightly connected to questions of legislation and public 
opinion. At one international meeting, for example, a statistician explains 
that because companies often cite legislative concerns as an obstacle 
to data sharing, regulators need to be approached first. Regulators, on 
the other hand, he notes, usually highlight the need for a public debate 
before more legislative powers to NSIs are given. The statistician 
suggest therefore that regulators and companies should be approached 
“carefully” as not to give the impression that the NSIs want to impose 
further regulations on companies. Similarly also to my interviews, 
statisticians from other countries cite experiences where CEOs of 
companies have been markedly more positive about sharing their data 
than employees further down the company hierarchies. Also mimicking 
my interview findings, the point is often made that companies tend to be 
happy to share their data especially after it is no longer economically 
relevant for them, for example after a certain period of time since it’s 
generation has passed.  
 
Other findings help to elaborate on some of the themes of my interviews. 
For example, an issue that gets discussed on numerous occasions is 
whether attempts at gaining access to private sector data should be 
coordinated at the European level. The point is sometimes made that 
because data is increasingly global, so too should attempts at gaining 
access to it be. At one meeting that discusses, amongst other things, an 
international framework for data access principles, the question gets 
raised whether NSIs should be willing to pay companies for the data or 
for the service of providing the data. At this particular meeting the 
consensus is that NSIs should “not pay for data that has a public interest, 
but only for the service of its pre-processing and transmission”. Expertise 
in statistical analysis and quality assurance are often mentioned as 
services that NSIs can offer companies in return for their data. 
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An entirely new theme, one that was not discussed in my interviews, is 
the need to convince also colleagues at NSIs of the usefulness of the 
new data sources. One statistician explains that companies will only 
release their data if they are convinced of its usefulness for NSIs: 
We need to prove to them that we can use it, that it is useful for official 
statistics, only then will they give us the data. (ARITHMUS fieldwork 
notes 2016) 
However, in addition to actors in the “outside world”, such as companies 
and citizens, also colleagues at statistical agencies must be convinced 
of the value of Big Data: 
In this report we have to convince people in our house that this is a 
viable data-source that we need. Then we have to convince the 
outside world that we need this data, that it is important for official 
statistics. (ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
Such internal and external politics therefore requires “showing 
usefulness”, which is defined as involving not studying everything that 
can be produced with a new data source, but focusing instead on 
developing the appropriate methodologies and procedures for a number 
of topics so that the results can be reproduced by other NSIs in other 
countries: 
The main point of the whole [Big Data] project is to “show usefulness”, 
that is what [the funders] are stressing: don’t study all sorts of things 
and say this could be useful, but decide first what you want to do, then 
do it and develop methodologies that can be used by others […] this 
[the final report of the project] should become a reference for other 
countries to go to their data providers and say we need your data. 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
In “demonstrating usefulness”, data visualisation techniques are often 
identified as being a key component. 
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6.3.3.2 Partnerships 
 
The word partnerships yielded by far the most results of all the keyword 
searches that I conducted, which indicates its current prominence in 
official statistics. As one ARITHMUS researcher remarks in her fieldwork 
notes, partnerships seems to increasingly form one of the buzzwords in 
the field. 
 
Numerous policy documents and presentations highlight the strategic 
importance of partnerships as “statistical offices cannot meet the global 
data challenge alone.” (UNECE, 2016b: 3). This is especially the case, 
it often gets noted, since NSIs usually do not possess the (big) data, nor 
the expertise needed in its analysis. Partnerships are furthermore 
required because users too are partners, and in a changing world official 
statistics will only stay up to date if NSIs maintain an awareness of the 
information needs of the people who use their products. In many 
presentations the argument is made that Big Data calls for statistical 
agencies to reflect on their role in society and that an important part of 
this is to acknowledge the importance of forming partnerships with actors 
who at one point might have been seen solely as competitors. One 
presenter at an international conference suggests that in addition to 
gaining a better understanding of user priorities, by forming partnerships 
NSIs can gain “knowledge of technology”, “clues for future standards and 
concepts”, “a higher position in society” and the chance to “achieve goals 
that could not be realised alone”. 
 
Similarly to my interviews, in many of the documents in the ARITHMUS 
database the point is made that although the technical issues of data 
analysis are without a doubt challenging, they are usually secondary to 
the challenges in establishing access to data sources. In many cases, it 
is noted, Big Data projects exist only if a working partnership with a data 
provider can be forged. Hackathons, which I already mentioned in a 
previous section, and training bootcamps, are sometimes taken up as 
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examples of organisational arrangements through which partnerships 
with private actors such as start-ups can be formed. As I mentioned 
already previously, it is interesting that such practices, long used in the 
private sector, are currently being appropriated by governments also. 
 
Similarly to the discussions around data access in the previous section, 
also in relation to partnerships the global nature of the issue is identified. 
At international meetings the point is regularly made that since the 
devices and data are not based in countries, but are international, 
partnerships must also be international and therefore established as part 
of intergovernmental processes. One of the numerous strategy 
documents on partnerships for example proposes that for multinational 
data sources “an intergovernmental group should work to forge 
partnership agreements that can be used by all statistical organizations”.  
 (UNECE, 2014a: 18). 
 
Some of the fieldwork notes collected at the supra-national statistical 
organisations suggest also that the global nature of Big Data is 
rearranging the relationship between the NSIs and the supra-national 
organisations, such as Eurostat, that increasingly set the broader 
parameters for their work. If for example partnerships were to be 
increasingly arranged at the supra-national level, this would inevitably 
take some autonomy away from the NSIs. In such discussions, however, 
statisticians at the international organisations often stress the 
importance of involving the NSIs in any negotiations with the private 
sector. According to a Eurostat statistician, every country that 
participates in such negotiations can enhance some aspect of the 
production of Big Data statistics, not least due to their knowledge of 
national peculiarities and circumstances. He explains: 
We do not go to [private company] without for example Statistics 
Belgium. So they are engaged. But of course whatever we learn now 
from this exercise we can easily export it to Germany. Maybe in 
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Germany there are some more peculiarities but so they will see that a 
lot of the investment they do not need to do. This is already an 
advantage for them to jump onto a train. But we always learn, they 
may have some greater ideas to improve certain things. We cannot 
claim that whatever we are going to produce now is perfect so every 
country that joins can enhance certain aspects of the production. 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
Best practices in forming partnerships are debated extensively at 
international meetings. Many statisticians suggest that the starting point 
in forming them should be to identify what benefits they can yield for 
different stakeholders, especially since, as one ARITHMUS researcher 
documents in her fieldwork notes, “recognizing [the] capabilities of 
different partners can lead to win-win situations”. Different stakeholders, 
it is sometimes noted, have different interests, and the key to success is 
in effectively communicating what NSIs can offer. On numerous 
occasions, the argument is made that the best way to approach private 
businesses is to emphasise the social good aspects of statistics to them. 
One strategy document (UNECE, 2016b: 4), for example, points out that 
“increasingly, with globalisation of information industries comes 
corporate social responsibility – a desire to improve lives and be seen to 
improve lives beyond the narrow impact of a particular commercial 
service or product”, and that this is something that NSIs must tap into. 
 
In addition, a successful strategy involves emphasising the mutual 
benefits of partnerships. Besides the social good aspect, NSIs can for 
example offer companies, amongst other things, expertise in handling 
and interpreting data, a “treasure chest” of existing data and information 
sets, a reputation for quality and independence, and a collection point 
for sensitive data. As one keynote speaker at an international conference 
frames the issue, NSIs advantages includes being seen as the “good, 
trustworthy data professionals” who also happen to have good 
connections to policy makers. Another point that is often made is that 
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because companies already rely heavily in their operations on the data 
produced by the NSIs, one approach to partnerships is to agree to offer 
companies tailored data products in return for access to data. By drawing 
on experiences from one case study, the point is made that the challenge 
in this is in getting the companies to realise that NSIs can enrich their 
data and thereby potentially help them in commercialising it. In such 
discussions, personal relationships between representatives of NSIs 
and companies are identified as being key. Statisticians are however 
keenly aware that in some cases, the benefits of partnerships might be 
experienced only by the NSIs. In such cases, financial compensation for 
the work involved is suggested as being appropriate. As I previously 
mentioned however, money should only be paid for the service of 
providing the data, and not the data itself. 
 
At one international meeting an interesting debate takes place on the 
topic of finding the correct balance between establishing partnerships 
and enforcing legal coercion. A representative of a European NSI sites 
their experience where half of the companies they wanted to form 
partnerships with declined because the types of analyses the NSI was 
offering  in return for data were already being provided to the companies 
in a much more detailed form by private market research agencies. The 
NSI in question therefore decided to seek to enact legislation in order to 
gain access to the data held by the companies. The representative of 
the NSI therefore raises the question whether partnerships are sufficient, 
or whether NSIs will increasingly have to seek to enact coercive legal 
frameworks in order to gain access to data. In the debate that follows the 
point is made that extending the legislative powers of NSIs requires 
public debate, and that caution should be exercised so as not to 
jeopardise the public trust upon which the NSIs depend on. “From a trust 
building point of view”, it is noted, “partnership agreements seem to be 
the better approach”. 
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In addition to differing interests and asymmetries in rewards, cultural 
factors are identified as another potential obstacle to partnerships. One 
presenter at an international conference reminisces that even though 
partnerships are in principle nothing new to NSIs, even as recently as a 
decade ago academic researchers requesting data access were 
considered “intruders”. Another presenter suggests that NSIs have taken 
the principle of independence “to an art form”, which has resulted in an 
isolation where NSIs are unable to recognise the mutual interests that 
they might have with others. Limited resources of NSIs and inflated 
expectations are identified as yet another set of challenges that NSIs 
face when forming partnerships. Furthermore, difficult situations are said 
to arise in situations where some companies are more open to 
collaboration than others. In relation to mobile phone data, for example, 
national markets are usually controlled by a number of players, and full 
coverage of mobile phone data therefore means forming partnerships 
with all of them, which has often proved difficult. 
  
As I mentioned at the start of this section, my respondents at Statistics 
Finland were markedly more positive about the prospect of increasingly 
having to collaborate with the private sector than what I was expecting. 
I ended the previous chapter by suggesting that the issue was probably 
far more complex than what I was able to uncover based on my sample. 
The ARITHMUS database is particularly useful in shedding more light 
on this topic. 
 
Different NSIs cite for example numerous issues that they have 
encountered when trying to form partnerships with different actors. 
Private gain and public good are recognised as sometimes being in 
conflict with each other, especially since companies operate in 
competitive markets where they might at some point be forced to seek 
financial compensation for their data in order to stay competitive. At one 
international meeting the question is raised whether “public good” truly 
is a motivating factor for companies. It is agreed that although many 
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companies recognise the importance of corporate social responsibility, 
it is rarely part of their core business models. Partnerships are therefore 
conceded to often require business cases that go beyond promises of 
collective contributions to the greater good. 
 
In relation to the issue of offering services in return for data, numerous 
questions are raised. With their limited resources NSIs “can’t do 
everything” and the prospect of offering to evaluate companies’ data in 
return for accessing it might therefore in practice be unrealistic, some 
statisticians strongly feel. The issue gets also raised that by offering 
services in return for data, NSIs might end up interfering with markets. 
In practice therefore any service that NSIs would be willing to offer to 
one company, they would have to be willing to offer to all other 
companies as well. The analytical point that I draw from this is that the 
prospect of increasingly having to partner with private actors in order to 
obtain access to Big Data raises some very important questions about 
the independence and impartiality of NSIs. 
 
Finally, some of the material in the ARITHMUS database raises 
questions about how comfortable NSIs actually are with the increasing 
involvement of private actors in the production and management of data. 
In one country, where a private data contractor has been able to obtain 
a position as a mediator between companies and public sector 
institutions wanting to gain access to their data, a statistician admits 
feeling “threatened” by the company. She notes that this company 
already provides statistics directly to various public sector institutions, 
and that recently the company has tried to sell their statistical products 
even to the NSI. She therefore feels that by subcontracting tasks to the 
company, NSIs are allowing it to enter their “turf”: 
They are conquering our turf. They already do statistics for the police, 
for the road traffic office, for the […] central bank, for municipalities 
[…] and now they even want to sell us their statistics. […] there is also 
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the view that we should not give money to private companies like […] 
we are making them stronger […] we are getting the money and we 
should use it but instead we give it to them and then they go to the 
[companies] and get the data and then they will produce the statistics, 
not us. (ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
Offering money to the private contractor is therefore in her opinion not 
the correct way forward, because she feels that as the statistical office, 
they should be the ones producing the statistics and not private 
companies: 
This is not the way we should go that we buy statistics from them […] 
we are the statistical office […] we should produce the statistics. 
(ARITHMUS fieldwork notes 2016) 
The analysis in this final section has again yielded many similar findings 
to what I was able to discover based solely on my fieldwork at Statistics 
Finland. Obtaining access to more Big Data sources is identified as a 
key concern also at the international level, and the way to secure them 
is by forming partnerships with actors that previously might have been 
considered purely as competitors. In forming such partnerships, NSIs 
are advised to emphasise the public good aspect of official statistics. 
Numerous mutual benefits of such partnerships are also recognised, 
such as NSIs long established experience in quality assurance, which 
they can offer companies in return for their data. 
 
In contrast to the markedly positive outlook of my interviewees, however, 
numerous issues are identified at other NSIs and at international 
meetings. It is for example recognised that although modern companies 
care about corporate social responsibility, it is usually not part of their 
core business model. Therefore, it is conceded that NSIs might 
increasingly have to offer services in return for data access, which again 
raises its own set of issues, not least the risks to the impartiality and 
independence of NSIs that it poses. Finally, some of the fieldwork 
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findings of the other ARITHMUS researchers suggest that, in contrast to 
what my fieldwork material indicated, statisticians are far from 
comfortable with the increasing involvement of private actors in the 
production and management of statistics. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have situated developments at Statistics Finland in the 
transnational field of statistics of which it is part. Many of the findings that 
I have uncovered bear close resemblance to the findings of my previous 
chapter, thus highlighting the transnational, rather than national, 
character of official statistics, Big Data and processes of 
neoliberalisation. The analysis has highlighted numerous examples of 
ways in which struggles over the meaning and impact of issues such as 
Big Data in official statistics are “not delineated by national interests and 
practices […] but part of transnational negotiations, contestations and 
tensions that cut across numerous NSIs and international statistical 
organisations” (Grommé et al., Forthcoming: 2). Importantly, the analysis 
has provided further support to the finding that a prominent way in which 
NSIs are responding to the perceived challenge of Big Data is by 
adopting private sector mentalities, rationalities, and practices also 
within their institutes. Furthermore, often these developments are being 
pushed by the supra-national organisations, and in ways that raise 
discontent in the NSIs who must see the projects through in practice 
often amidst cuts to their general budgets. Following the conceptual 
starting point of this thesis, these findings can be viewed as examples of 
processes whereby the production of statistics is undergoing 
transformations in conjunction with broader political changes, such as 
neoliberal drives to not only reduce the sizes of state agencies, but to 
make them operate more like actors in the private sector. Future 
research much disentangle in detail the different agendas and objectives 
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of the stakeholders that are currently participating in the struggle over 
the meaning of Big Data for official statistics. 
 
In addition to pointing out similarities between places, however, the 
analysis has highlighted potential points of divergence in how the 
challenge of Big Data is being taken up across countries. Specifically, 
some of the findings in this chapter suggest that NSIs in countries with 
established traditions in register based statistics not only approach the 
issue of defining Big Data differently, but also view the partnerships with 
the private sector often necessitated by it in a more positive light than 
others. Due to the many similarities between population registers and 
Big Data noted also by my interviewees, it is possible that countries 
whose statistical systems rely mainly on registers are better placed to 
integrate Big Data sources into their production. As Peck and Tickell 
(2002: 383–384) point out, processes of neoliberalisation are neither 
monolithic in form nor universal in effect. Although similar processes can 
be identified across diverse contexts and circumstances, this does not 
mean that they necessarily lead to a convergence of outcomes, “a 
neoliberalised end of history and geography”. As I covered in detail in 
chapter three, the register based statistical system was made possible 
not just by technological advances, but also by a set of specific social, 
political, and historical circumstances. In light of this it would be 
surprising if local conditions would play no role in how Big Data is being 
taken up and addressed in different countries. Future research must 
explore and contrast in more detail local articulations of the significance 
and meaning of Big Data for official statistics. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, this chapter has problematised many aspects 
of the increasing involvement of private actors in the production of data. 
In stark contrast to the narratives of my previous chapter, an examination 
of the larger corpus of ARITHMUS data has revealed that official 
statisticians are in fact far from comfortable with the idea of increasingly 
having to partner with private actors in order to gain access to data. 
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Instead of viewing them solely as potential partners in the advancement 
of social goods, private companies are also sometimes seen as direct 
competitors. 
 
Some of the findings of this chapter furthermore raise questions about 
the  appropriateness of NSIs current responses to Big Data. Due to their 
role as impartial providers of factual knowledge of societies, not least to 
ensure democratic accountability, NSIs cannot in the end be just one 
seller and buyer of data in a market place of a plethora of data producers. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, there are ways in which functioning 
like a market actor is likely to come into conflict with the principles of 
impartiality and independence that NSIs role in society is predicated 
upon. NSIs response to Big Data must therefore, in the long run, 
necessarily go beyond appropriating the practices, mentalities and 
rationalities of the private data conglomerates. As Letouzé and Jütting 
(2014: 15) put it, due to the inherently political nature of the “data 
revolution” currently underway, engaging in the debates over data 
ownership and control is for NSIs “not a technical consideration but a 
political obligation”. In the next and concluding chapter, I will provide 
some reflections on what this might mean, and propose directions for 
further research. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
In this thesis, I have explored the meaning and significance of Big Data 
from the viewpoint of states, which for long held a near monopoly on the 
production of statistics concerning whole populations, territories, and 
societies. By doing so, I have provided one response to the call for 
research on Big Data articulated by Kitchin (2014b) amongst others. I 
have contributed to both our empirical and conceptual understanding of 
Big Data and the so called data revolution of which it is part. 
 
Instead of starting from a technical definition, I began the analysis by 
exploring the literature around the history of statistics and its sociological 
interpretations. From this analysis emerged the conceptual starting point 
of this thesis: that historically, statistics have emerged out of a co-
constitutive interaction between methodological and technological 
developments and changes in the political and administrative world 
(Desrosières, 1998). By exploring different historical configurations of 
this co-constitution, I demonstrated how advances in statistics have 
often been closely linked to changing governmental rationalities 
particularly concerning the question how to best address social issues 
and to regulate society more broadly. 
 
By exploring historical configurations of this co-constitution in Finland, I 
suggested that the production of data on which statistics have relied has 
often been monopolised by dominant institutions, first of the church and 
later the nation state. I argued furthermore that the increasing production 
of data by private corporations signals a historical shift whereby the 
production of data has potentially started to move away from its historical 
basis in states. Following Alastalo (2009b), I demonstrated examples of 
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the numerous ways in which data production in the period of welfare 
states has been predicated upon social welfarist governmental 
concerns. 
 
Building on the framework of co-constitution, I then situated Big Data in 
the context of contemporary political economy and argued that its 
emergence reflects broader processes of and rationalities of 
neoliberalisation that have gained increasing prominence in western 
polities in the past few decades, particularly in the sense that much of 
Big Data is currently being produced and accumulating in the private, 
rather than the public sector. I suggested that as a result, data production 
is increasingly becoming underpinned by capitalist objectives and 
rationales. 
 
By exploring responses to and experiments with Big Data both at 
Statistics Finland and within the transnational field of statistics of which 
it is part, I suggested that the increasing production of data in the private 
sector based on market and profit rationalities is changing and 
challenging how NSIs conceive of how they produce data for official 
statistics. I suggested that a prominent way in which NSIs are 
responding to the perceived challenge of Big Data is by adopting 
neoliberal rationalities and mentalities in their practices. I argued that 
there are ways in which these rationalities are likely to come into conflict 
with the social welfarist concerns that for long have underpinned the 
production of official statistics, at least in welfare states such as Finland. 
 
I will conclude this thesis by first, proposing a set of broader analytical 
themes that follow from my findings, and second, by highlighting issues 
and concerns that I have not been able to attend to within the remits of 
this study, and that must therefore be addressed in future research. 
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7.2 Analytical themes raised by the research 
 
7.2.1 Big Data is an outcome of how its production is organised 
 
Conceptually, this thesis has reinforced the importance of understanding 
and studying Big Data, not only as a technical object, but also a socially 
produced entity. Numerous accounts, both popular and academic, have 
taken up Big Data solely as a technical object, locating its newness in its 
technical qualities such as the 3Vs of Volume, Variety and Velocity. 
Sometimes accompanying such analyses has been the claim that in 
contrast to previous forms of data, Big Data occurs “naturally” without 
intervention from human subjects such as researchers. In contrast to 
surveys, which reflect what people say they do or think, Big Data is 
claimed to be based on direct measurements of phenomenon and 
therefore reflective of “actual” transactions, interactions and behaviour 
of people, societies, and economies. 
 
My analysis does not support such views. Following Ruppert (2016), I 
approached Big Data as an emerging field of data practices that include 
“not only technologies and people but also norms, values, conventions 
and rules” (Ruppert, 2016: 2–3) and that together are generative of the 
sometimes novel qualities of Big Data. To move beyond attempts to 
define Big Data through its technical qualities, I sought a way to analyse 
some of these different elements and their interactions. In relation to the 
concerns about the future of empirical sociology raised by Savage and 
Burrows (2007), it is difficult to imagine many topics where social 
scientific reflections and approaches are currently more sorely needed. 
 
What my analysis showed was that in marked contrast to the hype, Big 
Data cannot necessarily be easily defined based on its technical 
qualities. My respondents identified numerous similarities between old 
and new forms of data, specifically between administrative registers and 
Big Data. Importantly, both were originally created for purposes other 
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than official statistics, and had to therefore be cleaned and conjoined 
before they could be used. Since both were also generated outside of 
Statistics Finland, they necessitated arrangements and agreements with 
a variety of stakeholders. In very concrete ways therefore, what data 
constituted in both of these cases depended not only on the technologies 
used to produce them, but also on sets of arrangements made between 
different stakeholders. 
 
Based on both a conceptual and an empirical analysis, I suggested that 
in an age of Big Data, the content of official statistics is likely to be 
increasingly influenced not by the motifs and rationales of government 
departments, as has been the case in the period of register based 
statistics (Alastalo, 2009b), but by those of private corporations. 
Furthermore, I suggested that a prominent way in which NSIs are 
responding to the perceived challenge of Big Data is by adopting the 
rationalities and mindsets of the private companies that have gained 
increasing prominence in terms of its production. Following the 
conceptual framework that society and statistics are co-constituted, I 
suggested that this reflects recent trends towards neoliberalism in 
western polities in that the production of official statistics is potentially 
becoming increasingly underpinned by neoliberal, rather than social 
welfarist, principles. 
 
I must highlight the role of human agency in all of this. Not only is Big 
Data an outcome of how its production is organised, but how its 
production is organised is a question for humans to decide. Arguably, 
this question forms one of the most pressing political concerns of our 
time. 
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7.2.2 How the production of Big Data is organised is one of the 
most pressing political concerns of our time 
 
Throughout this thesis I have advocated and sought to practice a critical 
attitude towards some of the claims that have been made about the 
socially transformative powers of digital technologies. Nevertheless, it 
seems safe to assume that digital data is becoming ever more central to 
the running of capitalist businesses, governments and societies more 
generally. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 182) are clearly on the 
right track when they claim that: “Data is to the information society what 
fuel was to the industrial economy: the critical resource powering the 
innovations that people rely on.” 
 
What follows from this is that data is an increasingly important source of 
social power, and that is why we must be concerned about its distribution 
and control. One of the things that I have argued in this thesis is that at 
least in Finland, data concerning societies has historically been 
produced by the dominant institution of its time. Reflecting on some of 
the key findings of this thesis, how much authority over the production 
and management of data concerning societies should be given to private 
companies? On other hand, and connected to this, what should the role 
of the state be? Based on the historical analysis in chapter three, I 
suggested that the extensive governmental data collection system in 
Finland was made possible by a high level of trust towards the state, and 
that it is not inconceivable that this trust could be lost in the future. Since 
trust towards the state is historically formed, it is interesting to speculate 
what will happen to this trust as a result of the processes of 
neoliberalisation that my analysis too has highlighted. If, following recent 
political trends, the state is increasingly seen as a burden, rather than 
an enabler and facilitator of things, will citizens still be happy to trust it 
with their data? Or should, following neoliberal principles, all of the 
production and management of Big Data be left to the private sector? 
What will the legitimacy of a neoliberalised state versus privately owned 
240 
 
multinational companies be in the future? For the past decades many 
have vocally argued that markets are the best way to organise things, 
and this surely will have an impact on our ability to imagine alternative 
Big Data futures as well. 
 
Clearly neither capitalist businesses nor states should be idealised. 
Nevertheless, I do believe that some of the findings in this thesis suggest 
that states must continue to have a central role in managing and 
regulating data also in the future. In marked contrast to businesses, NSIs 
are at least in principle democratically overseen. They are usually part 
of state departments which are, at least at the level of principle, run by 
elected politicians. But who regulates Google and Facebook, two prime 
examples of Big Data companies that increasingly seem to operate 
beyond and above national governments? It seems that often this role is 
left to the market, and the market only. One wonders how feasible this 
arrangement will be in the long run as these companies continue to 
amass more data, power and responsibility. 
 
Furthermore, my analysis suggests that there are ways in which the 
need to turn in profits conflicts with a desire to share data for the greater 
good. Private businesses exist only as far as they are able turn in a profit, 
and any other considerations must therefore come second to them. 
Profits are the very precondition of their existence, and the ability to 
generate them are increasingly tied to the data that they possess. But 
due to the data that now accumulates especially in the large technology 
companies, it seems likely that they will start to obtain roles and 
responsibilities that have previously been under the jurisdiction of the 
democratic state. The question about the future role of NSIs therefore 
cannot be separated from larger questions about the types of polities 
that we want to live in in the future. What might alternative Big Data 
futures look like then? 
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7.2.3 The end of new dawn of Social Democracy? 
 
As Ruppert (2015) points out, Big Data is a collective accomplishment 
of connected and interdependent peoples and technologies. Big Data is, 
in other words, made possible not just because of entrepreneurial 
individuals such as Mark Zuckerberg and Steve Jobs, but because 
billions of people share their lives on commercial platforms provided by 
them. If we accept that Big Data is socially produced, then surely it is not 
unreasonable to demand that so too should its benefits be? Based on 
my analysis, it seems difficult to claim that these benefits are currently 
shared very fairly or effectively. Instead, reflecting broader trends in 
western political economies, Big Data seems to increasingly function as 
the generator of the unnatural riches of a handful of individuals and their 
families. A world dominated by a few multinational corporations surely 
cannot be the best thing that we can imagine of our Big Data futures. 
 
In order to avoid the dystopian scenario depicted in The Circle that I 
started this thesis with, therefore, what we must urgently do is to start to 
cultivate Social Democratic Big Data imaginations. Although their 
precise form is difficult to pin down, the question about the future role of 
the NSI must form a central component of such debates. Morozov (2017) 
for example points out that although in order to exploit all the insights 
from Big Data it needs to be accumulated in to one entity, this does not 
mean that that entity must be a big technology firm. He proposes that 
instead, all the nation’s data could, for example, accrue to a national data 
fund, co-owned by all citizens (or, in the case of a pan-European fund, 
by Europeans). Companies that want to build new services on top of 
data would then have to pay a corresponding share of their profits for 
using it. It is difficult to imagine anyone better suited to run such a data 
fund that the NSIs with their centuries of experience of handling sensitive 
data. Based on the analysis that I have conducted in this thesis, we could 
claim that they have in fact been running one already until now, and that 
it would therefore be only natural for them to continue to do so also in 
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the future. In important ways therefore, the future of Social Democracy 
and the future of NSIs are intertwined. 
 
I conclude this thesis by highlighting issues and concerns that I have not 
been able to attend to within the remit of this study, and that therefore 
must be addressed in future research. 
 
7.3 Directions for future research 
 
A major limitation of this study is that it explores the stakes and 
challenges with Big Data almost exclusively from the viewpoint of just 
one stakeholder, official statistics. But as I have argued repeatedly, 
numerous stakeholders are implicated by Big Data, and they collectively 
produce what Big Data becomes. I have been able to highlight what the 
challenges with Big Data are for NSIs, but how do for example 
companies or legislators view them? Because my fieldwork has centred 
upon Statistics Finland, my coverage of companies’ views on Big Data 
has been limited to second hand sources. In contrast, an important next 
step would be to hear their views directly. Therefore, large scale 
research on the social production of Big Data is urgently needed. 
 
Within such a remit, I would propose a multi-sited ethnography where 
Big Data analytics are used to map and visualise the different 
stakeholders involved in the production of Big Data. Ideally, such a study 
would consist of four or five different units of analysis, for example 
countries, where one researcher would be assigned to each. The project 
could start by mapping the historical trajectory of statistics in each 
country, much like what I have done. In the next stage, key stakeholders 
in Big Data would be identified, potentially with the assistance of large 
scale data analysis techniques. Previous studies have for example 
identified key stakeholders within professional fields using Twitter data 
(Puhakka, 2014), and I see a potential to do something similar in relation 
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to the different actors who have a stake in Big Data. 
 
After having identified and mapped the different stakeholders, the next 
phase of the project would consist of the researchers systematically 
seeking to interview them. These stakeholders would include, but not be 
limited to, officials in key government departments, politicians, data 
protection legislators, CEOs and personnel at various companies, and 
representatives of other non-governmental organizations. By working 
with a comparative approach from the very beginning, the project could 
highlight how Big Data does or does not get local articulations depending 
on the different histories and political circumstances in different 
countries. 
 
With such an approach, it would be possible to give a more rounded 
picture of the ways in which Big Data currently challenges different 
institutions. And by understanding the stakes and challenges involved 
for different actors, rather than just one or two of them, we would be 
better placed to construct frameworks and principles through which we 
will be able to unleash the power of Big Data for the advancement of 
common, rather than private, purposes. 
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